




Blame Avoidance  
in Government Communication 
 
An exploratory study of the defensive discursive strategies 
used by government communicators in the United Kingdom  






A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
 







I declare that this thesis is my own work, and has not been submitted in substantially 






Governments’ policies and actions often precipitate public blame firestorms and 
mediated scandals targeted at individual or collectiv  policy makers. In the face of 
losing credibility and resources, officeholders are tempted to apply strategies of blame 
avoidance which permeate administrative structures, operations, and language use. 
Linguistic aspects of blame avoidance are yet to be studied by discourse analysts in 
great detail. It is necessary to develop a more sophi ticated, context-sensitive 
understanding of how blame avoidance affects public communication practices of 
governments, because certain defensive ways of communicating may curb democratic 
deliberation in society. 
In this thesis, I propose a systematic approach to identifying and interpreting 
defensive discursive strategies adopted by government communicators in the 
circumstances of blame risk. I do this by engaging with a set of recent empirical data 
(samples of text, talk, and images produced by the British government at critical 
moments in the aftermath of the financial crisis of the late 2000s; field data from the 
backstage of British government communication), and integrating political science 
literature on the politics of blame avoidance with the linguistically rooted discourse-
historical approach to the study of social problems. 
I show how reactive and anticipative blame avoidance i  government communication 
involves the use of particular strategies of arguin, framing, denying, representing 
social actors and actions, legitimating, and discurive manipulation. I argue that 
officeholders’ discursive practices of blame avoidance should be interpreted in 
relation to various conceptualisations of ‘governmet communication’, understood 
within the frames of a discursively constructed ‘blame game’, and analysed as 
multimodal defensive performances. 
This is a multidisciplinary exploratory study that I hope will open up new avenues for 
future research into government blame games, and, more broadly, into blame 
phenomena in political and organisational life. 
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Over many centuries, numerous helpful ‘check lists’ have been devised by various 
authors who have sought to inform and educate the public about the (mis)uses of 
language in public life. An early case in point is the 4th century B.C. On Rhetoric, 
where Aristotle (2007) made a seminal distinction between three forms of persuasion 
– appeals to character, emotions, and reason (ethos, pathos, and logos) – used in 
speech situations. Aristotle wanted his students to learn how to recognise when a 
speaker was trying to manipulate them, and this threefold model provided a useful 
starting point for discussions about the nature of civic discourse and its uses for good 
or ill.  
In The Book of Fallacies, English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1824) listed around 
50 ‘political fallacies’ that in his view characterised the British parliamentary 
discourse at the beginning of the 19th century. This work was explicitly motivated by 
his hope that when people become aware of and alert to the ‘fallaciousness’ (from 
Bentham’s utilitarian perspective) of the rhetorical moves employed by the Members 
of Parliament to block certain radical reforms, such ‘misuse’ of language would 
become obsolete and the reforms would go ahead.  
Between 1937–1942, several lists of propaganda techniques were compiled and widely 
distributed in the U.S. by an organisation called the Institute for Propaganda Anlysis. 
The aim of the Institute was to teach American citizens to recognise and ‘deal with’ 
Nazi propaganda. The most well-known list contained descriptions of seven common 
propaganda ‘tricks’, which were given memorable names, such as ‘Glittering 
Generality’ and ‘Band Wagon’ (see Marlin, 2002, pp.102–106).  
After the end of the Second World War, English author and critic George Orwell 
(1968) published an essay “Politics and the English Language” where he famously 
lamented that political speech and writing at the time was “designed to make lies 
sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure 
wind” (p. 139). He listed and described “various of the tricks by means of which the 
work of prose-construction is habitually dodged” (Orwell, 1968, p. 130), such as the 




and avoiding such usages would enable his readers ‘think more clearly’ and thereby 
bring about ‘political regeneration’. 
Over the past decades, the proponents of critical linguistics and critical discourse 
studies have produced various heuristic devices1 – models or outlines of ideal types – 
that focus on distinct formal properties of texts to illuminate the (often subtle) ways in 
which the political elites and media personalities use language to belittle 
vulnerable/minority groups and exclude them from having a say in public debates. For 
example, Ruth Wodak (2011, 2015) has outlined five general types of discursive 
strategies that are commonly used in political life for the purpose of positive self- and 
negative other-presentation. (I will discuss these in detail later in section 3.2). Critical 
studies of political discourse seek to provide citizens with the resources for building 
critical language awareness that is essential for comprehending the linguistically 
mediated power in contemporary societies. 
Given that power relations work increasingly at an implicit level through 
language, and given that language practices are incasingly targets for 
intervention and control, a critical awareness of language is a prerequisite for 
effective citizenship, and a democratic entitlement. (Fairclough, 2013, p. 534) 
What I am trying to do in this thesis bears a similarity to these works. Just like the 
authors mentioned above, I am ultimately hoping to contribute to improving citizens’ 
lives by educating them about the possible effects of particular ways of symbolic 
expression in public life (i.e., civic discourse). However, I have chosen a specific 
focus that sets this thesis apart from previous works that seek to promote critical 
language awareness: I attempt to integrate the contemporary methods of discourse 
studies with current knowledge of administrative blame avoidance to improve our 
understanding of the ways in which language and other symbolic resources are used 
by modern government communicators for the purpose of holding on to power.  
                                               
1 The term ‘heuristic’ derives from ancient Greek word heuriskein, meaning ‘to find’ or ‘discover’. In 
the social sciences, a heuristic device is understood as an analytical tool, often in the form of a model, 
diagram, or metaphor, which helps to discover particular social phenomena and relations between them. 
Heuristic devices ‘tell’ researchers ‘what to look f r’ as they interact with their data, and provide ‘sign 




Why is this relevant? If we assume that in modern pluralist democracies government 
outsiders should be able to participate in shaping their political and social world, then 
one of the preconditions for this is the capacity to assess the behaviour of public 
officeholders, including the ways in which they make and deliver policies, arrange 
government institutions, and communicate with the public. When officeholders’ 
behaviour does not satisfy the purposes and needs of citizens, the latter should be able 
to challenge and possibly change the circumstances i  which they find themselves. 
This may be achieved by expressing discontent with officeholders’ actions – that is, 
by blaming them – thereby forcing them to either leave their office or to modify their 
behaviour. To hold on to power, officeholders may try to use language in such ways 
that would impair or bias the public understanding of (potentially) harmful events and 
their causes, and derail or block debates over blame issues. When government 
outsiders become proficient in spotting such (often subtle) moves, they can gain a 
more adequate understanding of the situation and avoi  being manipulated. 
As will become clear in the course of the following chapters, defensive 
communicative behaviour in government is a complex social phenomenon. In modern 
democracies, communication with the public is widely seen as a core activity of the 
executive government. Citizens expect to have some acc ss to information regarding 
the workings of the public administrators and to be a le to engage in some form of 
interaction with those in power to influence their behaviour. This arguably constitutes 
a minimal prerequisite of ‘democracy’ as a form of g vernment characterised as ‘rule 
by the people’.2 Politicians working in executive offices are expected to talk and listen 
to their constituents. And most government institutions employ communication 
professionals, who are explicitly tasked with establishing and maintaining 
relationships with people and organisations that are external to the institution and, as a 
minimum, informing them of certain policies, decisions, and actions of their 
organisation that affect people’s lives. However, in dealing with issues revolving 
around clashes of interests, struggles for power, and v rious risks and crises, 
governments are unavoidably positioned in the middle of a plurality of conflicts and 
dilemmas. Governments’ policies and actions often preci itate public blame 
firestorms and mediated scandals, propagated by their int rnal or external adversaries 
                                               
2 For a concise discussion regarding the ambiguity of he concept of ‘rule by the people’, see, for 




and targeted at individual or collective policy makers. In the face of losing credibility 
and power, officeholders are tempted to apply strategies of blame avoidance that 
permeate administrative structures, operations, and language use (Hood, 2011). For 
example, officeholders may try to avoid blame by delegating potentially offensive 
tasks to suitable ‘scapegoats’, by establishing rigid working routines that minimise 
individual discretion and seemingly ‘diffuse’ blame when something goes wrong, and 
by evading blame-implicating questions posed by the press. While such strategic 
behaviour may help officeholders to hold on to their job and income, sustain the 
functioning of their organisation and, more broadly, preserve the existing social order, 
this may not always be beneficial from the perspectiv  of government outsiders whose 
interests and concerns are thereby disregarded. 
All governments can be conceived of as busy playgrounds of a variety of ‘blame 
games’ – performances designed to attribute blame to someone or to deflect blame 
from someone for causing something negative. The public communication practices of 
a government within a blame game may either encourage or discourage social learning, 
that is, the processes by which people both in- and outside of government make sense 
of each other’s perspectives and attitudes, gain moral insight, and reproduce shared 
meaning. Surprisingly, however, the intersection of g vernment communication and 
blame avoidance has received rather limited academic attention. Scholars of political 
communication have paid most attention to election campaigns and presidential 
rhetoric in the United States, often neglecting the discursive analysis of other contexts 
of government communication (Canel & Sanders, 2013). There is a body of political 
science literature that deals with the ‘politics of blame avoidance’ (e.g., Hood, 2002, 
2011; Stone, 1989; Weaver, 1986) and a body of literature informed by sociology of 
media and communication that deals with various mediat  ‘blame phenomena’ like 
political scandals and organisational crises (e.g., Thompson, 2000; Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, 
& Sundelius, 2005; Entman, 2012). And indeed, there are many studies that provide 
insights into what may be broadly categorised as ‘defensive communicative behaviour’ 
covering topics such as face-work and remedial interchanges (e.g., Goffman, 1969, 
1981), accounting, apologia and excuses (e.g., Scott & Lyman, 1968; Ware & 
Linkugel, 1973; Ryan, 1982; Buttny, 1993; Benoit, 1995), evading, sidestepping and 
agenda-shifting (Galasiński, 2000; Clayman & Heritage, 2002), legitimising (van 




However, to date, there are no substantial empirical works within (critical) discourse 
studies that focus specifically on dissecting blame avoidance in government 
communication – notwithstanding that most democrati governments engage in public 
communication practices that habitually involve dealing with issues of blame. My 
thesis is a step towards filling this gap in our knowledge. 
1.1 What this thesis is about and what it is not about 
The impetus for writing this thesis arose from a combination of keen personal interest 
and a lucky coincidence. I had previously studied media and journalism, and worked 
as a civil servant, and was fascinated by what I saw as conflictual aspects or paradoxes 
of government communication. It seemed that while governments were obsessed with 
‘building trust’ through public communication, it was taken for granted in Western 
democracies that people are generally distrustful of administrators and their messages. 
It also seemed that while civil servants who spoke n behalf of their government 
claimed to be open, impartial and ‘politically neutral’ in their actions, governments 
were often perceived by outsiders to be ‘miscommunicating’ and ‘spin doctoring’, or 
perhaps even habitually lying. Governments and indiv dual officeholders seemed to be, 
on the one hand, resourceful agents with considerable power over people’s lives, and, 
on the other hand, self-evident targets of choice for blame attacks by news media and 
critical commentators of all sorts. I believed that government communicators faced 
several difficult dilemmas in their work, and that these were not always explicitly 
discussed. As I searched for literature dealing specifically with such aspects of 
government communication, there seemed to be very few scholars who addressed 
these issues in detail. 
But then, rather coincidentally, I happened to read two interesting and insightful books 
at the same time. One of these was Di course of Politics in Action by linguist Ruth 
Wodak (2011) and the other one The Blame Game by political scientist Christopher 
Hood (2011). As I was reading these monographs, I recognised and enthusiastically 
agreed with many of their central ideas.  
Hood wrote about blame avoidance as a useful angle from which to interpret the 
behaviour of government officeholders. He conceptualised blaming as an activity with 




certain time, and attributing agency for causing that loss to some individual or entity 
(blame taker). Hence, blame avoidance as an activity involves attempts by 
government officeholders as (potential) blame takers to manipulate others’ perception 
of loss and agency to limit the risks related to receiving blame from them (e.g., social 
embarrassment, losing one’s job). Hood claimed that once you start looking for 
instances of blame avoidance then you seem to find these almost everywhere in public 
administration: in the ways government officeholders use language, how they 
structure their institutions, and how they organise their operations. Some of their 
defensive behaviour is reactive (i.e., when officeholders respond to blame attacks) and 
some is anticipative (i.e., measures they take to ‘stop blame before it starts’, or to 
reduce their ‘exposure’ to potential blame attacks). I was particularly interested in 
what Hood called ‘presentational strategies’ of blame avoidance – ways of either 
engaging in arguments over blame issues or avoiding these arguments – as these 
seemed to most directly affect the ways governments communicate with and relate to 
people outside government. Importantly, certain ways of avoiding blame could be 
seen as detrimental to democratic deliberation overpublic matters as they may be 
designed to avoid critical questions from arising, derail ongoing debates, or bring 
them to an abrupt end. 
Wodak wrote about performative and linguistic aspects of ‘politics as usual’, how 
officeholders in political institutions present themselves to others, how people make 
sense of these presentations, and what might be the broader socio-political 
implications of these practices. She was particularly concerned with spotting and 
interpreting links between micro-sociological instances of text and talk and broader 
social and political phenomena, and she devised a useful set of concepts, principles, 
and methods, dubbed the discourse-historical approach, for carrying out such 
analyses (see Appendix A). Wodak highlighted the idea, originally developed by the 
sociologist Erving Goffman, that people tend to behave and present themselves 
differently in front of external audiences, that is, in the ‘frontstage’, compared to more 
concealed ‘backstage’ environments where they are not under direct public scrutiny. I 
realised that the deep contradictions between frontstage and backstage behaviour 
could be one of the reasons why governments seem to be predisposed to mystify and 




While reading these two books, I started to think how combining the two approaches – 
political science knowledge about officeholders’ motivations and the inner workings 
of government institutions on the one hand, and discourse-analytical detailed 
understanding of the performative and linguistic elements of ‘politics as usual’ on the 
other hand – could lead to new insights into how governments communicate with the 
public. Indeed, in his book, Hood noted the importance of identifying specific 
discursive features that characterise government officeholders’ persuasive 
communication. He wrote: 
Much presentational activity for blame avoidance consists of getting the words 
precisely right in the same way that a poet agonises ov r every syllable and 
inflection – going though all those endlessly tricky choices and nice judgments 
to hit the proper note of contrition, craft the excuse that is powerful enough to 
silence critics and skeptics, and find the killer argument that can convincingly 
show that what might be seen as a major loss is really a blessing, or at least is 
not as bad as it seems. (Hood, 2011, p. 56). 
Linguistics as an academic field – and its sub-field discourse studies in particular – 
has been long concerned with developing the specialist vocabulary and conceptual 
tools for describing the ways in which persuasion is ‘done’ with a particular focus on 
speech, writing, and other symbolic equipment. Hence, I began to entertain the idea 
that Hood’s framework of presentational strategies of blame avoidance in government 
could be developed further and operationalised for a linguistically informed empirical 
study of blame avoidance in government communication – and that Wodak’s 
discourse-historical approach to analysing social problems could provide a suitable 
conceptual scaffolding as well as the necessary anal tic tools for such a study. 
Accordingly, in my thesis, I set out to investigate defensive uses of language and other 
semiotic resources by government officeholders, guided by the following central 
research question: How to identify and interpret discursive blame avoidance in 
government communication? 
A critical approach to government communication 
In simple terms, ‘government communication’ can be conceived of as oral, written, 




general public or particular groups in society. From the discourse-historical 
perspective (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak, 2011), government 
communication belongs to the arena of p litical action. The word ‘political’ has 
several meanings and dimensions (see, for instance, Palonen, 2003), but in broad 
terms, it integrates two contradictory senses: 
On the one hand, politics is viewed as a struggle for power, between those who 
seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it. … On 
the other hand, politics is viewed as cooperation, as the practices and 
institutions that a society has for resolving clashes of interest over money, 
influence, liberty, and the like. (Chilton, 2004, p. 3) 
In government communication, like in politics in general, language is used 
strategically, that is, text, talk, and images are employed witha goal to manage the 
interests of the speaker/writer. Discourse analyst Paul Chilton (2004, pp. 45–46) posits 
that language use in politics can serve three broad and often intertwined strategic 
functions: coercion, (de)legitimisation, and (mis)rep esentation. This three-fold 
distinction can be usefully applied to guide our thinking about the functions of 
language in government communication. 
1. Language use of the executive government can be backed by legal and 
physical sanctions. A government can issue commands  use its non-
linguistic resources (e.g., the police, courts, and prisons) to punish those who 
do not comply. Governments and government officeholders are therefore often 
perceived as powerful, high-status actors and theirrequests, choices of 
conversational topics, and assumptions of shared knowledge and beliefs are 
frequently accepted by government outsiders even without the actual threat of 
coercion. Coercive power is also exercised by governm nt officeholders when 
they censor others’ language use, limit the public dissemination of certain 
kinds of information, and regulate the arenas of communication (e.g., by 
introducing policies that affect the work of journalists or social media 
platforms). 
2. Governments use language to establish and maintain their right to be obeyed 
by citizens. Such legitimising may involve arguing  favour of certain courses 




presentation (e.g., boasting about achievements of the government). On the 
other hand, governments use language to delegitimise various opponents by 
presenting them in a more negative light, sometimes blaming, insulting, or 
marginalising them, and presenting alternative courses of action proposed by 
opponents as undesirable. 
3. Governments try to control the amount and the quality of information that they 
give out. When government officeholders produce lingu stic representations of 
events, actors, or objects, they often omit or substitute some elements. They 
may also add new elements or rearrange the sequence of ev nts in their stories. 
Misrepresentation can involve manipulative moves like ying, verbal evasion, 
and the use of euphemisms with the goal of ‘blurring’ the audience’s 
understanding of some aspect of reality. 
I seek to illuminate the strategic character of government communication in the 
context of blame risk: how officeholders employ language as a means to hold on to 
power. In so doing, I align myself with the ‘critical’ stance taken in discourse-
historical studies, and attend to the three related spects of critique (Reisigl & Wodak, 
2009, p. 88):  
• text-immanent critique: analysing texts produced by officeholders to spot 
inconsistencies, self-contradictions and paradoxes within them; 
• socio-diagnostic critique: using contextual knowledge to interpret concrete 
discursive events and uncover the more or less manifest persuasive character 
of officeholders’ language use; and  
• prospective critique: formulating suggestions as to how communication culd 
be improved in the future. 
I will provide a more fine-grained discussion of what assuming a ‘critical’ stance 
toward government communication may mean in Chapter 2. For now, it should suffice 
to say that the approaches to government communication can be most broadly 
categorised under two analytic ideal types: administrative and critical. The authors 
who adopt ‘administrative approaches’ focus on the ‘how to’ of governing, leadership, 
management, and communication; generally take the perspective of leaders; tend to 
presume instrumental rationality of actors, and to idealise stability, efficiency, and 




Gelders & Ihlen, 2010; Gregory, 2006, 2008; Horsley, Liu, & Levenshus, 2010; Lee, 
2007; Vos, 2006). Informed by positive political theory, they prefer to study their 
subject matter using formal methods such as statistic l analysis, public choice theory, 
and game theory. The authors who subscribe to ‘critical approaches’ focus on 
contested meanings, inequalities and (latent) conflicts in society; generally take the 
perspective of the individual (or an oppressed group) rather than leadership or 
‘system’; reject the idea that social phenomena can be adequately explained in terms 
of economic and technological variables; and tend to accept higher levels of ambiguity 
and uncertainty (e.g., Coleman & Blumler, 2011; Edelman, 1977; Fairclough, 2000; 
Stone, 2012; Wodak, 2011). My approach to the subject matter of my research is 
significantly influenced by the works of scholars who belong to that latter camp. I 
wish to provide a contribution to the scholarly literature broadly dealing with 
symbolic aspects of politics and bureaucracy, and especially with conflicts and 
paradoxes inherent in public communication.  
A multidisciplinary study of defensive discourses 
My work is formally a thesis in applied linguistics. It is couched in the broad field of 
discourse studies, sharing its roots with rhetorical criticism, hermeneutics, literary 
stylistics, and (socio-)pragmatics. However, I recognise that the topic of my study –
blame avoidance in government communication – can be explored from a variety of 
disciplinary angles. I wish to avoid wearing narrowly discipline-specific lenses that 
may (unwittingly) filter out potentially very useful insights and approaches.3 Instead, I 
treat my research as a multidisciplinary (or post-di ciplinary) endeavour.4 For 
                                               
3 For example, the editors of the most recent issue of The SAGE Handbook of Political Communication 
(Semetko & Scammell, 2012) emphasise the importance of scholarly work published by political 
scientists and economists but do not even mention political linguistics or political discourse studies. 
4 For a solid argument for embracing post-disciplinarity, see Sayer (1999). As I explicitly try to bridge 
multiple disciplines in this thesis, I am aware that my work may attract criticism from multiple 
directions. For instance, some linguists may dismis it as ‘too political’ while some political scientists 
may complain that it is ‘merely about text and talk’. My response to this would be that my study is 
exploratory and problem oriented – and hence implies transcending disciplinary boundaries and using 
an eclectic set of theories and methods. Indeed, this characteristic is common to all critical approaches 
to discourse studies (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). Research into government communication and blame 
avoidance would benefit from combining theoretical, methodological and practical insights from 
sociology, political science, philosophy, linguistic , communication studies, cultural and media studies, 
economics, law, and (social) psychology, as well as their more specific sub-disciplines (or particular 
research traditions within them), for instance, public administration and policy, political discourse 





example, with regard to conceptualising and operation l sing ‘blame avoidance’ 
(Chapters 3 and 4), I draw upon and synthesise at leas three distinctive streams of 
literature. First, I embrace perceptive works emanating from political science that deal 
with blame games in public administration, the use of causal stories in political 
struggle, and blame avoidance as a policy motivation (e.g., Hood, 2002, 2011; Stone, 
1989, 2012; Weaver, 1986). These works are government-centred, and are strongly 
grounded in a thorough theoretical and conceptual understanding of politics and the 
inner workings of administrative institutions. However, while their approaches 
provide many useful insights, they are not particularly concerned with close analysis 
of empirical linguistic data. Second, I align myself with studies in sociology, media, 
and communication that help us understand mediatisation of politics, the nature of 
scandal, and the mediated construals of (political) rises and failures in society (e.g., 
Adut, 2008; Allern & Pollack, 2012; Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005; Entman, 
2012; Schudson, 2008; Thompson, 2000). These treatises are driven by social, cultural, 
and communication theories as well as a sound comprehension of the functions, 
effects, and daily workings of the (news) media. However, they rarely pay attention to 
minute linguistic detail when looking at mediated txt and talk about blame issues. 
And third, there are works by linguists who conjointly provide a wide and very useful 
inventory of discursive resources often used in blame games (e.g., Wodak, 2006a; 
Lakoff, 2008; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; van Dijk, 1992, 2006; van Leeuwen, 2008). 
These writings demonstrate great interest in and sesitivity to naturally occurring 
language and aim at explaining how the use of certain linguistic strategies at micro-
level is related to macro-level societal problems like injustice and xenophobia. 
However, theoretical and practical knowledge of press and politics may not be always 
sufficiently considered in these works. 
A difficulty arising from engaging with a multidisciplinary literature is that I need to 
find my way around the plurality of concepts, approaches, taxonomies, and key words. 
Authors operating within different disciplines and research traditions may use various 
discipline-specific or school-specific ‘labels’ to refer to similar phenomena. And vice 
versa: identical or very similar terms could be used to refer to different phenomena. 
One of such concepts, I should warn the reader at the outset already, is ‘strategy’. 
When discourse analysts use this term, they usually mean ‘discursive strategies’: more 




particular contexts (see, e.g., Culpeper, 2015). In political science literature, the term 
‘strategy’ often refers to calculated choices that are extra-linguistic, such as 
structuring an organisational hierarchy or arranging the administrative workflow in a 
particular goal-oriented manner (see, e.g., Hood, 2011). In this thesis, I use the term 
‘strategies of blame avoidance’ to encompass a broad range of practices (including 
linguistic ones) that characterise blame avoiding behaviour. When I refer to 
‘discursive strategies of blame avoidance’, it means that I zoom in to the uses of 
specific linguistic or semiotic resources for the purpose of self-defence against blame.  
A similar word of caution is due with respect to the use of the term ‘discourse’. Many 
authors use it simply to refer to a text, conversation, or debate. However, I follow the 
tradition of the discourse-historical studies, where discourse is defined as a complex 
analytical construct: 
a cluster of context-dependent semiotic practices that are situated within 
specific fields of social action, socially constituted and socially constitutive, 
related to a macro-topic, [and] linked to the argumentation about validity 
claims such as truth and normative validity involving several social actors who 
have different points of view. (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 89) 
Hence, discourses about blame are always related to specific topics (e.g., harmful 
events, norm violations), there are always multiple perspectives involved (e.g., 
contradicting views of blame makers and blame takers), and they are always 
argumentative (e.g., claims about someone’s blameworthiness or otherwise can be 
proved or disproved). Discourses are realised as text , each of which can be 
categorised under a genre, that is, a “socially ratified way of using languae in 
connection with a particular type of social activity” (Fairclough, 1995, p. 14). For 
example, genres used by government communicators include news releases, opinion 
pieces in newspapers, social media postings, policy do uments, televised speeches, 
broadcast interviews, and so forth. 
One more early warning regarding terminology: I am reluctant to use the term 
‘responsibility’ in this study. This term is frequently used in literature on blame 
phenomena, but it has many meanings (see, e.g., Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; 
Goffman, 2010, p. 99), and is more likely to blur rather than clarify the focus of my 




perception of what a government or an officeholder can do (i.e., their capacity) and 
should do (i.e., their obligations). The term ‘responsibility’ is a hypernym: it tends to 
be used so that it subsumes both of these meanings. In a similar vein, I generally avoid 
using the term ‘accountability’, which in political science is also used to mean 
different things, such as a virtuous behaviour or an institutional mechanism of making 
governments responsive to publics. 5 
Interpretivist presuppositions 
In this research project, I draw on constructivist–interpretivist presuppositions 
(Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012; Yanow, 2007). This means, above all, that the 
argument presented in this study “rests on a belief in the existence of (potentially) 
multiple, intersubjectively constructed ‘truths’ about social, political, cultural, and 
other human events” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 4). The primary task of a 
researcher, as I see it, is to try to understand (e.g., by consulting various theories and 
gathering new empirical data via fieldwork) the many perspectives people have on the 
social phenomena under investigation. Hence this study is concerned with meaning 
making (rather than hypothesis testing) and contextuality (rather than generalisability), 
and does not presume that the behaviour of human actors involved in blame games is 
always ‘rational’ (unlike the studies based on game theory and rational choice theory 
that explicitly rely on the rationality of the ‘players’, e.g., Anand, 1998). I am not 
seeking to construct a formal model of strategic interaction between blame makers and 
blame takers. Indeed, formal modelling may be questionable, not least because the 
participant roles in blame games are not stable: blame makers may become blame 
takers and vice versa (Hood, 2014). What I hope to achieve in this thesis is a broader 
interpretive understanding (verstehen rather than erklären) of the plurality of 
meanings attached to discursive blame avoidance behaviour. 
Interpretive researchers should be self-reflective and explicit about how their own 
perspectives might influence the research process (Altheide & Johnson, 2011). 
                                               
5 For a review of the various uses of ‘accountability’ as a complex concept, and the difficulties of 
substantially defining it, see Bovens (2010) and Pollitt & Hupe (2011). Interestingly, Hood (2014) 
suggests that if we take ‘accountability’ to mean ‘swerability’ (e.g., as explaining and diagnosing 
problems rather than establishing someone’s culpability), t has much in common with ‘blame 




Therefore, in the following points, I would like tofurther clarify the scope of my 
study, as well as my stance and interests as a resercher.7 
• I assume that the practices of government communication in modern 
democratic societies8 are influenced, inter alia, by (a) the inclination f 
officeholders to avoid blame; and (b) ‘government meta-communication’, that 
is, the manifold ways government insiders talk and write about government 
communication (e.g., in their communication guidelin s and at their 
professional training events). This assumption is largely based on my own 
previous work experience in news journalism and civil service. 
• I focus on executive government communication activities directed at the 
general public at the national level. Accordingly, my research is not about 
diplomacy, international communication between states, intergovernmental 
communication between central, regional, and local governments, or 
intragovernmental communication between various branches and departments 
of government. I am not studying communication in or on behalf of 
legislatures (parliaments). Neither is my research bout political parties and 
their campaign communication. The latter has been th  most common research 
focus taken up by numerous scholars in the field of political communication. 
• I wish to gain a deeper understanding of the (discursive) behaviour of 
government officeholders. Within the limits of my thesis, I do not intend to 
study the practices of media professionals or citizens (government outsiders) in 
considerable detail. However, I will refer to some pr vious studies that deal 
with certain practices and attitudes of media professionals and critical citizens 
in relation to public officeholders and governments. 
• My interest lies in linguistic, rhetorical, social, nd political aspects of human 
communication. My research is not about information and communication 
technologies or software used by governments to store, retrieve, transmit, and 
process data. In this study, I pay particular attention to textual forms of 
                                               
7 Admittedly, the following points serve as a kind of ‘disclaimer’ – a statement designed to ward off 
unwanted claims and complaints by explicitly delimit ng one’s obligations – which is a well-known 
discursive genre of anticipative blame avoidance used by the providers of various goods and services. 
8 Modern democracies are countries and territories that enjoy a wide range of political rights (including 
free and fair elections) as well as civil liberties (including freedoms of expression, assembly, 
association, education, and religion). According to Freedom House (2015), 89 out of the world’s 195 




meaning making. Detailed analysis of gestures, sounds, and phonological 
aspects of defensive government communication could be addressed in future 
studies. However, I touch upon some tools for multiodal analysis of blame 
avoidance behaviour as a performance in Chapter 7. 
• I am interested in how government officeholders try to hold on to their offices. 
Hence, I am not focusing, for example, on full apologies and resignations in 
this study. Delivering a full apology and resigning from office constitutes 
accepting rather than avoiding blame. Moreover, (political) apologia have 
already been studied in much previous research (Harris, Grainger, & Mullany, 
2006; Kampf, 2008, 2009, 2011). 
• Within my treatment of blame avoidance, I want to av id taking a stance of an 
indiscreet blame maker. There is no place in my thesis for labelling any 
government insiders, taken either individually or as a group, as essentially 
‘good’ or ‘bad’. Neither do I want to make overly hasty assessments of the 
content of the particular policies that the political actors defend or attack in the 
texts that I analyse. I do not see my study as being about ‘spin doctoring’, 
‘political marketing’, ‘political branding’, ‘propaganda’, or ‘public relations’ 
in general. While I explore persuasive communication practices of executive 
government, I do not essentially presume that all these practices should be 
attached to these (possibly derogatory) labels or dealt with only within 
research traditions that tend to apply such labels. 
• I do not regard blame avoidance as an essentially ‘bad’ practice in government. 
Avoiding risks – including blame risks – is an extrmely common, ubiquitous 
aspect of human behaviour. Indeed, having a sense of what kind of behaviour 
may be seen as blameworthy can encourage us to avoid transgressing moral 
norms and causing harm to others in the first place. In political life, the 
compulsion to avoid blame can sometimes feed into a fruitful public debate 
over possible merits and disadvantages of holding certain beliefs or behaving 
in certain ways. However, it is worth stressing here that I do not intend to give 
advice to government officeholders (or anyone, for that matter) on ‘how to 
better deflect blame’. 
• I do not regard having ‘less defensive language use’ or ‘better communication’ 




believe that greater alertness towards specific instances of strategic blame 
avoidance, coupled with a more nuanced understanding of the possible effects 
of the different discursive strategies adopted by government officeholders, 
would help citizens become more discerning in their judgements of political 
text and talk. 
1.2 Implications of this study for democratic deliberation 
I launch this both theoretical and applied research p oject with a broader societal aim 
in mind. By drawing attention to the possible ill effects of defensive government 
communication for government outsiders, I hope to contribute to increasing critical 
language awareness and improving democratic deliberat on in the public sphere. 
In representative democracies, a precondition for holding government insiders 
answerable to the public is that citizens approach political leadership with reflective 
scepticism, develop critical thinking skills, and are capable of engaging in open and 
uninhibited dialogue with powerful policy makers, thereby fostering mutual 
understanding. Some discursive strategies of blame avoidance, however, are designed 
to shut out any scepticism, derail or block a debat over a blame issue, and thus 
prevent social learning. Officeholders may try to impair or bias their audience’s 
understanding of information, make extensive use of discursive strategies focused on 
potential vulnerabilities of recipients (e.g., threats, discursive group polarisation, 
scapegoating), and hurt the interests of less powerful groups in society.  
Application of such strategies may have consequences that can be regarded as 
‘undesirable’ from normative points of view that idealise the Habermasian concept of 
public sphere or other forms of  mutually respectful and unhindered interaction 
between people. Thus, the ‘blame avoidance angle’ that I adopt in my study of 
government communication can be seen as having a rather firm normative footing in 
the Critical Theory (as does the discourse-historical approach to analysing social 
problems that guides my study; see Forchtner, 2011). From this critical perspective, 




to the production of text and talk that can be evaluated as manipulative – and hence as 
barriers to deliberative political life.9 
By conducting this research, I hope to deepen critical citizens’ understanding of where, 
when, how, and why defensive uses of text, talk, and images by government 
officeholders may amount to discursive manipulation. As a result, researchers will 
have new analytical tools to advance scholarly understanding of the linguistic aspects 
of blame avoidance, and government outsiders will improve their ability to cut though 
officeholders’ possibly misleading defensive text and talk. 
1.3 Research questions 
RQ: How to identify and interpret discursive blame avoidance in government 
communication? 
RQ 1: How to conceptualise and operationalise ‘discur ive blame avoidance’ in 
government? 
RQ 2: How to identify and interpret reactive discursive blame avoidance in the 
frontstage of government communication, i.e., in public (mediated) responses to 
public accusations? 
RQ 3: How to identify and interpret anticipative discursive blame avoidance in the 
backstage of government communication? 
1.4 Data 
My research questions imply that I should seek empirical evidence of government 
communicators using certain discursive resources to avoid blame. Admittedly, it is not 
easy to pinpoint exactly what kind of data and how much of it might be necessary for 
this project. Hypothetically, one option would be to compile an extensive data set, a 
large corpus of government-produced public text and t lk, possibly representing a 
variety of countries, time periods, and types of government, and then try to ‘extract’ 
                                               
9 I will expand on the notion of ‘manipulation’ with regard to blame avoidance in Chapter 4. For 
multiple conceptualisations of the term, see also de Saussure & Schulz (2005), van Dijk (2006), and 




each and every instance of discursive blame avoidance from this corpus. This, 
however, seems impracticable at this stage, because ther  are no existing 
comprehensive frameworks available for identifying and comparing various ways of 
avoiding blame specifically in government communication in terms of linguistic (or 
semiotic) features. Therefore, I need to design my research project as an exploratory 
study that would contribute to filling this gap in knowledge. In terms of the 
methodological stages of discourse-historical studies, my project would hence qualify 
as a ’qualitative pilot analysis’, aiming at formulating and testing analytic categories 
and first assumptions based on a relatively small range of data (Reisigl & Wodak, 
2009; see also Appendix A). 
Moreover, as I will explain in Chapter 3, ‘avoiding blame’ is not a linguistic category 
and cannot be always spotted simply by looking at a given text; rather, it involves 
strategic ways of exploiting shared knowledge (e.g., about the likelihood of certain 
outcomes attracting blame) in particular situational, institutional, and historical 
contexts. Therefore, my data selection is guided by non-linguistic contextual 
knowledge of when, where, how, and why government officeholders might engage in 
defensive behaviour. A useful source of general knowledge of typical defensive 
situations and moves in government is the political s ience literature on blame 
avoidance (e.g., Hood, 2011). 
The existing literature suggests that blame avoidance behaviour is more salient during 
the periods of economic turmoil when governments are fo ced to engage in more 
‘loss-allocating activities’ (Weaver, 1986). Hence I have decided to narrow down the 
temporal scope of data collection and focus my exploratory study on government 
communication during and in the aftermath of the most recent major (global or North-
Atlantic) financial crisis that emerged in 2007–2008 in the United States and affected 
many countries over the following years. 
For an exploratory study, it is also reasonable to narrow down spatial/institutional 
scope and focus on communication activities of a specific government, making it 
possible to pay sufficient attention to the specific contexts of the officeholders’ 
defensive behaviour. I have chosen to draw my data from the UK government during 




First, the UK was deeply affected by the financial risis of the late 2000s. The first 
signs of crisis emerged in the UK in 2007 during the rule of the Labour government, 
became a central issue of the 2010 general election ampaign, and continued to 
influence the political debates and actions during the rule of the Conservative–Liberal 
Democrat coalition government from 2010 to 2015. The coalition government 
introduced policies, such as cuts to the welfare budget, which typically prompt the 
government to engage increasingly in blame avoidance behaviour (Weaver, 1986; Pal 
& Weaver, 2003). The fiscal stress had also a direct effect on the organisation of 
British government communication: It provided the rationale for the coalition 
government’s decision to restructure the apparatus of the UK government 
communication, to freeze and cut its communication expenditure, and to declare 
‘efficiency’ a central value that should guide the work of government communicators 
(Sanders, 2013). Hence the professional (non-elected) government communicators 
employed in the British Civil Service also found themselves in a new situation where 
their instinct of self-preservation was presumably more manifest. 
Second, the UK has an exceptionally long and relatively well studied tradition of 
official government communication: It dates back to mid-19th century and has been 
addressed by several academic research projects as well as official investigations (e.g., 
Franklin, 1994; Gregory, 2012; Phillis, 2004; Sanders, 2013). Hence, by focusing on 
the UK, I have access to a useful body of relevant historical and institutional 
background information about its government communication, which helps me to 
contextualise my study and guide my data selection. 
Third, the UK government has made the announcements of the Cabinet Office and all 
the ministerial departments, as well as the transcript  of ministerial press conferences, 
accessible and searchable online, thus facilitating the collecting of samples of this type 
of data on public communication for the purpose of my research project. Moreover, 
the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition governme t that came to power in the 
UK in 2010 lent itself for exploratory study as it made some of its communication 
guidelines publicly available (Cabinet Office, 2012, 2013, 2014), granted me access to 
one of their major professional training events for g vernment communicators in 2014, 





Therefore, my decision to place government communication in the UK at the centre of 
this exploratory study is primarily justified by the combination of two factors: the 
salience of the financial crisis (and hence of the government blame games) in the UK, 
and the accessibility of a range of data about British government communication that 
could be subjected to discourse-historical analysis of blame avoidance behaviour. 
To answer RQ 2, I need to study specific moments when officeholders engage in 
reactive blame avoidance in the frontstage of governm nt communication. I limit my 
exploratory study to certain communicative genres that op officeholders use to 
provide public responses to public accusations: defending government’s actions in an 
opinion article in face of blame attacks from the opp sition, issuing an official 
response to a public accusation, performing a public apology after receiving blame, 
and responding to a blame-implicating question of a j urnalist. Admittedly, this 
selection of genres of responding to accusations is ot comprehensive: other genres 
can be studied in future research. 
For the purposes of this thesis, I first collected an  examined textual samples of each 
genre based on the selection criteria described below, and then, for detailed exemplary 
analyses, selected concrete texts that were related to particular extraordinary 
conflictual events and blame risks that seemed mostlikely to provoke defensive 
reactions from government officeholders.  
• To understand the blame game in opinion articles, I xamined the opinion 
pieces published by the UK Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition 
in the British broadsheet newspapers with the largest circulation figures (The 
Times, The Telegraph, Financial Times, and The Guardian) throughout the 
outset of the financial crisis in 2007–2008 (5 in total). For a detailed example 
analysis, I chose one of these that came out at a time when the financial crisis 
in the UK became most acute: the Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s article 
titled “We Must Lead the World to Financial Stability” that he published in 
The Times after his government had announced an unprecedented plan to 
support the banking sector with up to an aggregate total of £500 billion in 
loans and guarantees on 8 October 2008. In addition, to contextualise the 
blame-avoiding moves in the Prime Minister’s article as a part of the long-




Chapter 5), I decided to carry out a similar detaild analysis of an opinion 
article published in The Sunday Telegraph by David Cameron, the then 
opposition leader, after the first ‘materialising’ of the emerging financial crisis 
in the UK: the collapse of Northern Rock, a British bank, on 17 September 
2007. Doing so allows me to reconstruct the interplay between the opposition 
leader’s offensive discursive moves (blame making) and the Prime Minister’s 
defensive moves (blame avoiding), and to juxtapose their competing narratives 
about the causes of (and solutions to) the crisis. 
• To understand blame avoidance in official responses to public accusations, I 
examined the announcements of the coalition governmnt between 2010 and 
2015 on its official website (www.gov.uk), focusing on announcements 
marked as ‘government responses’ on the topic of ‘government efficiency, 
transparency and accountability’ (9 in total). For an example analysis, I chose 
a response published in response to an investigative story on government 
overspending in The Times on 9 January 2012. The story, entitled ‘Whitehall 
waste: the £31 billion cost of failure’ was a significant blame attack by a major 
broadsheet newspaper on the government on an issue that was at the time at 
the core of its programme: introducing cuts to the UK budget. This provoked 
the Cabinet Office to issue a carefully crafted defensive response. 
• To see how public apologising could be interpreted as a defensive move, I 
analysed a political apology that was arguably the most prominent of its kind 
delivered during the rule of the coalition government between 2010 and 2015: 
the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg’s apology for not keeping his party’s 
pre-2010 election promise to oppose increasing university tuition fees. This 
rather exceptional statement was published on Y uTube on 19 September 2012, 
and aired on television in the UK later that month. Public discussions over this 
move dominated the media agenda for several following eeks. 
• To find examples of government officeholders responding to blame-
implicating questions of a journalist, I examined the ranscripts of the press 
conferences given by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister 
between 2010 and 2015 (4 in total), and chose to focus my example analysis 
on a widely covered press conference on 7 January 2013 where David 
Cameron and Nick Clegg presented the first ever ‘mid-term review’ – an 




was as a major proactive attempt at positive self-pr sentation of the 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition, but the participating journalists used 
this as an opportunity to throw some hard-hitting questions at the presenters, 
thereby triggering defensive responses from the two top officeholders. 
To answer RQ 3, I need to study anticipative discurive blame avoidance behaviour – 
defensive action that does not take the form of messages directed at the general public 
but remains mainly in the backstage of government. It is admittedly very difficult to 
gain full access to the backstage of government communication to observe, as a 
researcher, every aspect of officeholders’ behaviour. Hence my data collection was 
guided primarily by accessibility. In the course of my research, I was able to scrutinise 
the recently published professional guidelines of UK government communicators, 
observe a major training event of UK government communicators, and carry out an 
interview with a top UK government communicator who had been involved in 
preparing the guidelines and the training programme. When collecting this data, I 
focused on the representations of problematic aspect  of government communication 
that could attract blame (see Chapters 2, 6 and 7), and, for a closer analysis in terms of 
anticipative blame avoidance strategies, selected certain textual and semiotic examples 
that seemed to be particularly defensive. 
I examined five operational guidelines that were made vailable on the website of the 
Government Communication Service between 2010 and 2015 to find evidence of 
‘defensiveness’. The existing literature suggests that the relationship between 
professional government communicators and ministers is problematic, has attracted a 
lot of criticism (see, e.g., Franklin, 1994), and thus might elicit anticipative blame 
avoidance. Therefore, for a detailed example analysis, I elected the most recent 
document that specifically dealt with describing and ‘regulating’ this relationship: 
Government Communication Service Propriety Guidance (se  Chapter 6). 
In addition, I was able to attend and take field notes at the largest professional training 
event of UK government communicators in June 2014, and arrange an interview with 
a top UK government communication professional in April 2015. These personal 
encounters allowed me to gain a better grasp of the officeholders’ views on what kind 




In sum, I have collected four kinds of empirical data that represents a range of 
linguistic and performative realisations of blame avoidance for analysis: textual data 
from frontstage rhetorical performances and written an ouncements of the UK 
government officeholders, textual data from operational guidelines aimed mainly at 
government communication professionals, field notes from a participant observation 
of a communication training event in the backstage of government, and an interview 
with a high-ranking government insider. Hence, for this research project I have 
engaged with an unusual and unique set of empirical data which allows me to shed 
new light on some of the reactive and anticipative defensive communication practices 
of the British government, and thereby improve our understanding of how to identify 
and interpret discursive blame avoidance in governmnt communication.  
A final note – a disclaimer, if you will – about data. As this is an exploratory project 
with a focus on developing analytic tools for detail d interpretations of concrete 
instances of defensive language use, my study is neither quantitative nor comparative. 
I am not going to make any strong claims about the frequency or prevalence of the use 
of the discursive strategies that I refer to in my analysis. I do not claim that all the 
insights that I draw from my data could be readily universalised across other countries 
or governments. All the examples I present should be seen as situated within specific 
historical, socio-political, and institutional contex s. I do not use experiments, tests or 
polls to ‘measure’ the possible effects of blame avoidance strategies to particular 
audiences. I do not attempt to explain similarities and differences in blame avoidance 
practices across time, type of government, country, and so forth. Moreover, while I 
draw my data from the British government communication in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis of late 2000s, my study is not about the causes and the broader social, 
political, and economic implications of that crisis. There are many other works that 
specifically focus on diagnosing the symptoms of this crisis, discussing the actions of 
various actors in response to these symptoms, and pl cing the crisis in a broader 
historical and theoretical context (see Benner, 2013; Davies, 2010; Hay, 2010, 2013;  
Jessop, 2015, among many others). I will, however, n cessarily take note of some of 
the conflicting causal stories about the crisis, as the e form a salient backdrop to the 




1.5 Overview of the thesis 
In Chapter 2, I review the conceptualisations of government communication in 
academic literature. From the perspective of blame voidance, I delineate four 
distinctive approaches: Government communication can be understood as a policy 
instrument, as a commodity, as self-serving manipulation by powerful officeholders, 
or as a factor that either facilitates or inhibits democracy. Each of these 
conceptualisations provides a different perspective from which to identify and 
interpret blame avoidance in government communication (RQ 1). 
In Chapter 3, I introduce blame avoidance as the central concept of this study. As the 
study of blame avoidance in government is essentially a study of ‘blame games’ 
between various (potential) blame makers and (self-pr serving) officeholders, I sketch 
out a general methodological ‘scaffolding’ for a discursive analysis of government 
blame games, and try to outline the components of the blame game conceived of as 
particular kind of language game (RQ 1). 
In Chapter 4, I operationalise blame avoidance in government communication for the 
purposes of discursive analysis (RQ 1). I engage with a variety of textual examples of 
reactive blame avoidance in my UK government communication data set (RQ 2), 
consult the existing literature on defensive (linguistic) behaviour, and propose a 
framework for pinning down and interpreting defensive discursive strategies that 
government officeholders employ in contexts of perceived blame risk. 
In Chapter 5, I further explore how to interpret reactive blame avoidance (RQ 2) by 
focusing, in particular, on the opposition–governmet blame game. I deconstruct in 
detail some of the discursive strategies that the opposition used to attribute blame and 
the government used to deflect blame during the outset of a financial crisis in the UK 
in 2007–2008. I analyse the opinion articles in broadsheet newspapers, written by the 
then Leader of the Opposition David Cameron and the then Prime Minister Gordon 
Brown, sketch out an argument model of the blame game, and evaluate the usefulness 
of using argument models for identifying and interpr ting discursive practices of 
blame avoidance. 
In Chapter 6, I shift my attention to anticipative blame avoidance in government 




communicators could be subjected to a discourse-historical inquiry and interpreted as 
complex discursive devices of deflecting and diffusng blame. I outline historically 
and institutionally situated issues of blame that inform the occupational habitus of 
government communicators in the UK. I analyse concrete examples from the propriety 
guidelines of the UK government communicators and demonstrate how the use of 
certain discursive strategies could limit the possible perceived blameworthiness of 
officeholders when they breach the border of propriety. 
In Chapter 7, I look further at anticipative blame avoidance in the backstage of 
government communication (RQ 3). I analyse the datag hered during a participant 
observation of the Public Sector Communications Academy, a major official training 
event organised by the UK Government Communication Service in Manchester in 
June 2014. I work towards developing a systematic approach to interpreting certain 
performative and multimodal aspects of personal and institutional blame avoidance in 
government. 
In Chapter 8, I provide a recap on my overall conceptual framework for identifying 
and interpreting discursive blame avoidance in governm nt communication. I discuss 
the implications of my empirical findings as well as my theoretical and 
methodological contributions to the study of governme t communication and blame 
games. I reassert the importance of sophisticated, context-sensitive analysis of blame 





2. Four conceptualisations of government communication 
In recent years, some scholars have attempted to define and map government 
communication as a distinctive field of research (Canel & Sanders, 2013; Garnett, 
2004; Howlett, 2009; Lee, Neeley & Stewart, 2012; Liu & Horsley, 2007; Strömbäck 
& Kiousis, 2011). The authors of these works tend to approach government 
communication from a narrowly functionalist perspective, their discussion is often 
confined to instrumental rationality, and they use language that is characteristic to 
managerial disciplines, such as public relations, marketing, and public policy. For 
example, Canel and Sanders (2013) claim to “capture the full range of the possibilities 
of government communication” by looking at “the role, practice, aims and 
achievements of communication” (p. 4) carried out in and by executive government 
agencies. What catches my eye in this definition, above all, is the unproblematised and 
unqualified use of the word ‘achievements’ – a term that implies success (for whom?) 
and effectively shifts researchers’ attention away from phenomena that could be 
regarded as possible (if not frequent) failures of administrative communication. Due 
to such ‘optimism bias’, much of the current theorising under the ‘government 
communication’ rubric has remained one-sided. 
In this chapter, my goal is to widen the theoretical m p of government communication 
research so that both the various and often conflicti g notions of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ 
in the field could be put into conversation. I work towards building a heuristic 
framework for understanding major differences and similarities between current 
approaches to government communication by outlining a d juxtaposing distinctive 
ways of legitimising (i.e., defending) and delegitimising (i.e., blaming) government 
communication as a social practice in scholarly litera ure. To achieve this, I start off 
by teasing out major distinctions between patterns of text and talk about government 
communication (i.e., metadiscourses) in relation to blame and blame avoidance. 
Blame as a concept as well as its social uses have attracted a lot of academic attention 
(Coates & Tognazzini, 2013a; Douglas, 1992; Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; 
McKenna, 2012; Scanlon, 2008; Sher, 2006; Tilly, 2008; Wodak, 2006a) and many 
scholars seem to agree that “an organisation is defned by how it handles blame and 
punishment” (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 131). Within political organisations, 




an essential policy motivator (Weaver, 1986) and as a “political and bureaucratic 
imperative” (Hood, 2011, p. 24) that helps us make sense of officeholders’ behaviour. 
Unsurprisingly, nearly all scholarly treatments of g vernment communication contain 
some instances of what I call lexis of blame/avoidance, that is, words and phrases 
which more or less explicitly refer to potentially blameworthy phenomena (e.g., 
problem, issue, risk, conflict, challenge, failure) or indicate officeholders’ general 
concern about avoiding blame (e.g., reputation, image, integrity, propriety). This has 
inspired me to look more systematically through the lens of blame/avoidance 
strategies at how government and its communication activities have been written 
about within a broad range of academic literature. 
What do I mean when I talk about applying the lens of blame/avoidance strategies to 
my literature review? Blame games between (groups of) people involve at least two 
sets of players: blame makers and blame takers (Hood, 2011). Blame makers engage 
in performances designed to attribute causal agency to someone for bringing about 
something negative. Blame takers, on the other hand, usually try to avoid, deflect, or 
diffuse such attributions for a (potentially) negative event or outcome. My ‘lenses’ in 
this study are focused on how such player positions are constructed in texts, how the 
‘moves’ of players in a particular blame game are described and evaluated, and how 
particular phenomena are presented as either warranting blame (e.g., failure, harm, 
wrongdoing, transgression) or not (e.g., solution, natural, ethical, justified).  
Government insiders – officeholders and public servic  providers at all institutional 
levels – often find themselves in the role of a blame taker. They may have multiple 
personal reasons to be concerned with the risk of being regarded as blameworthy. 
Elected politicians will care about blame if they think it will reduce their 
chances of re-election. Managers will care about blame if they think it will 
reduce their prospects of promotion, bonuses, staying in their current jobs, or 
moving on to better ones. Professionals will care about blame if they think it 
will diminish their reputations in ways that could damage their careers or 
produce expensive lawsuits over malpractice. Front-line bureaucrats will care 
about blame if they think it will cost them their jobs or their bonuses or their 





People outside of the government – users of public services, voters, journalists, 
opposition commentators, activist groups, and so forth – are more commonly seen as 
blame makers who may have various motives to attribu e responsibility for bad 
phenomena to the government. (However, some of the ‘outsiders’ may, at times, find 
themselves also receiving blame from the government, for instance, when officials 
blame the news media for ‘biased coverage’.) 
Why is this basic insider–outsider distinction relevant here? It is because when we 
look through the lens of blame/avoidance at how scholars write about government and 
its communication activities (government/communication), we notice that each author 
more or less explicitly takes sides with either blame takers or blame makers. While 
writers may differ in their specific choice of a perspective and their apparent 
knowledge interests, there seem to be two mutually antagonistic broad ‘streams’ of 
literature that can be delineated. 
On the one hand, there are authors who write about government/communication 
mainly from a perspective of a powerful government officeholder or an executive 
institution, and are thus more interested in the practical art (or science) of governing 
and maintaining control. From this perspective, receiving blame may lead to losing 
power and therefore blame avoidance – including defensive use of language – may be 
seen as an important skill or craft. This kind of approach belongs to what I call the 
stream of ‘administrative’ literature. 
On the other hand, there are scholars who generally empathise with ‘government 
outsiders’, often much less powerful individuals and groups (e.g., ‘people in the 
street’), and are rather concerned with helping them to avoid being governed in 
particular ways. From that perspective, dishing out blame to the government or a 
particular officeholder may appear as a necessary pr ctice of the ‘art of criticism’ that 
helps to keep (potential) abuses of political power at bay. Moreover, the competitive 
struggle between adversaries in political blame games (agonism) could be seen by 
some as the very essence of democracy. This kind of works I regard as belonging to 
the broad stream of ‘critical’ literature. 
The idea of distinguishing analytically between ‘administrative’ approaches to 
communication on the one hand, and ‘critical’ approaches on the other, is of course 




communication research by the Austrian-American sociol gist Paul Lazarsfeld 
already in 1941. This dual division is also in line with the main research traditions of 
social structures (see, e.g., Swedberg, 2005) as well as the categorisation of 
organisational theories into ‘instrumental’ and ‘inst tutional’ as devised by 
Christensen, Lægreid, Roness, and Røvik (2007). 
Furthermore, it is perhaps not too much of a stretch to trace the roots of these 
approaches back to certain broader historical strands of social and political thought, 
in a way following the basic macro-level distinction – ‘functionalist’ versus ‘conflict’ 
theoretical approaches – made in much social theory (Giddens, 2009). I thus presume 
that every current text about government/communication reflects distinctive 
historically sedimented sets of normative ideas about p litical life that its producers 
subscribe to. For instance, we notice major differences when we stay alert to what 
kind of metaphors certain authors choose to use. Do they talk, for example, of a 
society as a ‘body’ capable of self-regulation, or as a ‘structure’ with upper and lower 
‘layers’? Do they regard executive government as a ‘protector’ of individual liberties, 
a ‘provider’ of services and welfare, or an ‘oppressor’ of certain social groups? Is 
public communication by the authorities seen as useful ‘cultivation’ of civic virtues in 
free individuals, and maintenance of social consensus and stability, or as self-serving 
manipulation of the perceptions, beliefs, and values of the unsuspecting ‘masses’? 11 
Accordingly, in my view, theorising government communication primarily involves 
constructing heuristic devices – models or outlines of ideal types – that would help 
researchers notice and compare competing metadiscourses – alternative patterns of 
writing and talking about government communication. These metadiscourses are 
historically embedded and characterised by distinctive metadiscursive vocabularies 
and strategies (e.g., particular ways of naming, describing, arguin , and positioning) 
that express certain belief systems. In linguistic terms, the application of the lens of 
blame/avoidance means that I analyse metadiscourses about 
government/communication to explicate how discursive strategies of perspectivation, 
                                               
11 Metaphor can be understood as “the phenomenon whereby we talk and, potentially, think about 
something in terms of something else” (Semino, 2008, p. 1). Some metaphors may establish 
correspondences across different conceptual domains. For example, if we talk about politics in terms of 
a battle, then our knowledge about politics (as a ‘target’ domain) is partly structured in terms our 
knowledge about battles (as a ‘source’ domain). For a good overview of the use of societal metaphors 




nomination, predication, and argumentation are used to maintain and/or modify 
particular power relations between certain social actors.12 
Such a more detailed analysis of existing literature exposes four distinct ways of 
conceptualising government communication, based on how authors represent and 
evaluate the government blame game. 
1. Within administrative literature, some authors regad blaming the government 
as a fundamentally negative occurrence, perhaps even as a major threat to the 
functioning of the society as a whole because receiving blame erodes the 
perceived authority of the government and thereby curbs its capability to carry 
out its plans. From this point of view, government communication is seen 
mainly as a policy instrument – a useful tool for asserting control. 
2. Other scholars within the administrative stream write about blame attributions 
to the government as if these were unfortunate signs of customer 
dissatisfaction – certain individuals not being happy with (some aspect of) 
some government-provided service. From this perspective, government 
communication is treated as a commodity. 
3. Within critical literature, some authors treat blaming the government as a 
crucial task of oppressed and disadvantaged people, because they see it as 
perhaps the only way to remain resilient in the face of the many inevitable 
power abuses committed by the government. From this point of view, 
government communication is seen as essentially devious manipulation of 
public perceptions and behaviour. 
4. Many critical researchers take a more ambivalent stance towards government 
blame games. They regard blaming and blame avoidance s fundamental 
social processes by which people make meanings, contruct identities, and 
regulate power relations (through agonistic struggle) both within and between 
groups and organisations. Blame can be used both to advance and hamper 
participation and deliberation in society. From this perspective, government 
communication can be seen as either doing or undoing democracy. 
                                               
12 I will explain these discursive strategies further in Chapter 3. For a more detailed discussion and 




In the rest of this chapter, I will describe some pertinent characteristics of each of 
these four ways of talking about government/communication in turn, and bring 
concrete examples from literature to illustrate how the authors’ stances towards 
blame/avoidance indicate significant differences betwe n these conceptualisations. 
2.1 Government communication as a policy instrument 
My first example comes from an edited volume titled Carrots, Sticks, and Sermons: 
Policy Instruments and Their Evaluation by Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, and Vedung 
(2003). The authors use ‘sticks’, ‘carrots’, and ‘sermons’ as metaphors when writing 
about three general categories of public policy instruments: regulation (issuing orders 
that people are obliged to follow), economic means (giving or removing material 
resources, e.g., subsidies), and information (issuing voluntary appeals). They define 
policy instruments as “the set of techniques by which governmental authorities wield 
their power in attempting to ensure support and effect or prevent social change” 
(Vedung, 2003, p. 21). Thus, communication (or ‘information’, ‘exhortation’, or 
‘moral suasion’, to use the author’s preferred terms) is represented as one of the three 
kinds of ‘toolsets’ or ‘control models’ that governments may choose to apply in their 
work, usually in some kind of a combination with oter instruments. 
People’s support to government’s policy choices and ‘legitimacy’ of particular 
policies is conceptualised in the book as follows: 
Legitimacy represents a political criterion which stre ses that acceptance is 
crucial for actual effectiveness of a policy or program. It is then regarded as a 
‘conditio sine qua non’ for effectiveness; without it, the governee will look for 
behaviour alternative to the one prescribed or induce  by government, and will 
thus frustrate the intended effects. (Bemelmans-Videc, 2003, p. 8) 
What is evident from this quote is that ‘effectiveness’, defined as a situation where the  
‘governees’ are behaving in the way the government has intended them to behave, is 
represented as the highest goal of the administration, for which public ‘acceptance’ is 
a precondition. 
Admittedly, this precondition can be difficult to ful il. Administrative agencies seem 




reputation’ – namely, possible public accusations of wr ngdoing that could undermine 
organisation’s legitimacy. This tendency is well exemplified by the following 
assertion by Carpenter and Krause (2012): 
Naturally, public administrators confront three primary challenges that are 
fundamental to governance: (1) how to maintain broad-b sed support for an 
agency and its activities, (2) how to steer a vessel amid hazardous shoals 
(enemies and potentially disaffected supporters), and (3) how to project a 
judicious combination of consistency and flexibility. (p. 26) 
The use of the ‘organisation is a vessel’ conceptual metaphor is perhaps most salient 
here. Top officeholders are depicted as ‘captains’ who hold the ‘steering wheels’ of 
their organisations and seem to be in full command of its crew and course. 
Organisation as a vessel on the sea is a closed container that exists and functions 
separately from other containers – that is, each government agency is represented as 
essentially ‘sailing on its own’. And the ‘enemies’ of the organisation (whoever these 
are) are represented as dehumanised natural objects – shoals – that are often invisible 
but should be avoided at all costs. Government organisations are thus advised to 
remain constantly alert and capable of dodging potentially hidden external (blame) 
threats. 
Much instructional literature for officeholders describes as problematic such 
circumstances where government encounters ‘obstacle’ lik  public distrust and 
disobedience, and becomes ‘dysfunctional’ in the sense that officeholders experience 
erosion of their control over public issues. On a personal or organisational micro-level, 
blame firestorms and scandals are feared as these may ruin individual or 
organisational reputation and result in the loss of power, finances, and job security for 
particular individuals (Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005). Government 
institutions are tempted to devise formal procedures which are designed to increase 
public trust in public administration. They talk, for instance, about the essential need 
for ‘building relationships with publics’, ‘managing issues’ and ‘putting out fires’ to 
avoid disruptions in the ideally stable functioning of administration. 
While ‘building relationships’ may sound as a nice and safe activity to many, 
governments’ instrumental uses of text and talk someti es actually involve elements 




Sermons (Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 2003), there is a section describing the 
following particular communicative technique that governments may use to achieve 
‘acceptance’ from a certain group of ‘governees’. 
A very special tool in the information tool kit is investigation and publicity. 
One effect of an investigation – for instance, in the field of environmental 
policy – could be to push the management of an industrial plant, under the spur 
of public opinion, to make changes in, for instance, polluting practices, in 
advance of or without recourse to regular schemes. Effective as this means of 
control may be in some cases, certain drawbacks associ ted with it make it one 
to be used sparingly. It is inquisitorial and therefo  less pleasant to use. 
(Vedung, 2003, p. 50) 
This suggested technique – instrumental mobilisation of public blaming to increase 
obedience to authority – could be seen as touching t e borderline of coercion: it 
involves ‘pushing’ certain people, placing them ‘under the spur of public opinion’, 
and, as the author himself admits, carrying out an unpleasant inquisition. 
A reference to inquisition is actually very much to the point here if we think of the 
possible origins of the ‘communication as a policy tool’ conceptualisation. 
Administrative writings on government/communication may be seen as having their 
historical roots in the medieval instructional literature called ‘mirrors for princes’. 
Such ruler’s handbooks, famously exemplified by Niccolò Machiavelli’s 16th century 
Il Principe (The Prince), provided monarchs with practical advice on their daily 
business of running a state, doing politics, being in control, and holding on to political 
power. 
Il Principe contains several sections that deal in considerabl detail with symbolic, 
communicative, and performative aspects of politica le dership. The importance of 
such issues for the princes at the time is testified by Machiavelli’s choice of titles for 
his chapters. These include, for example, ‘Chapter 15 – Concerning things for which 
men, and especially princes, are praised or blamed’, ‘Chapter 19 – That one should 
avoid being despised and hated’, ‘Chapter 18 – Concerning the way in which princes 
should keep faith’. Perhaps most (in)famously, Machi velli advises the princes to lie 





[A] wise lord cannot, nor ought he to, keep faith wen such observance may be 
turned against him, and when the reasons that caused him to pledge it exist no 
longer. . . .But it is necessary to know well how to disguise this characteristic, 
and to be a great pretender and dissembler; and men are so simple, and so 
subject to present necessities, that he who seeks to deceive will always find 
someone who will allow himself to be deceived. (Machi velli, 1513/2006, Ch. 
18) 
Going even further back in time, the oldest extant complete handbook on rhetoric, the 
4th  century BC Greek Rhetorica ad Alexandrum (Rhetoric to Alexander) in a rather 
similar vein presents pragmatic guidelines for a particular ruler, King Alexander. The 
anonymous author of the book coaches the king on how to persuade audiences by all 
means and with no particular regard to the benefit of any other than the speaker 
himself (Braet, 1996). As in the case of Il Principe, the author uses imperative 
language and takes the perspective of a ruler who seem  to be constantly in need to 
defend himself against adversaries, including, amongst others, the ‘common people’. 
The common people are not as annoyed at being deprived of public offices as 
they are at being grievously abused. It is necessary to resolve differences 
among citizens as quickly as possible and not to delay or to have a mob from 
the countryside collect in the city. The common peopl  gain strength from 
such meetings and overturn oligarchies. (Rhetoric t Alexander, 2011, p. 489) 
Modern administrative treatments of government/communication have a lot in 
common with these centuries-old works. Their focus is still on advising the authorities 
on tackling the day-to-day tasks of governing. In terms of perspectivation, these works 
are generally written from the standpoint of the administrative system, the government 
as an organisation, its leaders, its officeholders, and thus from the perspective of the 
relatively more powerful groups and individuals: the elite of a society. And in a more 
or less explicit way they all show interest in the practicalities of exerting ‘influence’ 
on other groups and individuals, be it by coercion, handing out money, or the 
mastering of rhetoric as a political art of persuasion and motivation. 
In searching answers to the central question of ‘what works’ in government, the 
authors of these instructional texts typically deal with organisational hierarchies 




‘legal acts’, ‘codes’), and processes (‘planning’, ‘coordinating’, ‘monitoring’, 
‘evaluating’). They draw upon and refer to various r les and regulations (e.g., the 
Official Secrets Act) and encourage the professionals to adopt particular strategies, 
tactics, and techniques (e.g., tips on media management). Some of the typical 
recurrent concepts that are used with a predominantly positive connotation in such 
literature are reminiscent of military language: ‘strategic’, ‘tactical’, ‘operation’, 
‘target’, ‘officer’. 
Works in this tradition generally adhere to a functionalist presumption that the society 
should be characterised by social order, stability, and productivity. More specifically, 
these more or less explicitly idealise the state of play in which (a) the government as a 
system ‘runs like clockwork’ without facing any serious internal or external obstacles 
or disturbances like resistance, scandals, or crises; (b) citizens follow the goals and 
rules set by the government, because there is an acceptable level of 
obedience/consensus/trust in the government among the citizens; and (c) de facto 
acceptance of norms and the compatibility of expectations is sufficient to ensure 
coordination within the society and to guarantee governmental stability. 
Accordingly, those individuals or groups who do notobey the rules are seen as 
deviants. There is a tendency to treat the (news) media as a deviant or an adversary if 
it is criticising the government, or as a helpful extension of the communication ‘tool’ 
if it is withholding criticism and helping to ‘spread the government’s message’. 
The authors who talk about government communication as a commodity share some 
of the functionalist presumptions of the ‘policy instrument’ conceptualisation, but 
there are also significant differences. 
2.2 Government communication as a commodity 
To illustrate how government communication is conceptualised as a commodity, I will 
use as an example a journal article published in Government Information Quarterly by 
Gelders and Ihlen (2010). They write about governmet communication about 
potential policies in terms of a framework that is primarily used in business service 
marketing to improve ‘service quality’. They conclude their analysis with the 




Customer satisfaction will only be achieved when the service meets the 
expected performance. Promotion of realistic expectations through 
performance communication will yield service validity (matching service 
expectations) and thus promote customer satisfaction . . . Politicians should 
learn from businesses to communicate less ambitious promises that are easier 
to reach. They should be inspired by the IKEA company, which announced 
that reorders of missing material will be sent within three weeks all the while 
knowing that it is normally sent within two . . . Such announcements can lead 
to more customer satisfaction than bold political promises. (Gelders & Ihlen, 
2010, pp. 38–39) 
What is striking here, above all, is the use of the word ‘customers’ (rather than 
‘governees’ or ‘citizens’) to refer to groups of peo le outside of the government. In 
line with that, a particular communication technique of a private service company is 
presented as an idealised model or a benchmark that should be followed by the 
government to achieve the ultimate goal of ‘customer satisfaction’. An emphasis is 
thus placed on governing and communicating according to the logic and values of the 
market. 
Unlike within the ‘policy instrument’ literature, the market-centred way of 
conceptualising government/communication implies that people are not expected to be 
obedient to public authorities. Instead, people as ‘cu tomers’ are expected to be self-
interested and rational utility maximisers. This is perhaps best illustrated by an 
influential economic theory of political behaviour devised by an early public choice 
theorist Anthony Downs (1957). His calculus famously includes an assertion that 
rational individuals do not seek political information. 
The government cannot coerce everyone to be well informed, because ‘well-
informedness’ is hard to measure, because there is no agreed-upon rule for 
deciding how much information of what kinds each citizen ‘should’ have, and 
because the resulting interference in personal affairs would cause a loss of 
utility that would probab1y outweigh the gains to be had from a well-informed 
electorate. The most any democratic government has done to remedy this 
situation is to compel young people in schools to take courses in civics, 




minimise his investment in political information, i spite of the fact that most 
citizens might benefit substantially if the whole ectorate were well informed. 
As a result, democratic political systems are bound to operate at less than 
maximum efficiency. (Downs, 1957, p. 148) 
‘Efficiency’ is one of the main keywords characteristic of the ‘commodity’ approach 
to government/communication. This is in line with traditional management books that 
offer advice to managers of production companies on ‘h w to run a business’, usually 
with a special focus on suggesting ways to transform ganisations to increase their 
productivity and efficiency in a competitive environment. This may be achieved by 
increasing organisational ‘competence’, which is talked about in terms of, for example, 
‘leadership and management skills’, ‘training’, ‘innovation’, and ‘knowledge-
intensive services’.                       
Some of the origins of this kind on literature lie in the development of scientific 
engineering of industrial workflows in the late 19th century USA. Taylor’s (1911) 
Principles of Scientific Management – an influential handbook for managers – laid 
down many of its central themes. Taylor prescribed, for instance, rationality, logic, 
economic efficiency, empiricism, and standardisation within organisations. 
Importantly, these principles were seen to be applicab e not only to the running of 
large manufacturing companies but to a whole variety of organisations, possibly 
including governments. 
What does modelling public administration after profit-seeking businesses entail for 
government/communication? In a nutshell, the underlying behavioural script of the 
market-oriented view is that one should carry out research to identify particular 
segments of customers, understand their needs and develop products and services for 
them (in a competitive environment), which would hopefully result in customer 
satisfaction and loyalty. All of this is often supported by meticulously designed and 
tested advertising and brand communication. Accordingly, public communication is 
primarily regarded as a tool for attaining specific goals of organisations, usually 
related to selling more goods or services produced by the organisation (‘marketing’, 
‘promotion’, ‘publicity’, ‘advertising’) and guaranteeing the survival and smooth 
functioning of the organisation via ‘building goodwill’ among people external to the 




‘corporate social responsibility’). Managers talk of ‘investing’ money in 
communication to attain certain business objectives. For example, a senior member of 
the UK government communication staff (G. C.) whom I interviewed for this research 
project, explained that government communicators in the UK are concerned about 
“making sure that we can demonstrate the government communications is delivering a 
good return on investment” (G. C., personal communication, April 28, 2015). 
From this perspective, the (news) media professionals m y be seen as taking on at 
least three different roles. Journalists and editors c uld be regarded as (1) customers 
who should be ‘won over’ so that they would show high levels of ‘customer 
satisfaction, loyalty and goodwill’ in relation to he government, (2) publicity agents 
who could be persuaded or hired to disseminate favour ble messages about the 
government, and (3) competitors who should be outperformed in the race for the 
attention and the ‘hearts’ of particular audiences. 
Organisational public relations practices that have be n widely adopted by modern 
Western governments emerged in U.S. corporations in the early 20th century (Cutlip, 
1994). An early seminal work in the field was Edward Bernays’ (1928) book 
Propaganda, where he (in)famously argued that “the conscious and intelligent 
manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses is an important 
element in democratic society” (p. 9). Therefore it is not surprising that some people 
see governments’ communication activities primarily as full-on attempts to 
manipulate perceptions and behaviour of the people. 
2.3 Government communication as manipulation 
In an essay titled ‘Lying in politics’, Hannah Arendt (1973) warns her readers of “the 
commitment to nontruthfulness in politics … at the highest level of government” (p. 
4). Her case in point is the U.S. government’s propaganda activity surrounding the 
Vietnam War, but she is also making some universal claims about self-serving 
manipulative behaviour of top officeholders. 
Secrecy – what diplomatically is called “discretion”, as well as the arcana 
imperii, the mysteries of government – and deception, the deliberate falsehood 




been with us since the beginning of recorded history. Truthfulness has never 
been counted among the political virtues, and lies have always been regarded 
as justifiable tools in political dealings. (Arendt, 1973, p. 4) 
This quote reflects deep distrust in government/communication. Government is 
depicted as posing an inevitable threat to its ‘governees’ due to its permanent 
disposition to abuse its power and isolate outsider by mystifying its action. This 
conceptualisation uses some of the language reminisce t of the ‘policy instrument’ 
approach (‘means to achieve political ends’, ‘tools in political dealings’) but the writer 
imbues these with negative connotation by associating these with lying as a sin. 
Arendt (1973) specifically writes about the communication practices of the “public-
relations managers in government”, referring to these as the “more recent varieties” 
among “the many genres in the art of lying” (pp. 7–8). 
Public relations is but a variety of advertising; hence it has its origin in the 
consumer society, with its inordinate appetite for g ods to be distributed 
through a market economy. The trouble with the mentality of the public-
relations man is that he deals only in opinions and “good will”, the readiness to 
buy, that is, in intangibles whose concrete reality is at a minimum. … The only 
limitation to what the public-relations man does comes when he discovers that 
the same people who perhaps can be “manipulated” to buy a certain kind of 
soap cannot be manipulated – though, of course, they can be forced by terror – 
to “buy” opinions and political views. (Arendt, 1973, p. 8) 
This conceptualisation is in radical opposition with the ‘commodity’ approach to 
government communication. Arendt reminds her reader that a government ‘outsider’ 
should guard herself against both government communication as a policy instrument 
as well as a commodity. 
This highly suspicious stance is also often taken towards the output of the (news) 
media. Schudson (2008) summarises neatly what he calls the prevailing ‘lay 
understanding’ of how press operates in Western democracies.13 According to this 
                                               





understanding, the media is unable to provide citizens with adequate information 
about public affairs because 
(a) the government keeps information from the press or successfully 
manipulates the press into accepting its spin; (b) the corporate profit-oriented 
entities that gather most news are guided more by the economic advantages of 
sensation, sleaze, and the superficial than by efforts t  inform the public; and 
(c) the professional journalists who work inside thse corporate beasts and try 
to extract bits of truth from devious politicians are occupationally cautious, 
hobbled by in-group values of media elites, and motivated by professional 
advancement or driven by their own political views rather than by a passion to 
make democracy work. (Schudson, 2008, pp. 6–7) 
A concern about people being oppressed by malicious discursive manipulation, 
government-perpetrated propaganda and ‘spin-doctoring’ is the hallmark of numerous 
critical works in philosophy, sociology, political science, history, linguistics, and 
communication studies (among many others, Altheide & Johnson, 1980; Corner, 2007; 
Gaber, 2000; Jowett & O’Donnell, 2006; Marlin, 2002; O’Shaughnessy, 2004; Taylor, 
2003; van Dijk, 2006).  
Propositions in critical academic writings about government communication as 
manipulation can be traced back to the premises laid out in Marxist conflict theory in 
the 19th century. Major influences include the Marxist notion of ‘false consciousness’, 
Gramscian conceptualisation of ‘hegemony’, and the critical tradition of the Frankfurt 
School that focuses on the often subtle cultural and psychological strategies that 
powerful groups use to limit the capacity for critial thought among the masses. One 
of the emblematic notions often used in critical works is, unsurprisingly, ‘critique’. 
Critique may be defined as ‘the art of not being governed quite so much’ (Foucault, 
1997, p. 29) and thus seen as a definite counterpoint to the goal of administrative 
literature, that is, mastering the practical art of g verning. Many of these ideas are 
shared by the critical authors who write about practices of public communicators in 




2.4 Government communication as a factor in (un)doing democracy 
In an oft-cited article titled ‘The Third Age of Political Communication’, Blumler and 
Kavanagh (1999) list three ways how the current practices of mediatised 
government/communication pose problems to the deliberative processes of modern 
democracies. 
• The danger of subordinating public policy to campaign imperatives and the 
immediate pressures of media demand. Most criteria fo  good policy-making 
include time for deliberation, causal analysis, examination of options, conduct 
of pilot studies, and perhaps even incremental decision making. … But it is 
clearly at odds with the media-driven school of ‘instant response.’ 
• The doubtful relevance of much political communication to the substantive 
tasks of government and the substantive concerns of citizens. This arises 
ultimately from (a) politicians’ involvement in image building and projection; 
(b) journalists’ focus on process and dramatic incident, particularly scandals, 
internal party disputes, and politicians’ mistakes; and (c) the struggle for 
tactical supremacy of both sides in their unceasing turf war. 
• The related danger of fostering or reinforcing public indifference and 
skepticism because so much political communication seems too negative, too 
focused on infighting, too scripted, too repetitious, and lacking convincing 
credibility. (Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, pp. 216–217) 
The authors further alert us that “low trust in political communication may in turn 
exert a ‘negative halo effect’ over government attempts to inform people in specific 
policy areas (such as the environment, food safety, or the future of public services)” 
(Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999, p. 217). 
These quotes illustrate not only the authors’ major concern about citizens’ limited 
ability or will to participate in public policy making, but also a rather sophisticated 
understanding of blame issues in relation to governm nt/communication. From this 
perspective, the government deserves blame if officeholders focus on ‘non-substantive’ 
activities like ‘image building’ and ‘infighting’ that do not address the concerns of the 
citizens. However, the blame for such behaviour is seen as shared between the 
government and the media: it is the complex interplay between the officeholders and 




trust in politics. The authors recognise that public communication on the part of the 
government is an integral component of policy-making a d the provision of public 
services, but they are also critically aware of its manipulative tendencies (e.g., ‘image 
making’). Government communication, therefore, could be seen as one of the factors 
in larger societal processes that either advance or limit public participation in political 
debates. 
‘Democratic deficit’ (or ‘political disenchantment’) in contemporary societies is a 
standard theme of many critical studies in sociology, political science, and political 
communication studies (see, e.g., Hay, 2007; Coleman & Blumler, 2009; Dahlgren, 
2009; Norris, 2011). Critical scholars generally suggest that the level of political 
control by the people in modern representative democracies is insufficient, citizens are 
growingly disaffected with their governments, and that certain communication 
practices of governments (among other factors) have led to these negative outcomes. 
From this perspective, governments should ideally observe high standards of integrity 
and commit themselves to certain criteria for ethical communication. Lack of integrity 
is, for these authors, one of the main warrants that justifies blaming the government. 
Much of the critical discussion has been revolving around the Habermasian 
conception of the emergence of the ‘public sphere’ (Öffentlichkeit) and the normative 
theories of democracy, where communication is central. Many share Habermas’ (1984, 
1987, 2006) normative ideal of deliberation as a free, equal, rational argument of all 
parties affected, in an atmosphere of non-coercion. H wever, his critics like Fraser 
(1990), Benhabib (1992), and Mouffe (1999) stress, in a way or another, that because 
power imbalances between individuals and groups are inevitable, consensus cannot 
and should not be reached and thus people should “be open to other points of view in 
a process of continued contestation and deep respect for the adversary” (Wright, 2008, 
p. 32). So, in stark contrast to administrative pers ctives, societal conflicts – 
including public blame firestorms – are not necessarily seen as negative but rather as 
having a “transformative potential” (Held, 1996, p. 241). Indeed, the practice of 
blaming the government when it ‘does wrong’ may be talked of as being worthy of 
praise: in the hope that such blaming has a “valuable educative and deterrent role” 




What kind of transformation and education is sought? In searching answers to the 
question of ‘who benefits at whose expense’, the authors of critical texts often deal 
with the issues of power and knowledge in modern societies. A central thrust is 
educating and empowering the less powerful people by producing and disseminating 
“critical knowledge that enables human beings to emancipate themselves from forms 
of domination through self-reflection” (Wodak & Meyr, 2009, p. 7). This programme 
includes, for example, explicating the ‘technologies of power’ (Foucault, 1977), 
among which the sets of practices and strategies of government/communication may 
be seen as essentially belonging. Many critical authors focus on contesting ways of 
acting that construct and sustain inequalities based on gender, income, race, 
nationality, and so forth. They are opposed diametrically to functionalist and positivist 
scientists who, as they see it, usually disregard or downplay the sources of tension and 
inequality in society. Some recurrent concepts used in critical literature to warrant 
blame are ‘domination’, ‘hegemony’, ‘inequality’, ‘exclusion’, ‘conflict’, and ‘crisis’. 
Blame is often deflected by references to ‘equality’, ‘reflexivity’, and ‘social change’. 
Modern critical approaches to government/communication may be seen as having 
more varied sources of origin besides the Marxist and Gramscian ideas that have been 
already mentioned above. First, Max Weber’s early-20th century sociology provided 
an influential blueprint for analysing contradictions in modern societies. For example, 
he characterised bureaucracy as the most effective and efficient form of organisation, 
but also gave a critical warning that the mechanistic and impersonal application of 
rational rules would lead to a dehumanised society resembling an ‘iron cage’ (Weber, 
1905/1958). Secondly, a major impetus came from the interpretive, linguistic, and 
cultural turns in social sciences in the second half of the 20th century. The beginning 
of this turn is usually associated with the publication of Wittgenstein’s (1953) 
influential Philosophical Investigations. The turn to culture was driven by the rising 
prominence of social and cultural anthropology, andinterpretive ethnography as a 
research method (e.g., Geertz, 1973; Goffman, 1969). 
One realisation that is perhaps most characteristic to the linguistically oriented stream 
of critical scholarship is that communication can be used in political life both in ways 
that increase equality in society as well as in ways that isolate certain groups or 




Martin Reisigl (2008) defines political speeches as ‘interactional contributions to 
identity politics’ that function to 
accomplish the two political purposes of inclusion and exclusion. On the one 
hand, they are socially integrative by contributing to the formation of 
transindividual identity and to the foundation of group solidarity. On the other 
hand, they can fulfil disintegrative and destructive functions by mobilising 
addressees to social exclusion and, at worst, to violent attacks against those 
excluded and denigrated by the orator. (Reisigl, 2008, p. 251) 
Researchers working within the tradition of critical discourse studies have developed 
some essential tools for delineating between these functions in political text and talk. 
For instance, they have produced critical accounts of how racism, antisemitism, 
ethnicism, and populism are reflected in discourses (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; 
Krzyżanowski & Wodak, 2009; Wodak, KhosraviNik, & Mral, 2013; Wodak, 2015), 
provided detailed analyses of the discursive construction of history and national 
identity (Martin & Wodak, 2003; Heer, Manoschek, Pollak, & Wodak, 2008; Wodak, 
De Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 2009), and carried out ethnographic studies of how 
language is used in the backstage of political institutions (Wodak, 2011). Importantly, 
as I will show in the following chapters, the same context-sensitive linguistic tools can 
be applied to gain a more sophisticated understanding of how blaming and blame 
avoidance work in government communication (see also Hansson, 2015a, 2015b). 
2.5 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have adopted the lens of blame/avoid nce strategies as a heuristic 
device to distinguish between alternative ways in which government communication 
is conceptualised in academic literature. I summarise the main characteristics of the 





Table 2.1. Four conceptualisations of government communication 
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This fourfold distinction is an important step towards understanding the basic ways in 
which discursive blame avoidance in government communication could be interpreted 
(and hence a step towards answering my central research question). It suggests that a 
particular way of interpreting blame avoidance in government is dialectically related 
to the interpreter’s general conceptualisation of government communication.  
• If one conceptualises government communication primarily as a policy 
instrument, blame avoidance seems to be a set of measur s that should be 
activated whenever receiving blame might hamper or block the government 
from achieving its policy objectives.  
• If one conceptualises government communication as a commodity, blame 
avoidance appears to be a necessary craft of ‘managing’ blame as a business 
risk that is related to customer dissatisfaction.  
• If government communication is taken to be essentially manipulative, blame 
avoidance on the side of the government seems to serve the maintenance of 
unequal power relations between the government and he victims of its 
manipulation: Avoiding blame means withstanding (and ignoring) the 
objections less powerful groups and individuals expr ss against the oppression 
by the ruling elites. 
• If one conceptualises government communication as an essential component of 
democratic political life that may have both positive and negative implications, 
then both blaming and blame avoidance have a potential to foster social 
learning as well as to increase democratic deficit. 
My focus on alternative ways of framing problems bears resemblance to the 
grid/group model of cultural theory that originated in the work of the anthropologist 
Mary Douglas (Thompson, Ellis, & Wildavsky, 1990; Hood, 1998) and the 
constitutive metamodel of communication theory proposed by Robert T. Craig (1999, 
2007). Both of these models outline mutually antagonistic ways of thinking about 
certain social phenomena: the former does so with ‘organising’ and the latter with 
‘communicating’. The results of my study and these two models have some possible 





According to the grid/group cultural theory, one can distinguish between four 
competing ways of thinking and talking about how various collectivities are organised: 
hierarchist, individualist, fatalist, and egalitarian (Hood, 1998). Based on my analysis, 
the ‘policy instrument’ conceptualisation of government communication may be seen 
as chiming with the hierarchist view of organising, the ‘commodity’ conceptualisation 
with the individualist view, and the ‘manipulation’ and ‘un/doing democracy’ 
conceptualisations with the egalitarian view of organising. Some writings on 
government communication as manipulation also contain tr ces of fatalism, for 
instance, intensified claims of someone being completely and inevitably excluded 
from important debates over public affairs due to the innate dishonesty of the 
government and the uselessness of the press in uncovering its deceptive moves.  
According to Craig’s (1999, 2007) metamodel, one can distinguish between at least 
eight competing traditions of theorising communication: rhetorical, semiotic, 
phenomenological, cybernetic, sociopsychological, sociocultural, critical, and 
pragmatist. In the light of my analysis, it seems that those who write about 
government/communication from the ‘administrative’ (or blame taker’s) perspective 
typically gravitate towards three of these traditions: (1) rhetorical tradition, where 
communication is seen as the practical art of discourse, (2) cybernetic tradition, where 
communication is conceptualised as the flow of information, and (3) 
sociopsychological tradition, where the focus is on the effects of interaction on 
individuals. Why would ‘administrative’ authors base their works primarily on these 
selected conceptualisations of communication and large y ignore all the others? I 
suggest that they do so because these three are the most functionalist traditions in 
communication research: rhetorical, cybernetic, and sociopsychological approaches 
are best geared towards generating practical advice on how to avoid blame, how to 
persuade, control, and manipulate people. As Craig (1999) succinctly puts it, these 
three traditions, unlike others, “valorise technique” (p. 26). 
My proposed heuristic model has at least two caveats. First, it certainly is not a 
comprehensive explanatory or predictive theory and I am not making any claims of its 
universality. The fourfold classification scheme applies only to existing academic 
works dealing with government and its communication activities in Western 
democracies. While empirically grounded, the conceptualisations should be seen as 




fusions between the four types. It should not come as a surprise that authors borrow or 
appropriate concepts from other perspectives (e.g., ‘administrative’ works may 
include some ‘language of democracy’ that is calculted to appeal to some ‘critical’ 
readers). An attempt to label each individual author as permanently belonging to only 
one of the ‘streams’ could also be misleading. In separate pieces of work, a single 
author may adopt different stances in relation to blaming the government, thereby 
contributing to different ‘streams’ of literature as defined here. 
Second, what I have devised is just one possible way of theorising government 
communication. I have explicitly placed the practical issues of blaming and avoiding 
blame – or seen more broadly, the discursive negotiati ns of interpersonal relations of 
power via legitimising and delegitimising – at the centre stage. I have highlighted 
some of the fundamental conflicts between different ways of talking and writing about 
government/communication. In so doing, I am siding with ‘critical’ rather than 
‘administrative’ approaches and subscribing to the ‘un/doing democracy’ 
conceptualisation of government/communication. Indeed, this is evident already in the 
introductory chapter of this thesis, where I use discursive strategies which are typical 
to this conceptualisation. And as a critical work, my contribution to the theory of 
government communication is, of course, itself wide op n to criticism. 
Despite these caveats, I hope to have expanded the theoretical boundaries of 
government communication research by showing how its various conceptualisations 
could be put into conversation with each other over particular issues of blame. In the 
next chapter, I will shift my focus on the various conceptual tools that can be used to 






3. The blame game and the language game: A discursive 
guide to the politics of blame/avoidance 
Since the 1980s, scholars of political science and public administration have produced 
a substantial body of literature on the topic of blame avoidance in democratic 
governments (e.g., Weaver, 1986; McGraw, 1990; Pierson, 1994; Bovens, ’t Hart, 
Dekker, & Verheuvel, 1999; Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2006; Hering, 2008; Hood, 2002, 
2011; Mitchell, 2012; Hobolt & Tilley, 2014; Hinterl itner & Sager, 2015). In his 
seminal article ‘The Politics of Blame Avoidance’, Kent Weaver (1986) noted that 
political actors who wield executive power are often motivated in their policy 
decisions by the desire to avoid blame, because receiving blame might lead to 
diminished voter support at the next elections.14 Taking this idea a step further, 
Christopher Hood (2011) has convincingly argued that bl me avoidance should be 
regarded as a “political and bureaucratic imperative” (p. 24) that guides the behaviour 
of officeholders at all levels of the government, icluding those who inhabit non-
elected civil service positions. According to Hood, fficeholders’ concern about 
receiving blame affects the way government organisations are structured, what kind of 
policies and operating routines officeholders adopt, and how they present themselves 
and their work to the public. 
A notable metaphor that is commonly used in the blame voidance literature is 
government ‘blame game’. This metaphor links the target domain of executive politics 
with the source domain of playing a game. It is notori usly difficult to provide a neat 
and comprehensive definition of the concept of ‘game’ (Wittgenstein, 1953). 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that by using the ‘blame game’ metaphor 
the writers essentially represent those political ators who blame, and those who avoid 
blame as ‘players’ that use their skills and other resources to try to ‘win’ some kind of 
competition by making certain calculated ‘moves’ in a supposedly adversarial 
interaction. 
                                               
14 Weaver’s conceptualisation of the politics of blame avoidance was notably influenced by the 
psychological theories of choice that emphasised th ‘negativity bias’: the notion that the perception of 





The interactive nature of the blame game means that if an analyst wants to develop a 
comprehensive understanding of blame avoidance, she should also pay due attention 
to how (and by whom, in relation to what, for what purposes, etc.) blame is generated. 
And vice versa: a study of blame-making would remain incomplete without 
considering the possibility that a blame attack might be pre-empted, mitigated or 
countered by a potential blame taker. Ignoring one sid of the interaction would be as 
futile as trying to understand a chess or football match by looking at only defensive or 
only offensive strategies adopted by the players.15 
In my study, I treat academic text and talk about blame and blame avoidance as 
‘language games’ (Wittgenstein, 1953), and as recont xtualisations16 whereby text 
producers omit, background, emphasise, or modify certain aspects of social reality 
(van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). This allows me to study the ‘anatomy’ of the blame 
game from a discursive point of view: to identify some recurring components (or 
content topics) in stories about blame and blame avoid nce in government, and 
suggest ways of analysing blame and blame avoidance s oncrete institutionally and 
historically situated discursive practices. My overall goal is to improve our 
understanding of how blame games are constructed throug  language and to help 
orient future studies on this topic. Hence, I begin by situating the discursive study of 
political blame games in the wider scholarship dealing with a variety of blame 
phenomena. 
3.1 Approaches to blame phenomena 
The approach I adopt when I examine blame phenomena is multidisciplinary and 
discursive. What this means, above all, is that rather than trying to define through the 
lens of a particular discipline what blame ‘is’ (or t  determine when it is appropriate 
                                               
15 That is why I prefer to use the term ‘blame/avoidance’ instead of ‘blame avoidance’: the former is 
meant to stand for an integral relationship while th  latter seems to refer exclusively to the motivations 
and actions of a ‘defending side’. Indeed, blaming a d avoiding blame imply each other, just like 
Foucault’s (1980) ‘power/knowledge’. By using the fused concept of blame/avoidance I wish to (a) 
emphasise the dynamic, conversational character of blame phenomena in political life, and (b) remind 
the readers that someone who is being blamed may choose to generate blame in response – so that 
‘avoiding blame’ sometimes paradoxically means ‘generating blame’. 
16 ‘Recontextualising’ is a term that is used in discourse studies to refer to the transformations that 
occur when a practice is turned into discourses, e.g. when it is written or spoken about in a variety of 




to blame someone, or which are the most effective moves if one wants to avoid blame, 
etc.), I look at how blame phenomena are constructed through language use, and 
discuss how these may be subjectively perceived. There is no single universal 
definition of ‘blame’ – and perhaps there should not be one. I presume that there are 
many different ways one could conceptualise ‘blame’ and related phenomena. As will 
become clear below, researchers ask different questions about blame phenomena and 
go about answering these in a variety of ways. 
As an initial orienting step, I suggest that the academic approaches to blame 
phenomena can be divided into three broad groups based on whether these are mainly 
grounded in philosophical, psychological, or sociological research traditions. 
Philosophically oriented approaches to blame are based on logical argument, 
intuitions, conceptual analysis, thought experiments, and introspection. Usually 
scholars imagine and discuss hypothetical scenarios to illustrate what 
‘blameworthiness’ or ‘being a moral agent’ might mean: neither experiments nor 
ethnographic fieldwork are carried out and no substantial amount of real-life data is 
collected. 
Scholars of moral philosophy (or ethics) have tradiionally been engaged in 
discussions over the abstract concepts of ‘moral responsibility’ and ‘moral agency’, 
their principal question being ‘who is an apt candidate for blame or praise’. Such 
discussions have a very long history in the Western philosophical tradition, dating 
back at least to Aristotle’s 350 B.C. Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle, 2004). Much of 
these historical debates have involved metaphysical attempts at defining (seemingly 
rational and universal) criteria for blameworthiness (Strawson, 1962). More recently, 
philosophers have focused on the role of blame in interpersonal relationships and 
regard blaming as a natural reaction we have towards someone’s ill will, as well as a 
tool we use to regulate others’ attitudes and behaviour (Coates & Tognazzini, 2013b). 
They remind us that blaming should not be regarded as something essentially negative 
or harmful. In his book In Praise of Blame, George Sher (2006) rightly argues that 
“living a fully moral life requires blaming those who ignore or flout morality’s 
demands” as the “unpleasantness of the anger and reproaches that wrongdoers and bad 
people must often endure” can be seen as playing a “valuable educative and deterrent 




What could be seen as constituting ‘flouting morality’s demands’ is one of the central 
themes in ethical theorising. There are three competing traditions in contemporary 
Western moral philosophy: 
1. deontology, a view that an act and/or intention should be evaluated on the basis 
of whether or not it conforms with a moral norm (a right or a duty); 
2. consequentialism, a view that an act and/or intention should be evaluated on 
the basis of its outcomes; and 
3. virtue ethics, a view that an act and/or intention should be evaluated on the 
basis of the character of the actor (e.g., her honesty, benevolence, etc.). 
For a discursive study of government blame games, th  main takeaway points from 
the reading of philosophical literature are that (a) bl me can be conceptualised and 
talked about in either more abstract or more practic l ways, (b) blaming can be 
regarded as a natural response as well as more or less calculated action that carries a 
social function, (c) participants in a blame game may choose to emphasise in their text 
and talk either the rights and obligations of actors, consequences of actions, or the 
character traits of actors, and (d) blame phenomena ca  only be understood in relation 
to particular systems of (shared) values. 
Psychologically oriented studies of blame typically seek to provide empirical answers 
to questions about people’s mental processes in relation to moral judgements. In 
contrast to philosophical approaches, psychological blame phenomena are often 
studied quantitatively, that is, measured by subjecting selected human participants to 
various tests like questionnaires, brain imaging, timing of task completion, and so 
forth (e.g., see Weiner, 2006). While there are many competing views within the 
discipline of psychology on how blame should be theorised (Malle, Guglielmo, & 
Monroe, 2014; Malle, Monroe, & Guglielmo, 2014), researchers share a common 
interest in what is happening inside the mind of a person who makes certain moral 
judgments or experiences moral emotions.17 Accordingly, scholars who mainly use 
                                               
17 Blame has both private (mental) and public (social) sides. Psychological studies of blame tend to 
focus on the former, unexpressed and invisible side: the results of experiments are usually interpreted as 
reflecting the test subjects’ moral emotions (e.g., anger, guilt, shame) and judgments, that is, 
evaluations of the wrongness and permissibility of actions, and socio-cognitive assessments of mental 
states and intentions of other persons. The mental processes may include perceiving an event (i.e., 
behaviour or outcome) as violating some norm, assessing the severity of the violation, establishing a 




psychological research methods tend to pay relativey little attention to (the social 
construction and uses of) norms, histories, traditions, social problems, and power 
relations that may underlie blame phenomena in political life – these ‘variables’ 
cannot be easily detected and manipulated in experimental settings. 
Sociologically oriented approaches to blame are adopted by scholars who are 
generally less interested in understanding blame phenomena primarily as mental 
processes of individuals, or as topics of abstract heorising. Instead, their interest lies 
mainly in making sense of blame phenomena that unfold in human social action in 
real-life (non-experimental) situations, often occurring at the level of groups and 
societies. Such scholars include sociologists (e.g., Goffman, 1967, 2010; Thompson, 
2000; Adut, 2008; Tilly, 2008), political scientists (e.g., Weaver, 1986; Anderson, 
1995; Hood, 2011; Young, 2011; Stone, 2012), anthropologists (e.g., Douglas, 1982), 
criminal law theorists (e.g., Felstiner, Abel, & Sarat, 1980; Robinson, 1982; Moore, 
2010; Crofts, 2013; Dingwall & Hillier, 2015), communication researchers (e.g., 
Iyengar, 1990; Knobloch-Westerwick & Taylor, 2008; Entman, 2012; Ewart & 
McLean, 2015), and linguists (e.g., Pomerantz, 1978; Brown & Levinson, 1987; 
Buttny, 1993; Benke & Wodak, 2003; Wodak, 2006a). 
Some of these researchers concentrate on micro-socilogi al analysis of concrete 
interpersonal encounters that may involve blaming while others approach blame in 
relation to macro-level social, political, cultural and historical processes like 
(de)legitimation of political power and action, social change, democratic elections, 
mediated scandals, and crisis tendencies in certain societal arrangements. Accordingly, 
knowledge of blame phenomena is constructed using various quantitative and 
qualitative social science research methods, including forms of analysis of text and 
talk, interviews, ethnographic observations, opinion surveys, and statistical modelling. 
                                                                                                                             
intentionally, considering what may have been the reasons for her action, considering the agent’s 
obligation and capacity for preventing norm violation (i.e., whether she should and could have avoided 
this), considering agent’s character, and experiencing moral emotions that interact with other mental 
processes (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Alicke, 2000; Shaver, 1985; Weiner, 2006). 
Psychologists who study the attribution of blame in the tradition of Heider (1958), note that the cause of 
an actor’s behaviour can be either internalised (e.g., attributed to her ability or effort) or externalised 
(attributed to situational factors, e.g., peer hindra ce). A lot of research has focused on attributional 
biases, that is, systematic errors people tend to make when reasoning about the causes of behaviours. 
Probably the most widely known of these biases is called the fundamental attribution error – “the 
relative disregarding of situational causality or the over-allocation of dispositional ascriptions” (Weiner, 




In addition, such studies are more or less explicitly ouched in at least one of the main 
streams of social theorising: functionalism, conflict theories, and symbolic 
interactionism. 
• From a functionalist perspective, blaming may be seen as an instrument of 
social regulation or social control, and evaluated on the basis of whether it 
supports or disrupts the operation of society as a whole.  
• From a conflict theoretical perspective, blaming is intimately related to the 
notions of social critique and political crisis: Blaming is a way of contesting 
powerful groups and individuals who cause or sustain injustice, inequality, 
xenophobia, and other social problems that are constructed by less powerful 
groups and individuals as needing a decisive intervention. Accordingly, from 
such a critical point of view, blame avoidance could be seen as a set of 
strategies that powerful groups and individuals use to defend themselves 
against social critique and hold on to power.  
• At the centre of micro-sociological symbolic interactionist accounts of blame 
phenomena is the notion of meaning making: Blaming a d blame avoidance 
may be seen as conversations between people who ascribe meaning to objects, 
actions, and concepts. 
A discursive study of government blame game, as I see it, mainly follows the 
symbolic interactionist path: the blame game is conceived of as a goal-oriented and 
often highly mediated discursive struggle over the meaning of (potentially negative) 
events and (potentially blameworthy) actors in relation to government. Hence, to carry 
out a comprehensive analysis of a government blame game, one needs to combine at 
least three kinds of specialist knowledge: 
1. how people use symbolic resources like language, images, props, and so forth, 
to construct certain impressions and persuade others o change their attitudes 
and behaviour in relation to a participant of a blame game; 
2. how people use various media to amplify, sustain, or cover up stories about 





3. how the behaviour of the participants in the blame game is both facilitated and 
constrained by various institutional, historical, and political factors (e.g., the 
political triggers and outcomes of a blame game). 
A useful heuristic device for bringing these types of knowledge together is the context 
model employed in discourse-historical studies (Wodak, 2011). According to this 
model, researchers should interpret a blame game by switching systematically 
between several levels of analysis. Doing a micro-level linguistic analysis means 
zooming in on concrete episodes of text and talk nd intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationships, for instance, capturing the dynamics of interaction and taking into 
consideration other texts that the interactants mayincorporate or refer to in their 
offensive or defensive messages. The analysis of extra-linguistic institutional and 
situational variables means engaging with middle-range theories that focus n the 
institutions involved in the blame game, including media as the venue where the most 
visible games are initiated and played out. Macro-leve  analysis means zooming out to 
capture broader historical and socio-political backdrop, for instance, the financial 
crisis and austerity politics as a motivation for va ious groups to cast blame on the 
government and a motivation for government officeholders to try to ward off blame. 
In the next section I outline some of the conceptual tools and insights that, in my view, 
are essential for analysing government blame games at these levels: discursive 
strategies of persuasion, mediation of blame (scandal and crisis), and the variables of 
the political and institutional environment. 
3.2 Conceptual tools for analysing government blame games 
Discursive strategies 
A central concept for the linguistic analysis of blame games is discursive strategy. 
Discourse analysis traditionally involves examining concrete instances of text or talk 
as linguistic means for persuasion and hypothesising about their goals and effects. 




practices adopted by speakers or writers to achieve particular goals (e.g., political, 
social, psychological).18 
This line of analysis can be traced back to Aristotle’s 4th century BC On Rhetoric 
(Aristotle, 2007), a seminal treatise of the art and ethics of public speaking. Perhaps 
the most well-known insight from this work is his threefold typology of the general 
modes of persuasion by spoken word: the perceived credibility and goodwill of the 
speaker (ethos), appeals to the emotions of the audience (pathos), and logical 
argumentation (logos). All of these means of persuasion are exploited by the 
participants in government blame games. Receiving blame may diminish the 
perceived credibility of the speaker as a source. Thus the strategic placing of blame 
can be seen as an attempt to deprive the blame taker of some of her persuasive means. 
Accordingly, from a classical rhetorical perspective, an officeholder who tries to avoid 
blame does so not only to defend the public impression of her good character but also 
to keep her persuasive ‘artillery’ intact. 
Participants in a blame game deploy discursive strategies either to attack or defend 
face. ‘Face’ is a key analytic concept for scholars who study blame phenomena within 
the traditions of symbolic interactionist sociology, sociopragmatics, and discourse-
historical analysis. From Erving Goffman’s (1969) dramaturgical perspective, face (or 
‘mask’ or ‘front’) is a set of techniques that is ued by a performing person (e.g., a 
government officeholder speaking on television) to control the way audience 
perceives her. Face can also be conceptualised a set of basic human wants: People 
want to act so that they are not impeded by others, and people want their goals to be 
approved by others (Brown & Levinson, 1987). By blaming a person we express 
disapproval. Thus blaming can be categorised as a ‘face threatening act’. In this sense, 
blaming belongs to a broad family of linguistic ways of causing offence. Face-
threatening behaviour includes, for instance, using insults, complaints, silencers (‘Shut 
up!’), threats and negative expressives, ignoring the other’s presence, belittling the 
other, interrupting, and seeking disagreement (Culpeper, 1996, 2011, 2015).19 
                                               
18  For a concise discussion of the various uses of the term ‘strategy’ in linguistics, see Culpeper (2015). 
19 Blaming should be distinguished from many seemingly similar acts like criticising someone’s ideas, 
disagreeing with someone, calling someone names, being impolite or rude to someone, heckling, 




Blame-avoiding behaviour can be thought of as serving the goal of saving one’s face. 
On the one hand, a potential blame taker may try to avoid various acts that might 
threaten her own face, for example, (possibly) confrontational encounters, confessions, 
admissions of guilt, and self-contradictions. On the other hand, a (potential) blame 
taker may choose to carry out various acts that either uphold or attack face of the 
(potential) blame maker and/or the audience of the blame game with a view to 
reducing their desire to generate blame. Upholding face could take the form of acting 
politely to help “maintain the social equilibrium and the friendly relations” (Leech, 
1983, p. 82) with others. This can be realised in a variety of ways, for example, by 
claiming common ground (e.g., using ingroup identity markers, presupposing 
common knowledge, joking, expressing admiration and interest), representing the 
relationship as cooperative (e.g., assuming and asserting reciprocity, expressing 
concern for the wants of others), fulfilling the wants of others (e.g., giving gifts), and 
minimising imposing on others by being indirect, hedging, impersonalising and 
nominalising (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Attacking face to avoid blame could take 
the form of what Culpeper (2011) calls ‘coercive impoliteness’: offensive language 
use that is calculated to force a (potential) blame maker to withhold her (future) 
criticism. An impolite utterance serves a function of coercion, for example, when in 
response to a journalist’s blame-implicative question at a press briefing, an 
officeholder says that asking such a question is foolish.20 
In general, the systematic ways individuals and groups use language to persuade 
others to blame or not to blame someone can be broken down into linguistic strategies 
of naming, attributing, arguing, perspective taking, and intensifying/mitigating 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2009; Kwon, Clarke, & Wodak, 2009; Clarke, Kwon, & Wodak, 
2012; Wodak, 2011; see also Appendix A). 
• Naming and attributing can be used to mobilise audiences by establishing 
ingroups and outgroups and labelling actors or actions as positive (e.g., ‘a 
great opportunity’) or negative (e.g., ‘troubled’). This often involves the use of 
                                                                                                                             
all of these communicative acts can be realised so that they do not imply that the addressee should be 
seen as blameworthy.   
20 Culpeper’s (2011) distinguishes between three functio s of impoliteness: affective, coercive and 
entertaining. I suggest that the same functions apply to blame. Blaming can be seen as an ‘objective’ 
affective reaction to someone’s behaviour, as a ‘whip’ for enforcing someone to comply, or as a 




linguistic membership categorisation devices and references to stereotypes. 
For example, if in an official announcement a cabinet minister in the UK 
compares the UK economy with that of ‘troubled Europe’, he may be 
attempting to diminish the risk of receiving blame from UK citizens by 
implying that they belong to a privileged, ‘non-troubled’ ingroup. 
• Arguing involves using argumentation schemes and warrants tha  lead to the 
conclusion that someone should be blamed or not. For example, to support a 
standpoint that a particular officeholder deserves blame, a blame maker may 
be asked to demonstrate that the officeholder caused a negative outcome, did it 
intentionally, and had an obligation and capacity to prevent it.  
• Perspective taking involves using a variety of linguistic devices (e.g., deictics, 
reported speech, metaphors) to indicate speaker’s or writer’s point of view and 
involvement, that is, whether she is aligning with the position of the blame 
maker or the blame taker in a particular blame game. For example, when a 
news story contains several direct quotations of an opposition politician who is 
blaming the government but the blame taker is not qu ed once, then the text 
seems to primarily represent the blame maker’s perspective.  
• Intensifying and mitigating devices (e.g., hyperboles, vague expressions, 
hesitations) are used by participants to modify the epistemic and deontic status 
of utterances. For example, when a minister says in a speech, “I’ve always 
believed in the benefits of migration and immigration”, then the word ‘always’ 
is a hyperbole that she perhaps uses to fend off possible criticism for taking an 
‘anti-immigration’ stance or for changing her previously held views. 
Such detailed linguistic breakdowns, combined with knowledge of several layers of 
context, help us identify and examine the techniques that speakers and writers use to 
trigger particular emotional reactions from certain udiences or to exploit audience’s 
vulnerability (e.g., cognitive limitations or biases in judgement) by persuading them 
emotionally rather than rationally. For instance, blame/avoidance may involve 
argumentative moves which may be regarded as fallacious to attribute blame to the 




out a negative characteristic of the opponent), tu quoque (appeal to opponent’s 
hypocrisy), and victim-perpetrator reversal (blaming the victim).21 
These basic linguistic strategies may be conceived of as small but essential building 
blocks of offensive and defensive formations used by participants in blame games of 
all sorts. However, political scientists who study the inner workings of public 
administration provide us with insights into discursive strategies that are more specific 
to government. They point out some compelling ways in which blame-related 
language games and their inherent and frequently presu posed rules are embedded in 
the construction of government policies and the everyday professional lives of 
executive officeholders. 
The political scientist Deborah Stone (1989, 2012) suggests that we should look at 
how political actors construct ausal stories that place blame to certain actors for 
certain situations or actions and, by doing this, affect the formation of public policy 
agendas. Stone claims that causal stories form the ess nce of political problem 
definition and are thus instrumental in struggles btween individuals and groups over 
policy issues. 
Problem definition is centrally concerned with attributing bad conditions to 
human behaviour instead of to accident, fate, or nature. . . .The process of 
problem definition cannot be explained by looking solely at political actors, 
the nature of bad conditions, or the characteristics of issues. Problem definition 
is the active manipulation of images of conditions by competing political 
actors. Conditions come to be defined as problems through the strategic 
portrayal of causal stories. (Stone, 1989, p. 299) 
Causal stories differ based on whether the actions in question are described as 
unguided or purposeful and whether the consequences of these actions are depicted as 
intended or unintended. The types of causal stories, with admittedly fuzzy boundaries, 
can be roughly mapped out as follows (Stone, 1989, p. 285): 
                                               
21 For useful discussions of fallacious arguments, see for instance, van Eemeren & Grootendorst (1992), 




• Intentional cause. People are perceived to have direct control over th i actions 
and carry these out with a particular goal in mind. Examples include stories 
about assault, oppression, victimising, and deliberately concealed activities. 
• Mechanical cause. People are perceived to behave wilfully, but have only 
indirect control over the outcome because of the involvement of an 
‘intervening agent’. Examples include blaming technology for disasters at 
power plants or aeroplane accidents, and blaming people for causing harm 
when they carry out the will of others. 
• Inadvertent cause. People are perceived to behave wilfully, but with 
unintended consequences. Examples include stories of ‘harmful side effects of 
well-intentioned policy’, but also stories of carelessness and recklessness. 
• Accidental cause. Total absence of human control and intention. Examples 
include natural disasters and accidents caused by severe weather conditions. 
Importantly, during a debate or confrontation, political actors may calculatedly choose 
to ‘move’ between these different stories, or try to ‘push’ explanations from one 
causal story type to another, based on their perceived argumentative strength, to 
defend their position. 
Hood (1998) provides another useful government-specific analytic tool for making 
sense of competing stories of blame. Drawing upon the grid/group cultural theory 
devised by the anthropologist Mary Douglas (1982), Hood suggests that people regard 
different public administration phenomena as ‘failures’ or ‘problems’ depending on 
their world-view or ‘cultural bias’. Four distinct ideal type world-views can be 
delineated, each of which entails a general understanding of how government should 
be organised, what government should or should not do, what constitutes a problem or 
a failure in government, and how these matters should be talked about. 
Accordingly, Hood (1998, pp. 24–26) outlines four distinct and mutually exclusive 
clusters of government-related blame that people who share a particular world view 
typically produce when almost any kind of problems occur. Each of these lines of 
blame can be paired up with a plausible counter-argument that emphasises the 





1. Poor compliance with established rules and lack of pr fessional expertise. 
Lack of rules, not enough strict following of existing rules and best practices, 
too little planning, poor coordination, unclear assignment of authority, weak 
managerial ‘grip’, and limited use of expert knowledg . These events prevail 
in blame narratives generated from the ‘hierarchist’ point of view. To counter 
such criticism, one may choose to emphasise the risk of fiascos resulting from 
excessive trust in authority and expertise. These include large-scale policy 
planning and delivery failures (which may lead to technological disasters, 
military defeat, etc.) that are caused by massive miscalculations and human 
error, often as a result of ‘groupthink’, procedural rigidity, and failure to learn 
from mistakes. These failures are characteristic of the ‘hierarchist’ way of 
organising. 
2. Abuse of power by top-level government leaders and system corruption. Too 
many (often contradictory) rules, overly strict (blind, rigid) rule following, 
overreliance on experts, the tendency to scapegoat subordinate officials and to 
blame the victims, deficit of ‘democracy’, too little ‘empowerment’ of people 
who could challenge the self-interest of leaders, lack of community 
participation. These events prevail in the ‘egalitarian’ stories about 
government failures. To counter such criticism, onemay choose to emphasise 
the risk of unresolved conflict. This essentially includes perceived lack of 
capacity to govern effectively and to exert central authority, resulting in 
seemingly endless confrontations, disobedience of public servants, and in 
extreme cases – civil war. These failures are charateristic of the ‘egalitarian’ 
way of organising. 
3. Faulty incentive structures through over-collectivisation and lack of price 
signals. Too much collectivisation and organisation, excessive faith in 
planning and authority, lack of regard to individuals s self-interested rational 
choosers, too little stress on personal ambition and competition among 
individuals, ignoring the advantages of market systems. These charges are 
typically presented in government-related failure stories produced by the 
adherents of ‘individualist’ world-view. To counter such criticism, one may 




Problems under this category include misappropriation of public property, 
extortion, and bribery (corruption); abandonment (avoiding unpleasant work); 
grandeur, self-indulgence, and ego-tripping. These failures are characteristic of 
the ‘individualist’ way of organising. 
4. No one should be blamed. Many problems and failures in societal life are 
unique, random, unpredictable, unintended, and involve indeterminate ‘X-
factors’. Thus blaming a person or a system (or government) for a past failure 
is wrong and prescribing big ‘remedies’ against future failures is futile. 
According to Hood (1998), such views are voiced by those who share a 
‘fatalist’ cultural bias according to the grid/group theory. To counter this 
stance, one may choose to highlight the risks related to apathy and inertia. 
This includes perceived lack of planning, initiative, and foresight; lack of 
disposition to take responsibility, being stuck in (possibly pointless) routines, 
and incapability to take action to avoid serious dangers and to overcome 
extreme problems. These failures are characteristic of he ‘fatalist’ way of 
organising. 
Hood’s analysis drives home the point that there cannot exist a particular way of 
governing that would be universally failure-proof and thus also blame-proof. Failure 
and blame are inseparable aspects of political life. Th refore government 
officeholders carefully seek to present themselves in ways that might limit blame. 
Some of the most typical ‘presentational strategies’ (Hood, 2011) of blame avoidance 
in public administration include engaging in an argument over blameworthiness 
(denying, providing justifications or excuses, shifting blame), offering a quick 
apology to deflate blame, diverting public attentio away from the blame-attracting 
event or actor, and using covert ways to discourage blame-generating (e.g., hiding 
information about failures and norm-violations, threatening potential blame makers). 
For a more detailed analysis, the specific ways government officeholders use language 
to avoid blame can be broken down into discursive strategies of arguing, framing, 
representing social actors and actions, denying, legitimising, and manipulating (see 
Chapter 4; Hansson, 2015a). 
A close analysis of the discursive strategies – conventional goal-oriented 




government blame game. However, government blame gaes usually take place on 
highly visible stages like websites, television, radio, and newspapers. Such extensive 
mediation adds specific variables to the game, thus compelling the analyst to engage 
with relevant insights from the sociology of media. 
Mediation of blame 
Within media sociology and communication studies, government blame games can be 
interpreted in terms of theories of mediated scandal. Political scandals could be seen 
as “struggles over symbolic power” which have the capacity to “destroy reputations” 
of (often powerful) individuals and “undermine trust” in them (Thompson, 2000, p. 
245). 
According to the sociologist John B. Thompson (2000), the common themes of 
political scandals include sexual transgressions, fi ancial misconduct, and abuse of 
power by top officeholders. Such scandals, Thompson writes, have the following five 
characteristics: 
1. someone breaks a norm in (at least partial) secrecy; 
2. the occurrence of transgression becomes known to a ‘n n participant’; 
3. someone who learns about the transgression feels off nded by the 
transgression; 
4. someone expresses publicly (via media) their disapproval of the transgression;   
5. publicly expressed blame poses a threat to the reputation of the person(s) who 
committed the transgression. 
Other authors have more recently pointed out that the ransgressions that precede 
publicised allegations (1) are often not real, but only apparent or alleged, and (2) are 
often not concealed but are well-known to many (Adut, 2008; Entman, 2012). Indeed, 
a frequent type of political scandal is ‘talk scandl’ which arises when a politician 
says something – often publicly and in the limelight of media – that is disapproved by 
some observer(s) as an illegitimate or inappropriate speech act (Ekström & Johansson, 
2008). Hence, a scandal could be more broadly defined as “an event of varying 




a negatively oriented audience and lasts as long as there is significant and sustained 
public interest in it” (Adut, 2008, p. 12).22 
A central concept used in analysing mediated scandal is fr ming (see, among many 
others, Goffman, 1974; de Vreese, 2012; Entman, 1993, 2012). Framing occurs when 
communicators, for example news reporters, “select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating context” (Entman, 1993, p. 
52). From this perspective, blame/avoidance can be perceived as competitive framing 
– the juxtaposing of frames and counter-frames by blame makers and blame takers in 
the media. In their stories, journalists tend to (and re trained to) select, configure, and 
present information about (alleged) transgressions and expressions of disapproval in 
such ways which emphasise the existence of conflicts and help to construct a 
dramatised ‘scandal narrative’ (Allern & Pollack, 201 ). Scandal narratives are based 
on familiar cultural frameworks, often simplified as dynamic oppositions between a 
villain and a hero, an aggressor and a victim, good and evil. Obviously, the logic of 
these narratives involves a need for a resolution, which usually means administering 
some type of punishment to the ‘villains’.23 
News organisations tend to regard launching a scandal as a benchmark of success. A 
‘scandalous’ story may provoke other media institutions to join in the intense and 
critical reporting of the topic, leading to a phenomenon sometimes called a ‘media 
hunt’ (Allern & Pollack, 2012). Political opponents of the government may exploit the 
media’s preference for scandal to launch ‘character at acks’ against individual 
officeholders (Castells, 2009). These may involve blaming or simply presenting the 
target in a negative light: as someone who is untrustworthy, hypocritical, reckless, and 
lacking moral purity. News media often play an important agenda-setting role in the 
opposition–government blame game: When journalists produce stories about social 
                                               
22 Adut (2008) suggests that analytic approaches to scandal can be broadly divided into ‘objectivist’ and 
‘constructivist’. Objectivists, like Thompson (2000), generally focus on instances of real misconduct 
(e.g., corruption) and discuss the causes of such deviance. Constructivists, however, tend to be more 
concerned with public reactions to and social construction of scandals as rituals that represent cultural 
divisions in society. 
23 Frames that are specific to news media can be divided into episodic and thematic: episodic framing, 
which is particularly common in television news, emphasises individual causality and thereby also 
individual blame (Iyengar, 1990, 1991). In addition, construction of conflict and blame in news media 




problems, opposition parties may use these as ‘ammunition’ to attack the government 
(Thesen, 2013).24 
Interestingly, government officeholders may act as ‘cooperators’ in constructing and 
elevating scandals. In his study of presidential scndals in the United States, Bob 
Entman (2012, pp. 25-26) observes that  
journalists require official investigations, reports, leaks or confessions by 
somebody directly involved for evidence of the misbehaviour to publicise. For 
scandal news to attain significant magnitude, the media need official 
government actions responding to initial disclosure. This creates continuing 
news pegs and stories worth pursuing because of their pot ntial political 
fallout or because they reveal additional malfeasance. 
Officeholders’ attempts to cover up their transgressions when a scandal has broken 
can be perceived as ‘second-order transgressions’ (Thompson, 2000) that may 
instigate further blame attacks, thereby magnifying rather than mitigating the ongoing 
scandal. Moreover, politicians may sometimes deliberately provoke a scandal by 
publicly violating some norm (e.g., by saying something ‘politically incorrect’) with 
the implicit goal of (re)setting the news agenda and receiving a lot of media coverage 
(Wodak, 2014, p. 115; see also Wodak, 2015). 
Much like with scandals, blaming can also be seen as a constitutive element of crises 
– discursive representations of some kind of failure that needs decisive intervention. 
The political scientist Colin Hay (1996) proposes that the discursive construction of 
crisis should be seen as a process of abstraction thr ugh which various stories about 
complexly related or independent events and statistics are linked together as 
‘symptoms’ of a crisis. When a crisis narrative hasbeen established, people tend to 
include more (possibly unrelated) phenomena into this more general story, as “the 
crisis diagnosis is confirmed in each new ‘symptom’ which can be assimilated within 
this meta-narrative” (Hay, 1996, p. 268). Importantly, the attributions of blame related 
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straightforward: People do not directly subscribe to (often fragmentary) media frames of norm 
violations but interpret mediated representations of scandals based on their cognitive and emotional 




to specific actors and events may be backgrounded or omitted in the process of such 
abstraction. 
The links between the concepts of ‘blame’, ‘scandal’, and ‘crisis’ could be described 
briefly as follows: The speech act of blaming can be seen as an elementary unit 
needed to discursively construct scandals or crises. A reference to a speech act of 
blaming related to a description of some kind of (alleged) transgression can be applied 
in journalistic storytelling to establish a conflict frame, thus making the story more 
newsworthy. Widely mediated publication of allegations related to certain 
transgressions combined with significant and sustained public interest in these events 
can be labelled ‘scandals’. And references to particular ‘scandals’ can, in turn, be 
embedded into a meta-narrative of a ‘crisis’ as its ‘symptoms’. 
A good sociological understanding of how mediated scandals and crises are 
constructed clearly complements the textually or rhetorically oriented study of 
blame/avoidance. However, government blame games are constrained by a 
sophisticated web of structural political and historical variables. How does the 
political environment affect the blame game? 
Political environment 
In a book titled Defending Politics: Why Democracy Matters in the 21st Century, the 
political scientist Matthew Flinders (2012, pp. 100–1 1) states: 
For the media and the public blame games exist becaus  of the ‘self-evident 
truth’ that politicians always attempt to hide their corrupt behaviour or failed 
policies by seeking to shift the blame onto the shoulders of others (e.g. 
bureaucrats, the previous government, etc.). In some cases this interpretation 
may be absolutely correct but in the majority of cases the explanation is far 
less scandalous: modern government and governance is … incredibly complex. 
All aspects of this complex system, of course, cannot be described in a nutshell. 
However, it is reasonable to pay due attention to some of the political variables that 





The main structural precondition for the emergence of a government blame game is 
“the ability of citizens and/or politicians to hold government officials accountable, be 
it through elections, votes of confidence in Parliament, demonstrations, or coups d’etat” 
(Weaver, 1986, p. 390). When government officeholders choose which policy to 
pursue, they are mainly driven by one of the following three motivations (Weaver, 
1986, p. 372): They may either seek to 
1. maximise benefits to society: o adopt what seem to be ‘good policies’, 
regardless of what the voters might think, 
2. maximise political payoff: to do what voters like, so that policymakers can 
claim credit for pleasing them, or 
3. minimise blame: to do what voters do not dislike, so that they would not 
‘punish’ the policymaker at the next elections. 
Democratically elected governments increasingly engage in blame avoiding behaviour 
when (a) fiscal stress motivates them to initiate loss-imposing initiatives (e.g., welfare 
cuts) that hurt the interests of some groups; (b) citizens base their electoral decision on 
the perceived performance and credibility of the incumbent government instead of 
remaining loyal to a specific political party; and (c) interest groups engage in more 
active and sophisticated blame making (Weaver, 1986; Pal & Weaver, 2003). 
The field of the blame game expands as the government expands its field of regulation: 
“The more governments attempt to do, the more likely they are to be held liable for 
poor performance, or for policy changes that impose l ses, in those sectors” (Weaver, 
1986, p. 390). Therefore, for the political leaders of the government, one of the most 
salient defensive moves in the blame game is to limit the regulatory field of the 
government: to depoliticise some of the decision making. 
If a loss-imposing policy decision has to be made, th n the government may try to 
diffuse or delay the losses (so that the concrete ‘los r’ is not evident or the losses will 
only occur in the future), delegate the making of this decision (e.g., to an independent 
commission), find a scapegoat (e.g., claim that the decision is made necessary by the 
problems caused by the previous government), support an alternative decision that is 
more popular, diffuse blame by sharing it among as m ny actors as possible, and 
restrict their discretion so the decision seems inevitable (Weaver, 1986, p. 385). 




some sort of compensation (Pierson, 1994), or to cooperate informally with the 
opposition parties to reduce their blame-generating motivation (Hering, 2008). 
The degree of centralisation of power is an important v riable that constrains the 
moves in policy-related blame games (Weaver, 1986). Decentralised governments are 
more likely to try to avoid blame by delegating blame-generating decisions to 
someone else, for example, the parliament. Centralised governments are more 
disposed to place blame to an external scapegoat, for instance, the previous 
government. Authoritarian governments are more likely to try to suppress blame. 
Governments in parliamentary systems are more likely to attempt delaying bad policy 
outcomes to avoid blame. Coalition governments tendo be less punished at the 
elections for poor economic performance than single-party governments. The role of 
the political opposition is also structurally determined: 
So long as there is a majority government, opposition parties in parliamentary 
systems can do little other than generate blame, for they cannot hope to have 
an effective voice in formulating policy. In countries with Question Time or its 
equivalent, this blame-generating process has becom highly institutionalised. 
The opposition seeks to embarrass the government, and the government seeks 
to dodge the questions, obfuscate or counterattack. (Weaver, 1986, p. 391) 
Blame games are constrained by the institutional architecture of government 
organisations (Hood, 2011). In some organisational arr ngements, top officeholders 
delegate the responsibility for problematic decision  and services to lower-level 
‘lightning rods’. Organisations may be reorganised o that the perceived obligation 
and capacity of officeholders to deal with certain problems becomes muddled. The 
establishment of inter-organisational (inter-governme tal, public-private, etc.) 
partnership structures can have an effect of diffusing blame risk. And some aspects of 
administrative organisations may be (re)structured according to ‘market forces’, 
thereby impersonalising the causes of any troubles that may occur. 
Blame games are also constrained by the operating routines adopted in government 
organisations (Hood, 2011). A very common characteristic of bureaucratic operating 
is the extremely careful following of rules and stand rds, doing everything ‘by the 
book’, thereby avoiding individual discretion. This means that if something bad 




intentionality by pointing the finger at the established rules. Another typical 
operational feature in many government organisations s doing everything collectively, 
as a group. This is expected to have an effect of diffusing possible blame. In other 
settings, on the contrary, the blame risk may be indiv dualised, for instance, by 
establishing individual performance targets for each officeholder and thereafter 
scapegoating them whenever a target is not met. And importantly, government 
organisations may try to avoid doing things that could attract or substantiate blame. 
For instance, providing less public services and not keeping written records of certain 
activities of an organisation may be seen as reducing the overall blame risk. 
I started off this chapter by briefly outlining some of the different ways blame 
phenomena can be studied, and introducing a discursve approach to understanding 
government blame game. Then I covered the main conceptual tools and insights 
needed to interpret the government blame games on three levels of analysis: discourse, 
media, and politics. Next, I will dissect the blame game, conceived of as a language 
game, into its typical content topics. What are the key components of stories about 
blame/avoidance in government? 
3.3 The discursive components of government blame games 
On the basis of a multidisciplinary literature review and the analysis of my UK 
government communication data set, I suggest that much of text and talk about the 
government blame games in modern Western democracies revolve around the 
following nine content topics: 
1. blame makers: individuals or groups who generate blame; 
2. blame takers: individuals, groups or entities receiving blame; 
3. norms: rules or expectations that are claimed to be violated or conformed to; 
4. events: behaviours or outcomes that are evaluated in light of norms; 
5. audiences: individuals or groups who observe the blame game; 
6. contexts: situational, institutional, and socio-historical settings of the blame 
game; 
7. moves: actions undertaken by the participants and observers of the blame game; 
8. outcomes: results of the blame game; and 




This ‘checklist’ could serve as a tentative guide for researchers who try to make sense 
of the discursive aspects of blaming and blame avoidance in political life. Importantly, 
not all of these topics are always overtly expressed in every account of a blame game: 
Certain features may be omitted or merely implied in the story. I will briefly touch 
upon each of these features in turn. 
Blame makers 
Blame makers in the sense of the blame game are individuals or groups who attribute 
or are likely to attribute blame to someone – and make this attribution accessible to an 
audience of hearers or readers. Blame makers can be conc ived of as the metaphorical 
‘prosecutors’ who press charges against a blame taker (  ‘defendant’) or ‘judges’ who 
evaluate a blame taker and an event and announce their decision regarding the degree 
of blameworthiness of the blame taker. ‘Blame maker’ could be seen as a relational 
identity: by expressing blame, the speaker/writer claims a certain moral standing and 
positions herself in relation to others; she distances herself from a blameworthy actor 
and a negative event, and aligns herself with others who potentially share her stance. 
There are many potential blame makers: individuals and groups who seem constantly 
ready to saddle government officeholders with blame. If something goes wrong or 
people suffer a loss then various critics often seem to be predisposed to point finger at 
government, perceived to possess the capacity and obligation to prevent harmful 
events (e.g., a terrorist attack, flood damage) from happening, and whenever bad 
things do happen, then to ‘set things right’ and solve the problem quickly. 
Government officeholders are potential blame makers, too: they may choose to 
generate blame to shift (possible) blame away from themselves – either within 
government or to some external blame taker. By making public accusations, potential 
blame makers turn into actual blame makers (or simply blame makers) – participants 
in a blame game who already have expressed their blame towards someone. 
A lot of critics in Western democracies are ‘professional blame makers’. Opposition 
politicians are in the business of weakening the government by blaming it for all kinds 
of ills, thereby hoping to overthrow the incumbent. News journalists are expected to 
be adversarial towards officeholders, ask inquisitorial questions and focus on fault 
finding. Audit offices and enquiry committees publish official reports that criticise 




disaffected interest groups work daily to make protest voices against certain 
government policies heard as loudly as possible. Moreover, grassroots movements can 
emerge and expand very quickly: Individuals can use online social networks to 
organise virtual communities that channel and amplify b ame and mobilise resistance 
against a particular course of action. Much of thisblame making could be regarded as 
strategic action oriented at achieving certain goals like persuading particular audiences 
(e.g., voters) or officeholders to change their behaviour or their plans.25 
Taking a discursive approach to the study of blame games means, in my view, that an 
analyst should pay detailed attention to how blame makers are represented in text and 
talk, and make inferences about the effects of particular linguistic choices. Hence, a 
useful entry point to understanding a government blame game might be to ask: How 
are blame makers named and referred to? What characteristi s are attributed to them? 
Strategic discursive choices in terms of categorisation devices and social actor 
representation affect the perception of the credibility of the blame maker and therefore 
also the perception of the blameworthiness of the blame taker. For example, if blame 
makers are represented as members of an ingroup (‘us’), or as victims or heroes, then 
their blame attributions may seem more true. The opposite effect may be achieved by 
portraying blame makers as members of an outgroup (‘them’) or as villains. Blame 
makers may be omitted, backgrounded, foregrounded, or substituted in text and talk. 
Omission of a blame maker, for example, by agent deletion (e.g., “the government has 
been blamed”) may modify the audience’s perception of blame. Blame makers’ social 
status and role in a particular event can be emphasised or de-emphasised in text. 
Blame makers may be represented as individuals, or as blaming on behalf of groups, 
organisations, or even countries or nations (e.g., metonymic constructions such as 
“Greece accuses Germany”). 
Blame makers may be attributed with positive characteristics that signal moral high 
ground, goodwill, and credibility, or negative characteristics that indicate, for example, 
hypocrisy, ill-will, and lack of credibility. A blame-making newswriter could be 
                                               
25 On the other hand, of course, there are individuals who simply disagree with the government’s line of 
policy, or do not like a particular officeholder, and express their disaffection publicly by blaming the
government. This could be seen as non-strategic, affective or ‘natural’ blame making. Public opinion 
research in Western democracies has also constantly shown that large proportions of citizens are 




represented, for instance, as an ‘intrepid investigative reporter’ or as a ‘sensationalist 
journalist’. Presenting the blame maker in a positive l ght could have an effect of 
making the blameworthiness of the blame taker seem truer. 
Blame takers 
Blame makers may choose to attribute blame to individuals, groups, institutions, 
categories of persons (e.g., immigrants), or abstract entities (e.g., ‘capitalism’).26 In a 
blame game, blame takers are mainly seen as actors wh  can respond to blame: they 
are the metaphorical ‘defendants’ who try to prove their ‘innocence’ or limit the 
severity of (potential) punishment from blame makers and audience members, or – 
already preemptively – build passive resilience in the face of blame risk. They are 
portrayed by blame makers as having a role (or about to have a role) in a negative 
event, or as having bad character traits.27 
There are potential blame takers who experience a blame risk because their action 
may harm someone’s interests (e.g., a government introducing a new tax), or because 
they may be perceived as possessing negative traits (e.g., government press officers 
are known to have deceived or bullied the reporters and thereby mislead the public). 
Potential blame takers may engage in anticipative blame avoidance (Sulitzeanu-
Kenan, 2006; Hood, 2011), that is, behaviour that helps to limit the blame risk before 
a concrete blame-generating event occurs or blame emerges. Actual blame takers (or 
simply blame takers) are actors who receive blame and may choose to respond either 
by accepting it or by engaging in reactive blame avoidance (Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2006; 
Hood, 2011). 
                                               
26 Many scholars maintain that blame can only be about a person because blaming essentially involves 
ascriptions of agency and intentionality (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). However, others point 
out that in the lay use of the word, people actually often ‘blame’ impersonal entities like natural 
phenomena and fate for bad outcomes. And scholars of political blame avoidance have rightly pointed 
out that officeholders sometimes try to shift (and succeed in shifting) blame for negative outcomes to 
entities such as ‘European Union’ or ‘capitalism’ (Hood, 2011; Hobolt & Tilley, 2014). 
27 Whether possessing bad character traits could warrant blame or not remains a matter of heated debate 
among theorists of blame. Some scholars maintain tht blame is always event-focused: blaming 
someone essentially involves linking a bad event to a person who either caused it or failed to fulfil her 
obligation to prevent it from happening (Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014). Others claim that one 
could be blamed not only for bad deeds or outcomes, but also for bad character traits or dispositions 
(e.g., Sher, 2006). In my study, I take what I see as a more flexible stance, assuming that all blame 




Blame takers, both actual and potential, are usually regarded as having the desire to 
avoid blame. Their individual capacity to avoid blame depends on their position in the 
formal organisational hierarchy (e.g., top officeholders can delegate tasks that could 
attract blame down the line to lower level managers) and their experience, that is, how 
well they are socialised into the blame-related language games in their particular 
community of practice. Blame takers may include scapegoats, the ones to whom other 
blame takers try to shift blame. Clearly, ‘blame taker’ as a participant role in a blame 
game is volatile: When a blame taker makes an attemp  to shift blame, she also 
becomes a blame maker. 
Blame makers are usually expected to present some cnditions or criteria that warrant 
blaming a concrete target. The blame taker may be described, for instance, in terms of 
causality (whether or not her behaviour led to a bad outcome), intentionality (whether 
or not the blame taker intended to cause a bad outcome), reasons (whether or not the 
blame taker can provide justifications for causing a bad outcome or having bad 
character traits), obligation (whether or not the blame taker had an obligation to avoid 
the bad event or a bad character trait), capacity (whether or not the blame taker had 
the capacity for avoiding the bad event from occurring), and character traits (whether 
or not the blame taker is a ‘good person’). 
Blame seems to ‘stick’ more easily to some actors cmpared to others. Blame can be 
cumulative: those individuals and groups who are known to have a long track record 
of receiving blame may be easier to portray as being blameworthy. Social distance and 
involvement are salient: blame makers may find it easi r to place blame on actors who 
are neither members of their ingroup nor the ingroup f the main audience of the 
blame game. In addition, the blame taker’s perceived coercive power can have a 
deterring effect: blame maker may choose to withhold blame if the potential blame 
taker is likely to retaliate with serious consequences for the blame maker (e.g., those 
who blame the government in a totalitarian society may be incarcerated). 
Governments and individual officeholders are often targets of blame because they are 
seen as agents who have both the obligation and capacity to avoid all kinds of 
problems from occurring, and, if they should occur, resolving them promptly. 
Moreover, government officeholders may be seen as elite , people with high social 




individuals – hence, officeholders’ norm-violations may be perceived as more 
blameworthy. Therefore, an officeholder who tries to defend herself against blame 
during a conflictual encounter may sometimes try to switch her social role and present 
herself as a private person rather than a civil servant on duty, or switch her speaker 
role, claiming that she is merely acting as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the government.28 
Just like blame makers, blame takers can be represented in text and talk using various 
discursive strategies that can elicit different persuasive effects. Hence an analyst 
should ask: How are blame takers named and referred to? What characteristics are 
attributed to them? 
In terms of social actor representation (van Leeuwen, 1996, 2008), blame takers can 
be identified to a varying degree, thereby making blame seem either more targeted or 
more diffused (see also von Scheve, Zink, & Ismer, 2014). For example, blame seems 
clearly targeted when a blame taker is personalised and individualised – referred to by 
proper name of a physical person or by a singular pronoun (e.g., blame maker says 
‘she deserves blame’ while pointing a finger at a concrete individual); blame may 
seem distributed and somewhat less targeted when blame takers are assimilated and 
collectivised, for example when proper name of an entity (‘British government’) or 
first person plural pronoun (‘we’) is used; and blame seems diffused when placed on 
categorised collective actors (‘immigrants’) or impersonal objectivated actors (‘a 
report said’). Blame takers may be excluded (‘the mistakes were made’) from text and 
talk but still effectively implied in a particular context. For example, when in 2010 the 
newly elected British Prime Minister David Cameron spoke of “the mistakes of the 
past decade” that led, as he suggested, to a financial crisis in the country, he implied 
that the Labour government that had been in office or the past ten years deserved 
blame for that outcome. 
Blame makers may refer to blame takers in blame-implicating ways, for example, as 
‘villains’, ‘liars’, or ‘perpetrators’, or as members of an outgroup (‘them’) to distance 
the speaker/writer – as well as the audience – fromthe . Blame takers, on the other 
hand, may try to invite sympathy and identification from the audience, portraying 
themselves as members of the ingroup (‘us’) and avoid using blame-implicating 
                                               
28 Culpeper, Bousfield, & Wichmann (2003, p. 1565) describe such role switching in response to a face 




vocabulary. Blame makers may try to foreground certain blame takers in their stories 
(e.g., by repeating their names), while blame avoiders may try to background 
themselves as actors in relation to a negative event, or substitute themselves with other 
social actors (scapegoats) in their counter-stories. 
Blame takers may be perceived as more blameworthy when they are attributed with 
bad character traits (‘reckless’, ‘foolish’) and bad intentions (‘devious’). Obligation 
and capacity to prevent certain negative events are often implied in text and talk about 
government actors as blame takers. Blame takers may be predicated with reasons 
(justifications) for behaving in certain ways or having certain character traits, thereby 
possibly reducing their perceived offensiveness. 
Norms 
Norms are socially shared understandings of what kind of patterns of behaviour, states 
of affairs, and character traits are, or are not acceptable in a particular group or society. 
Blaming involves stating explicitly or presuming tacitly that a norm has been violated. 
Participants in the blame game may affirm norms by citing or alluding to certain 
imperatives or prohibitions, and engage in arguments over which norm should 
override the other one. 
Evaluations of wrongness or appropriateness of governm nt’s actions are often based 
on normative ideas about harm, fairness, and loyalty. People may have different 
understandings of how government should be organised, what a government or an 
individual officeholder should or should not do, and what constitutes a problem or a 
failure in government (Hood, 1998; Howlett, 2012; McConnell, 2010; Stone, 2012). 
Blame makers do not always express the particular norms that guide their blaming. 
Analysts can uncover the underlying norms and expectations by looking at the 
argument put forward by a blame maker, and reconstructing the warrant – the 
conclusion rule that connects her evidence with the wrongness claim. The warrant is 
often based on commonplaces that are presumably shared with the audience. A 
technical term for such a content-specific warrant is topos. For example, if a critic 
advances a standpoint that the government deserves blame for discriminating against a 




topos of justice – an understanding that granting equal rights for all should be a 
norm.29 
Similar, more or less evident commonplaces can be used by blame takers when they 
try to justify their acts. For example, when an official claims that she should not be 
blamed for causing a bad outcome because she followed the rules to the letter, she 
evokes the topos of law – a normative understanding that when a law requires doing 
something then it should be done in any event. Another common warrant that 
officeholders use to justify controversial policies s an appeal to ‘greater societal 
fairness’ (McGraw, 1990, p. 122). Hence, an analyst of a blame game should always 
seek an answer to the question: On what topical conclusion rules are the claims of 
wrongness or rightness of an event (or a character trait) based? 
Events 
Events are certain behaviours or outcomes, either real or alleged, that are portrayed by 
blame makers as violating some norm and attributed to a blame taker.  
Behaviours and outcomes differ from each other in terms of how easily these could be 
linked to a particular blame taker as a causal agent. In case of negative behaviour (e.g., 
launching a physical attack on someone), agency is often instantly evident: there is a 
concrete actor or a group of actors whose concrete acts can be observed as a process 
by one or more people and interpreted in relation to certain expectations. In case of 
negative outcomes (e.g., an international financial crisis), agency is often less evident: 
one cannot observe an activity, one can only interpret the results of a process and 
hypothesise about its causes. Moreover, negative outcomes are less likely to attract 
attention “if they are spread widely rather than cocentrated, and if they are diffused 
over time rather than delivered in a single shot” (Pierson, 1994, p. 20). 
It would be, of course, impracticable to try to present a comprehensive list of every 
imaginable event that could be represented by someone as violating a norm. Blame 
attributions in government blame game may include descriptions of government actors 
doing something bad (e.g., abusing official power, mismanaging finances, lying), 
                                               
29 I will return to the notion of topos and the importance of identifying topic specific argumentation 
schemes for the study of blame/avoidance in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. See also Reisigl & Wodak (2001) 




taking something good away (e.g., cutting pensions, limiting freedoms), not doing 
something good (e.g., failing to achieve a policy goal preferred by the blame maker), 
or not preventing something bad from happening (e.g., increase in violent crime). 
Notably, omissions to act are generally more difficult to detect, because there is no 
behaviour that can be observed and evaluated. 
In government blame games, events are often past or ongoing acts (including attempts) 
that – according to blame makers – constitute or bring about norm violations. 
However, blame may be placed on someone for (alleged y) planning to do or being 
likely to do something bad in the future, due to, for instance, bad intentions or 
incompetence. Arguably, blaming has more persuasive forc  if one can present 
evidence of bad events which have already taken place or which can be observed as an 
ongoing process. Persuasive blaming may thus involve attempts at modifying the 
audience’s perceptions of risk – their assessments of the severity of attempted harms 
and the likelihood of negative events in the future. Blame avoiders may try to 
manipulate the temporal perspective of the audience so that the event in question 
seems to have occurred a long time ago, assuming that a distant past event may be 
perceived as less offensive. Another temporal perspective-shifting discursive move, 
called ‘differentiation’ (Ware & Linkugel, 1973), involves inviting the audience to 
imagine looking back at the (seemingly) negative evnt from the future to recognise 
that it actually has beneficial effects in the long run. 
Different norm-violating events may have a widely varying social impact (or 
magnitude), ranging from relatively minor personal i ppropriate acts with little effect 
on society to large-scale institutional violations imposing major social costs (Entman, 
2012). Blame makers may try to use linguistic resources to foreground and intensify 
the negative impact of an event in their accounts, while blame takers often try to 
mitigate the impact or omit the event altogether. One common way of doing this is by 
comparing the event in question with some other event. For instance, a blame maker 
may suggest that a problematic situation that has emerged due to the inaction of the 
current government has negatively affected more people than a well-known historical 
crisis. Blame-avoiding officeholders, on the other and, may use comparisons to past 
problems, bad circumstances of other social groups, or hypothetical ‘worst-case’ 




Offensive acts may be represented by blame makers as intentional and perhaps even 
as defining characteristics of a particular blame taker. The blame taker may try to 
counter such representations by claiming that the negative event had a mechanical, 
inadvertent, or accidental cause (Stone, 2012). As Goffman (2010, p. 112) puts it, “the 
more an actor can argue mitigating circumstances successfully, the more he can 
establish that the act is not to be taken as an expression of his moral character; 
contrarily, the more he is held responsible for his act, the more fully it will define him 
for others”. A single negative event may be more easily depicted as incidental, while 
repeated violations may be regarded as warranting more blame. An event may also 
seem to warrant more blame when it involves violatins of several norms at once (e.g., 
an officeholder lies to hide government waste). 
From a discursive point of view, an analyst should ask: How are events referred to? 
How are the negative or positive aspects of the events intensified or mitigated? 
In stories about blame, events – or certain elements of events – may be strategically 
omitted, backgrounded, foregrounded, substituted, rarranged, or added. For example, 
potential blame takers may omit from their stories any references to victims and the 
inflicted harm or loss, or start talking about a completely different event that is less 
controversial and less likely to attract blame. In terms of social action representation 
(van Leeuwen, 2008), events can be portrayed dynamically as processes, or statically 
as entities or qualities: the static portrayal may h ve an effect of backgrounding 
human agency and reducing the perception of blame. Blame makers often try to 
represent negative events vividly, provide accounts a d imagery that are rich in detail, 
and use superlatives and appeals to threat to stir the emotions of the audience.  Blame 
takers, on the contrary, may refer to problematic events as routine occurrences, as 
‘business as usual’, and provide abstract, general accounts to downplay their 
significance. 
Events can be referred to using lexis that signals their negativity or positivity: for 
example, a blame maker may call an outcome a ‘crisis’ while a blame taker refers to 
the same outcome as an ‘achievement’. Evaluative terms that are used to refer to 
norm-violating behaviours include, for example, ‘violation’, ‘offence’, ‘transgression’, 
and ‘wrongdoing’. Evaluative terms that are used to refer to norm-violating outcomes 




‘harm’, and ‘loss’. Similarly, evaluations may be expressed with adjectives such as 
‘scandalous’ or ‘commendable’. Events can be referrd to using lexis that signals 
limited intentionality or capacity of the causal agent, such as ‘accident’, ‘unfortunate 
incident’, or ‘misunderstanding’. 
Audiences 
Audiences are individuals or groups who observe the blame game and who are 
expected to respond to blaming in some way. Audiences may include addressees (i.e., 
people to whom a particular utterance, text, or image is directed) as well as hearers, 
readers, or viewers who are unaddressed (Goffman, 1974). 
Both blame makers and blame takers try to persuade p rticular audiences to side with 
their position on a question of blame at hand, that is, to influence the audiences’ blame 
attributing decisions and loyalties. If persuaded by blame makers, audiences can also 
become blame makers. If persuaded by blame takers, audiences may ignore the blame 
attacks, or turn against blame makers, perhaps forcing them to stop generating further 
blame. 
In the political field, audiences usually include groups of citizens who can potentially 
punish the incumbent government at the elections. Public blame games often have 
multiple audiences with varying expectations, blaming motivations, and capabilities of 
penalising the blame taker. The size and other chara teristics of audience(s) depend on 
what kind of media is used as the stage for the blame game. For example, a 
confrontational statement on a small local radio station may be heard by a rather 
limited number of like-minded people, while a critical article in a major international 
newspaper reaches a vast and varied readership. Knowledge of the existing ‘common 
knowledge’ and loyalties held by particular audiencs is a vital resource for the 
players in the blame game. Blame makers, for example, may seek out and address a 
particular ‘negatively oriented audience’ (Adut, 2008) to build up a scandal around 
some issue (e.g., ultranationalist opposition politicians exploiting audiences with 
xenophobic predispositions to systematically blame the government for not curbing 
immigration). 
Audiences may be named and referred to linguistically in a variety of ways and with 




substituted, or added in stories about government-rela ed blame. They may be 
represented, for example, as victims of the blame tak r (e.g., suffering harm or loss 
due to government action), as in-group members (e.g., ‘us’) of either blame makers or 
(potential) blame takers, as voters (evoking the idea that they can ‘punish’ or support 
the incumbent government at elections), or as customers (evoking the idea that they 
have a right to blame the government for providing poor service). Moreover, players 
in the blame game may use language in ways that are designed for particular 
audiences (for the concept of ‘audience design’, see B ll, 1984). Both blame makers 
and blame takers may try to charm the audience by praising and flattering them. They 
may try to appeal to several audiences at the same time by producing text and talk that 
is ‘calculatedly ambivalent’ (Engel & Wodak, 2013), i.e., designed to convey different 
meanings to different groups simultaneously. Therefore, an analyst should investigate: 
How are the audiences of blame games constructed and represented? 
Contexts 
Contexts can be understood as situational, institutional, and socio-historical 
circumstances of blaming and avoiding blame, and their variable combinations that 
could affect any aspect of the blame game. 
Context of interaction is not an objective state, it is better conceptualised as a temporal 
sequence of changing states, experienced by particints (van Dijk, 2008, p. 17). 
These experiences include what was done, said, or written before and after a particular 
moment (i.e., previous and subsequent acts and texts) and a subjective sense of 
socially constructed limits (e.g., what can or cannot be said or done at a certain 
moment). How people understand the properties of communicative situations, such as 
the status and power of the participants, varies according to their epistemic groups, 
that is, the collectives with which they share particular systems of social beliefs (van 
Dijk, 2014, p. 147). 
For example, a salient situational feature of the blame game is whether the players – 
blame makers and blame takers – engage in face-to-face synchronic interaction or 
mediated (usually diachronic) exchanges. Face-to-face synchronic episodes of the 
blame game take the form of confrontational encounters: for example, journalistic 
interviews with top officeholders, or Prime Minister’s Questions in the British 




short timeframe, just like a football match. The players can take turns and respond to 
each other’s moves – attacks or defences – often within seconds. However, more often, 
blame makers do not confront a blame taker: accusations are voiced from a distance in 
terms of both time and space. Examples of this include newspaper articles, online 
postings, and public speeches where blame makers try to win an audience to their side, 
and where the ‘defendant’ usually has no possibility to provide an instant response to 
the attack. 
An example of an institutional contextual variable is the extent to which particular 
players in the blame game can control the information that could influence the course 
of the game. Government actors may be able to limitthe visibility (and public 
knowledge) of certain backstage behaviours and outcomes that could potentially 
attract blame. Institutional hierarchies and formal systems of delegation both enable 
and limit the actors’ possibilities for placing and deflecting blame. For instance, it is 
often much easier for the leaders to pass blame for wr ngdoings down to their 
subordinates (Mitchell, 2012). 
Socio-historical circumstances include a wide range of social and temporal variables 
that may provide or limit possibilities for blaming: long-standing conflicts between 
groups and entrenched loyalties within groups in society, growing social injustice, 
economic recessions, wars, natural and man-made disaster , and so forth. One 
instrument that is commonly used to contextualise blame games are the results of 
various public opinion polls. The poll figures are taken to indicate at any particular 
time how favourable or unfavourable attitudes certain segments of the population have 
towards the ruling parties, the government, their leaders, and their policies.  
With respect to the UK, some of the historical contextual information necessary for 
understanding attitudes towards government/communication during the rule of the 
Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition include the following (Sanders, 2013; 
Taylor-Gooby & Stoker, 2011): 
• Due to Britain’s first-past-the-post electoral system, the two main parties had 
been struggling for power since the 1920s: the Conservative Party and the 
Labour Party. The latter suffered from a hostile prss while being in opposition 
from 1979 to 1997. The British newspapers enjoy a large readership and have 




press tends to be strongly adversarial and highly partisan, usually reflecting the 
competition between the two major political parties. 
• After forming a government in 1997, the Labour Party with Tony Blair as 
Prime Minister, engaged in aggressive news management to win public 
approval. However, Blair’s government actually received public criticism for 
its ‘spin doctoring’ and overly orchestrated and expensive government 
marketing campaigns.  
• When Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron came to power as head of 
the coalition government in 2010, the UK economy was in recession and the 
government faced the largest budget deficit since the Second World War. The 
coalition government announced a substantial programme of public spending 
cuts and tax increases from 2010 to 2015. It also ann unced major reforms that 
included restructuring of state services, involving si nificant transfers of tasks 
from the state to the private sector. As a part of the broader reform, the official 
marketing and advertising campaigns were frozen and the communication staff 
reorganised, probably to distance the new government from the ‘spin’ and 
overspending scandals of the previous administration. 
• The Conservatives have tended to blame civil servants for impeding the 
overall change agenda of the government (Pyper, 2013). Notably, British 
government departments (ministries) are staffed at the highest level by civil 
servants who are expected to respect the civil service’s ethos of political 
neutrality. This requirement applies to communication professionals employed 
by the departments.  
The basic guiding questions that may help to bring some of these features into a 
discursive analysis of the blame game include: Which contextual features are omitted, 
backgrounded, foregrounded, substituted, or added in stories about government-
related blame? How do the various contextual variables of the blame game interact 
with what the players (can) do? 
Moves 
Moves are actions and reactions undertaken by blame mak rs and blame takers – and 
sometimes also by the audience – in relation to a blame game. The moves are often 




goal-oriented and more or less planned ways of generati g or avoiding/mitigating 
blame. The sequences of moves or episodes in a blame g e can be described, for 
example, as ‘strategic manoeuvring’, ‘outflanking’, or ‘staged retreating’. Moves are 
accomplished by drawing on various resources described above: using discursive 
strategies, exploiting the affordances of the media, and manipulating political 
variables. The discursive portrayal of moves unfolding in time forms the narrative 
‘plot’ of the game. 
A stereotypical sequence of moves involves an action followed by a reaction: a blame 
maker establishing a causal link between a blame taker nd a norm-violating event 
(e.g., a newspaper article blaming the government for wasting money) and the blame 
taker responding in some calculated way (e.g., governm nt officeholders publishing a 
news release claiming that they have actually saved money). Both players may 
employ specific linguistic devices, tell particular causal stories, and often react 
decisively to the coverage of the ‘game’ in the media to sway the audience. Blame 
takers may try to ‘restore their image’ after a blame attack by denying, evading 
responsibility, reducing offensiveness, corrective action, or mortification (Benoit, 
1995). However, moves of anticipative blame avoidance are carried out before a 
blame maker has made her move. This may involve, for example, intimidating or 
distracting the potential blame maker so that she would withhold blame, and limiting 
the visibility of potentially blame-inducing events. Blame-avoiding moves may have 
specific targets, for example, one could distinguish between opposition-oriented 
moves that are aimed at reducing their motivation to generate blame, and voter-
oriented moves which aim to avoid electoral mobilisation against the government 
(Hering, 2008). 
Unlike chess or football, the government blame games do not incorporate formal and 
universal ‘rules of the game’ that all of the players are obliged to follow when making 
their moves. However, as suggested above, the moves are both enabled and 
constrained by the subjectively perceived contexts of he players in the game: they 
possess (often habitually acquired and tacit) ‘know-ho ’ as to what can or should be 
done in particular situations. Players tend to make moves that seem to have ‘worked 
well’ in a similar situation before. However, the ‘rules’ regarding the acceptability of 
particular moves may be discursively constructed or m dified by the participants as 




subordinate, may be represented by a blame maker as a norm-violating event that may 
then become perceived by the audience as a new focal element of the blame game. 
Guiding questions for analysing a story about a blame game may include: How are 
moves in the blame game referred to linguistically? Are certain moves omitted, 
backgrounded, foregrounded, or substituted? What chara teristics are attributed to 
these moves (e.g., good, bad, clever, evil)? 
Outcomes 
How are the purposes and results of the blame game referred to and evaluated? How 
are links constructed between particular moves by the players and the overall outcome 
of the blame game? 
When blaming and avoiding blame is described in terms of a game metaphor, it is 
presumed that there should be winners and losers. Hnce, one of the typical ways to 
talk about the outcomes would be to focus on who benefits and who is worse off as a 
result of a blame game. For example, in the field of party politics, one might expound 
on how the blame game has influenced the voters’ choices at elections: Have the 
incumbents been voted out of office, perhaps, due to a string of scandals they were 
involved in? A broader question to ask could be: How have the relationships between 
certain individuals or groups changed as a result of the blame game? 
At the individual level, receiving blame may lead to a variety of consequences for a 
blame taker, ranging “from mild social embarrassment to deep shame or extreme legal 
sanctions involving loss of life or liberty” (Hood, 2011, p. 7). In government, blaming 
may come to an end when an officeholder resigns or i  expelled from her post. An 
individual blame maker who suffered due to the (in)action of the officeholder, may 
receive an apology and some kind of compensation, and may express forgiveness to 
the offender. 
At the group and societal level, blaming and avoiding blame can be conceptualised as 
essential elements of political struggles – as strategic activities aimed at certain 
outcomes. Stone (1989, p. 295) identifies four ‘political functions’ of causal stories 
that, in my view, succinctly describe the possible broader outcomes of government 




• either challenge or protect an existing social order; 
• assign responsibility to particular political actors so that someone will have to 
stop an activity, do it differently, compensate its victims, or possibly face 
punishment; 
• legitimise and empower particular actors as ‘fixers’ of the problem; 
• create new political alliances among people who are shown to stand in the 
same victim relationship to the causal agent. 
Some typical outcomes include corrective action on the side of the blame taker (e.g., 
compensation provided to victims), forgiveness on the side of the blame maker, and 
legitimation or delegitimation of the players’ actions in the audience’s eyes. Over time, 
large-scale political scandals may undermine the overall trust in politics and public 
administration (Thompson, 2000). A related – but perhaps less obvious – outcome is 
the further expansion and elaboration of blame avoidance behaviour in government. 
This may involve reorganising the work of the government (e.g., depoliticising certain 
decisions) and more sophisticated masking of the problematic aspects of officeholders’ 
behaviour. Such masking may inhibit reasonable public debate about people’s 
grievances, and block self-reflective learning from past mistakes, which, in turn, can 
lead to an increased risk of causing more harm and loss in the future (Hood, 2011). 
Metadiscourses 
If we understand the government blame game as a discurs ve practice, then the term 
metadiscourses may be used to refer to the ways people talk and write about the 
‘blame game’. The very text you are currently reading is a handy example of this. 
However, participants and observers of interactions that involve blaming also 
sometimes voice self-referential reflections, identifying themselves manifestly as 
players or witnesses of a ‘blame game’.  
Hence, an analyst might ask: Do speakers/writers refer to the ‘blame game’? Do they 
identify themselves as participants or observers of a blame game? What stance do they 
express towards the ‘blame game’? 
Producing metadiscourse on government blame game entails acknowledging one’s 
adoption of the game frame. This can have various effects on the general 




blameworthiness. By evoking the game frame, the speaker/writer draws the attention 
to the moves and characterisations of individual political actors, suggests that the 
actors should be ultimately divided into winners and losers, and therefore the focus 
may shift away from substantial (political) issues (Aalberg, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 
2012). The blame taker may try to present herself a a ‘victim of the blame game’, 
perhaps suggesting that blaming is an unsubstantiated character attack rather than a 
serious trial over a real transgression. This move reli s in part on the assumption that 
the term ‘blame game’ carries an essentially negative meaning for many people (e.g., 
see Malle, Guglielmo, & Monroe, 2014; Olson, 2000; Young, 2011), therefore making 
it feasible for blame-avoiding officeholders, at least in front of certain audiences, to 
blame the blame makers for starting and sustaining the ‘game’. Moreover, talking of 
politics mainly as of ‘playing a game’ seems to relativise the seriousness of ‘political’ 
issues in general and call into question their profound effects on people’s wellbeing. 
3.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have attempted to develop a general practical framework for 
interpreting government blame games as discursive practices. Blame games can be 
seen as stories consisting of certain typical components, each of which can be 
represented in text and talk in a variety of ways, leading to different understandings of 
reality. To construct a handy discursive guide for the scholars of the politics of 
blame/avoidance in democratic societies, I briefly described nine of such components. 
Unlike much of the existing political science literature on government blame games, I 
am advocating the kind of empirical bottom-up analysis that is rooted in symbolic 
interactionist sociology, and where the starting point is linguistic detail. In particular, I 
accentuate the need to interpret the particular ways blame phenomena are talked and 
written about, and to identify in each and every insta ce the discursive strategies that 
are used to attribute blame, avoid blame, or take sides in the ‘blame game’. In the 
spirit of discourse-historical studies, I suggest that analysts of blame games should 
move abductively between several levels of analysis, and bring together conceptual 
tools and insights from linguistics, sociology of media, and political science. 
Having described my overall approach to blame games, in the following chapters I 










4. Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government: 
A framework for analysis30 
4.1 Linguistic approaches to blame avoidance 
Several discourse analysts and cognitive linguists have explicated instances and means 
of blaming and blame avoidance in political and burea cratic communication. As a 
good general starting point, Wodak (2006a) provides a concise overview of 
linguistic/pragmatic approaches to blaming and its frequent complementary speech act, 
denying. Blaming as a constitutive feature of conflict talk can be analysed by using a 
variety of methodologies suitable to the particular genre and context. These 
approaches include, for instance, speech act theory, c nversation analysis, discourse 
analysis, argumentation analysis, and rhetoric. 
In political debates and persuasive discourses, blaming and denying are strategically 
planned and serve positive self-presentation and negative other-presentation. Thus this 
domain is of particular interest to discourse and argumentation analysts, who focus on 
strategies of blaming and denying and argumentative moves in conflict talk (see 
Wodak, 2006a, pp. 59-61). 
Ways of arguing 
When faced with blame risk in a public debate situation, for instance, a televised 
interview or a parliamentary discussion, officeholders use particular ways of arguing 
designed to convince the audience that they should not be regarded as being 
blameworthy. Essentially this involves making argumentative moves to manipulate (a) 
the perception of loss by proposing that there is little or no reason to blame anyone 
because little or no harm has been done, and (b) the perception of agency by 
proposing that harm has been done either unintentionally, unknowingly, involuntarily, 
or by someone else. 
The last mentioned move – shifting of responsibility and thus also blame – is 
particularly salient in political argumentation. This as been described by Wodak 
                                               




(2011) as one of the leitmotifs of ‘politics as usual’ in the context of European 
Parliament, where parliamentarians use “the highlightin  of mistakes and failures of 
the [European] Commission which are constructed as an obstacle to reasonable 
decision-making” (p. 132). In a rather similar vein, in their analysis of the UK 
government’s argumentative discourse, Fairclough and Fairclough (2012) argue that 
“the past and current governments have been for some time now engaged in a ‘blame 
game’” and that the present UK coalition “has exploited and reinforced the public 
perception of the previous government as being responsible for the crisis and for the 
spending cuts, in order to legitimise their own positi n and delegitimise that of the 
opposition” (p.172). 
These blame-shifting argumentative moves can be evaluated in terms of 
reasonableness based on the pragma-dialectical approach (see, for example, van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, p. 274-311). Attempts to shift 
blame may involve using pseudo-argumentative backing of claims or argumentative 
fallacies that neglect certain premises of rational discussion.31 Such fallacies include, 
for instance, shifting of responsibility (trajectio in alium), attacking opponent’s 
character to discredit her (argumentum ad hominem), misrepresenting opponent’s 
position (‘straw man’), concluding that a proposition is true because many people 
believe so (argumentum ad populum), appealing to audience’s feelings of compassion 
(argumentum ad misericordiam), providing false analogies, claiming that temporal 
sequence equals causality (post hoc, ergo propter hoc), and using unclear, ambiguous 
or unfamiliar language. 
Moreover, blame deflecting argumentation is often characterised by the use of certain 
topic specific conclusion rules or topoi. Topoi are quasi-argumentative shortcuts, 
content-related warrants that connect argument(s) with the claim, but the plausibility 
of which can be relatively easily questioned (see Risigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 74-80). In 
political communication, topoi are mostly  
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applied to justify and legitimise positions by providing ‘common-places’, 
instead of substantial evidence (for example, ‘something is a burden, a threat, 
costs too much’, and so forth). In this way, other groups or positions are 
constructed as scapegoats; they are blamed for trouble r for causing potential 
failure or discontent (with politics, with the European Union, etc.). (Wodak, 
2011, p. 43) 
For example, officeholders often reject blame for causing certain harm by claiming 
that they “just followed the rules” when the harm occurred. In doing so, they are 
applying the topos of law – that is, a conclusion rule that (implicitly) says tha  “if a 
law or otherwise codified norm prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative 
action, the action has to be performed or omitted” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 79). Put 
simply, public servants thus suggest that the harm in question has “happened” 
involuntarily – and if someone should be held respon ible for this harm at all, then 
these are the legislators who established those rules. 
Paying due attention to argumentation strategies is vital for any analysis of executive 
officials’ attempts to avoid blame risk (and hence I will expand on this in Chapter 5). 
However, for a more comprehensive understanding of blame games, one has to look 
beyond that. 
Ways of framing 
Cognitive linguist George Lakoff (2008) reminds us that our thinking is not 
universally rational: the human brain does not naturally produce conscious, universal, 
disembodied, logical, unemotional, value-neutral, interest-based and literal 
reasoning.32 Thus it is useful to analyse the discursive means of blame avoidance in 
executive government not only in terms of rational discussion and argumentation but 
by giving due consideration to reflexive modes of reasoning and the related strategies 
of predominantly emotional persuasion. 
People often attribute blame – as well as praise – in terms of a basic narrative frame 
that Lakoff (2008, p. 24) calls ‘Rescue narrative’. According to this narrative frame, 
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an (inherently evil) Villain harms a (helpless and i nocent) Victim, then an (inherently 
good) Hero struggles against and defeats the Villain, so consequently the Victim is 
rescued, the Villain is punished, and the Hero is rewarded.33 Accordingly, avoiding 
blame means avoiding being depicted as a Villain in stories about (possible) harm or 
loss. That is why officeholders who confront a blame risk may promptly try to 
describe themselves as the Heroes, or the Helpers of a Hero, or perhaps even one of 
the Victims – only to escape being assigned the role of the Villain by someone else in 
their narrative account of the possibly blameworthy event or outcome. 
Lakoff (2008, pp. 163-167) also describes another frame which is typically used in 
politics and other institutional contexts to shift blame inside an organisation. He calls 
it ‘the Bad Apple frame’, as it is based on the proverb “One bad apple spoils the barrel” 
which evokes a simple moral: get rid of a bad apple and the barrel will be saved. 
Lakoff argues that we interpret the proverb in terms of metaphors: apples are people, 
barrel is an organisation (container) containing peopl , people in the organisation are 
good (moral), and one or a few bad (immoral) people in an otherwise fine organisation 
can make others go bad (or look bad) and spoil the good name of the organisation. 
There is a systematic practice in an organisation that is either illegal, immoral, 
or at least underhanded. If the practice were publicly recognised, it would 
greatly harm the reputation of the organisation and threaten the careers of 
high-level members of the organisation. There are two related uses of the Bad 
Apple frame: 
1. To protect the organisation and its mode of operation. The Bad Apple goes; 
the organisation is redeemed and keeps operating as before. 
2. To find a target in the organisation to blame so that everyone else in the 
organisation escapes the blame. (Lakoff, 2008, p. 164)
According to Lakoff, this frame works not only because we think in terms of 
conceptual metaphors like Morality is Purity and Immorality is (possibly contagious) 
Rottenness, but also because it fits the Hero-Villain n rrative where “the Villain is a 
person, not a system, an institution, or an ideology” (Lakoff, 2008, p. 166). Thus 
                                               
33 Such formulaic use of character types was famously highlighted by Vladimir Propp (1928/1968) in 




institutions frequently respond to accusations by convicting a person rather than by 
changing their dominant beliefs or their possibly flawed system of operation. 
However, besides spelling out the use of certain persuasive argumentation schemes 
and frames, critical analysis of blame avoidance should specifically incorporate a 
sophisticated understanding of denial strategies. 
Ways of denying 
Conversation analysts regard rejection as the preferred mode of reaction to blaming 
(Pomerantz, 1978). Rejection of accusations may take v rious forms. Van Dijk (1992, 
p. 92) has proposed a useful general typology of denying as a part of a general ‘social 
defence’ strategy against the formation of negative self- or ingroup impressions. These 
types are: 
• act-denial (“I did not do/say that at all”); 
• control-denial (“I did not do/say that on purpose”, “It was an accident”); 
• intention-denial (“I did not mean that”, “You got me wrong”); 
• goal-denial (“I did not do/say that, in order to…”); 
• mitigations, downtoning, minimising or using euphemis s when 
describing one’s negative actions. 
Van Dijk notes that besides ‘denial proper’ there ar  cognitive and social strategies 
which can be regarded as ‘stronger forms of denial’: blaming the victim and reversal. 
This kind of defensive reaction has also been described as ‘turning the tables’, for 
instance, in Wodak’s (1991) critical analysis of antisemitic language use. 
Like some argumentative moves, most of these types of denying are aimed at altering 
the perception of the blame taker’s agency. In the complex and uncertain world of 
public administration, intention denials may be particularly effective, because in many 
cases it may seem almost impossible for accusers to provide actual evidence that 
certain people in the government had negative intentions.  
But denying may not always be the best way of doing away with perceptions of loss. 
Officeholders may find it even more appealing to chose simply not to mention 
possibly problematic issues at all or, when compelled to talk about certain actors or 




Ways of representing actors and actions 
The network of social actor representation, devised by van Leeuwen (1996, 2008), is 
yet another instrument for explicating instances of blame avoidance in text and talk. 
Such an approach is helpful because it leads analysts to focus their attention on 
exclusion, suppression or backgrounding (e.g., by impersonalisation or nominalisation) 
of victims and/or those actors who could possibly attract blame. 
Obscured agency as a linguistic means of blame risk avoidance is notoriously 
common in government texts. Just to mention one obsrvation, in an analysis of news 
releases of a US government institution, Scollon (2008) concludes that in these texts 
“it is linguistically problematical to know who is taking responsibility for the 
statements being made” as these “present a rather ambiguous array of writer/reader 
positions” (Scollon, 2008, p. 109). 
Vagueness is also salient in policy papers, which are often designed by officeholders 
with an implicit goal of avoiding personal or institu onal blame risks. Thus they may 
choose not to refer to possibly threatening situations or actions, or to refer to them 
obliquely or by euphemism, for instance, ‘pre-growth period’ instead of ‘economic 
recession’ or ‘workforce optimisation’ instead of ‘laying off people’. 
Representations of social actors may be analysed in terms of how calculated ways of 
naming (referential or nominational strategies) are us d for membership categorisation 
– that is, establishing ‘ingroups’ and ‘outgroups’ – and how calculated ways of 
attributing (predicational strategies) are used for portraying actors either as more 
positive or negative. Presumably, blame sticks more easily to those actors who are 
represented as ‘others’ and as possessing stereotypicall  negative attributes; and harm 
inflicted to actors who are represented as members of some negative (e.g., threatening) 
outgroup is less likely to generate blame. 
Certain ways of talking and writing about actions may have an effect of limiting the 
perception of blameworthiness. Van Leeuwen (1995, 2008) usefully reminds us that 
actions can be deagentialised, that is, represented as if the possibly harmful action in 
question came about without human involvement (e.g., “the problem occurred”, “the 
incident happened”), as if this ‘simply exists’ (e.g., “there is a problem”), or as if this 




Officeholders may choose to represent their actions at high levels of generality and 
abstractness so that it becomes less clear what they actually did or are doing (e.g., “we 
are tackling these issues”). And moreover, in an attempt to evade responsibility, 
officeholders may carefully avoid talking about their actions that have (possibly) 
material effects and instead switch to only describing their reactions – their mental 
processes that are invisible (e.g., “I am very concer ed about this”, “I hope that things 
will get better”). 
When officeholders hide or obfuscate blameworthy aspects in text and talk, or when 
they use argumentation, framing, and control-denial to reject responsibility for causing 
particular instances of perceived harm or failure, th y (at least seem to) admit the 
occurrence of harm or failure. However, they may instead choose a rather different 
approach – taking full responsibility but trying to present events or circumstances in 
question in a more positive light by employing strategies of legitimation. 
Ways of legitimising 
Legitimation, that is, explanations and justifications of practices of specific 
institutions, can be characterised “as an answer to the spoken or unspoken ‘why’ 
question” (van Leeuwen, 2007, p. 94). Obviously, this definition includes 
explanations and justifications of possibly blameworthy actions: why did (or should) 
we carry out these actions (in this way)? 
Responses to blaming – as well as preemptive communication of potentially 
unwelcome conduct – often draw upon the following ‘pool’ of legitimations, which 
van Leeuwen (2007, p. 92; based on van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999) has broadly 
divided into four categories:34 
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• authority legitimation: using personal references (to status and role), 
impersonal references (to rules), references to custom (tradition, 
conformity), or commendation (by expert or role model); 
• moral evaluation legitimation: using references to value systems 
(evaluation, abstraction, analogies); 
• rationalisation legitimation: using reference to the goals, uses and effects 
of institutionalised social action (instrumental rationalisation), or to a 
natural order of things (theoretical rationalisation); 
• mythopoesis: using narratives (e.g., moral tales, cautionary tles) in which 
legitimate actions are rewarded and non-legitimate ac ions are punished. 
Even though what is listed here may seem somewhat similar to argumentation 
strategies that I mentioned earlier, legitimations are more likely designed to end 
debates (for example, by imposing some kind of authority without further justification) 
rather than to resolve differences of opinion via cr tical discussion.35 And this 
recognition leads me to the question of manipulation. 
Ways of manipulating 
Linguistic strategies of deflecting blame may amount to discursive power abuse: 
communicative manipulation. Criticising someone’s linguistic behaviour as 
illegitimate manipulation rather than provision of legitimate excuses and justifications 
obviously requires an analyst to take an explicitly normative stance. Thus, the 
analyst’s ability to explain in considerable detail he societal consequences of a 
potentially manipulative communicative event is of utmost importance. 
Van Dijk (2006) has proposed a three-fold approach to understanding manipulation as 
a central notion in critical discourse analysis by bringing together its social, cognitive 
and discursive aspects. According to his framework, text and talk can be regarded as 
manipulative if these 
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1. are used by dominant groups (e.g., governments) to (re)produce their 
power and to hurt the interests of less powerful groups in society;  
2. are based on an explicit plan to impair or bias understanding of information 
(Short Term Memory-based manipulation) and formation of mental models 
in a way which is not in the best interest of the recipients (Episodic 
Memory and Social Cognition manipulation); 
3. make extensive use of discursive group polarisation (i.e., positive self-
presentation and negative other-presentation) and other discursive 
strategies focused on potential vulnerabilities of recipients (e.g., their 
strong emotions or traumas, their lack of relevant knowledge, their lower 
status) which make the recipients less resistant to accepting beliefs and 
doing things they otherwise would not do. Manipulation typically involves 
violations of conversational maxims proposed by Grice (1975/1989). For 
example, prolixity, irrelevance, and excessive repetition may be used 
calculatedly to distract or exhaust the opponent and thereby avoid dialogue 
and rebuttal (Hansson, 2015b). 
This framework serves as a useful reminder that, when wishing to provide 
normative critique of any particular way public authorities try to influence public 
perceptions of blameworthiness, discourse analysts must decidedly look beyond its 
purely linguistic aspects. Therefore I turn to insights about blame avoidance in 
government that have been accumulated within the discipl ne of public 
administration. 
4.2 Public administration approach to ‘presentational’ blame avoidance 
Hood (2011, p. 18) provides an insightful classification of ‘presentational’ blame 
avoidance strategies that are characteristic to public administration. These involve 
using arguments for limiting blame (excuses) or turning blame into credit 
(justifications) and other methods of influencing public impressions. These strategies 
are based on the assumption that presentational activity will limit or deflect rather than 
exacerbate or attract blame. He lists the following strategies: 
• Winning the argument. Officeholders who choose to apply this strategy try 




excuses and justifications. Officeholders may try to show there is no 
problem (problem denial), or, when admitting there is a problem, show that 
blame/agency lies elsewhere. Problem denial can take at least three forms 
(Hood, 2011, pp. 50-52): total problem denial, partial problem denial, and 
problem denial accompanied by a counter-attack. 
• Drawing a line. Officeholders who choose to apply this strategy “come out 
with a preemptive apology calculated to disarm critics and attract 
sympathy”; “apologise early in a blame sequence”, try to “defuse blame by 
(apparently) picking it up” (Hood, 2011, p. 54). Apologising can, in some 
circumstances, contribute to the positive self-presentation of an 
officeholder, but it can also be risky for the blame taker: apologies can be 
taken as confessions of guilt that invite dismissal by those higher in 
hierarchy, or they may lead to additional demands. 
• Changing the subject. Officeholders who choose to apply this strategy try 
to create or use “diversions to avoid the spotlight of blame and shift the 
public agenda onto other issues” and to find “good times to bury bad news” 
(Hood, 2011, p. 56). Hood observes that “times when public attention can 
be expected to be focused on other things (such as big sports events or 
public holidays) can provide convenient moments for officeholders and 
organisations to sneak out potentially embarrassing announcements of U-
turns or unpopular policies” (Hood, 2011, p. 56). 
• Keeping a low profile. This is a more passive strategy of dealing with 
blame by saying as little as possible. It may take several forms (Hood, 2011, 
pp. 59-61): restricting information, ‘lying doggo’ (staying silent), and 
‘working behind the scenes’ (using backdoor threats and inducements to fix 
the media agenda). 
Importantly, Hood discusses the possible positive and negative societal effects of the 
use of presentational strategies by government insti utions. He argues that the 
approaches based on avoiding public discussion could be seen normatively as 
detrimental. 
A key test of the positivity or otherwise of presentational blame-avoidance 
strategy is how far it serves to engage the citizenry in serious argument about 




organisations, and clarifies where fault lies after allegations of avoidable losses 
have been made. … So on that criterion we can argue that winning-the-
argument approaches are broadly positive, but changing-the-subject and low-
profile approaches (such as diversion tactics, nonegagement, or backdoor 
pressures on media) are negative. (Hood, 2011, pp. 174-175) 
As noted in the previous chapter, Hood also reminds us that there are other kinds of 
blame avoidance strategies beyond the ‘presentational’ es listed above: 
officeholders may preemptively distribute formal responsibility among each other 
and/or choose particular operating routines that make it easier to shift blame or limit 
personal blame risk if something bad happens. 
4.3 Embracing the blame avoidance framework 
Hood’s blame avoidance typology, though not claiming comprehensiveness, seems to 
be useful for gaining a broader insight into risk aversion practices in executive 
government contexts. The analytic tools embedded in the discourse-historical 
approach can complement this by providing an operation lisation of the above-
mentioned strategies through a variety of linguistic (or rhetorical or argumentative) 
means and micro-processes by which blame is framed, admitted, countered, or shifted 
by government communicators.  
For instance, after identifying linguistic evidence of hidden or backgrounded agency 
in a government-produced text, and taking into account the specific context of 
situation, as well as the history of the text and the institution, an analyst can interpret 
the particular discursive choice in terms of whether or not it may function as a blame 
avoidance device in a public administration organistion – and in which ways. 
In what follows, I am working abductively towards bringing these two kinds of 
knowledge together into a single heuristic model: typical macro-level choices of 
administrative blame avoidance on the one hand and the corresponding argumentative 
moves (fallacies, topoi, violations of the pragma-di lectical rules), frames, types of 
denial, ways of representing actors and actions, typical legitimations, and attempts of 
cognitive manipulation on the other hand. I describe the linguistic characteristics of 




textual examples drawn mainly from my UK government communication data set. My 
overall heuristic model of interpreting discursive blame avoidance strategies in 
government is presented in the form of a matrix in Table 4.1. 
Total problem denial is realised discursively as denying – “This has never happened” 
or “We did not do it” (act-denial). The possible blame taker may provide an inverted 
account of blame maker’s original accusation (e.g., “We helped X” in response to 
“You failed to help X”). In addition, explanations may be given which involve 
distorting or disregarding opponents’ original claims (argumentative fallacy called 
‘straw man’), giving an impression that there is nothing to discuss as everything is 
self-evident (evading the burden of proof), using uclear, ambiguous or unfamiliar 
language (fallacy of unclarity, fallacy of ambiguity) and attempts to rewrite history 
(manipulating Episodic Memory). Such a denial could be expected to exclude 
representations of victims and harmful acts, and to use reference to the higher status of 
the blame taker as a guarantee of the truthfulness of the denial (authority 
legitimisation). 
To illustrate how a relatively complex instance of total problem denial may be 
interpreted within my framework, I analyse an extract from the UK Cabinet Office’s 
news release in response to an investigative story on government overspending 
published in The Times on 9 January 2012. The story, entitled ‘Whitehall waste: the 
£31 billion cost of failure’ was significant because it constituted a well-grounded 
(based on the National Audit Office data) blame attack by a major newspaper on the 
government on an issue that was at the time at the core of its programme and thus also 
its collective identity. The story provoked the government to make an unusual move 
and issue a carefully crafted official response in the form of a Cabinet Office news 
release, entitled ‘Eradicating waste in Whitehall sves £3.75 billion’, on 11 January, 
2012. The news release contained a statement by Minister for the Cabinet Office 
Francis Maude (see Appendix C). Here are the first three sentences from his statement: 
 
Table 4.1. Discursive strategies of blame avoidance in government communication 
 Total problem 
denial 
Excuses Justifications Problem denial + 
counter-attack 











denying that any 
harm has been done 
Admitting (some of) the 
harm but rejecting 
(some of) the causal 
agency and 
intentionality 
Admitting the causal 
agency but rejecting 
the harm,  presenting 
the event (and the 
self) in a positive light 
Rejecting the 
accusation completely, 
or giving excuses, or 
giving justifications  –  























for the current 
purposes of 
conversation 
Opting out  




blame makers by 
covert coercion or 
inducements 
Ways of arguing 
Examples of 
related topoi and 
fallacies 





playing on feelings of 
compassion 
 
Ad populum: playing on 
audience’s emotions 
 
Topos of ignorance 
Ad verecundiam: 












Topos of threat 
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1 When we arrived in government we pledged to be ruthless in hunting down and 
2 eradicating waste in Whitehall and that is precisely what we have done. 
3 Just in the first ten months to last March we saved £3.75 billion - equivalent to twice 
4 the budget of the Foreign Office, or to funding 200,000 nurses. 
5 This has not been easy; spending hours renegotiating contracts, tackling vested  
6 interests and large suppliers and cutting back on spend on consultants and  
 advertising 
7 does not make for glamorous or headline grabbing work. 
In lines 1–2, Minister for the Cabinet Office uses the argumentative strategy of 
parading one’s own qualities (argumentum ad verecundiam) by claiming that the 
government has fulfilled its pledge. Importantly, this sentence also implies a total act-
denial: the Minister states that the government has ‘er dicated waste’, that is, he and 
his colleagues have done the opposite of ‘wasting’. The Minister represents wasting 
not as an action carried out by his fellow officeholders but as a nominalised entity: 
‘waste in Whitehall’. Moreover, he diffuses blame by portraying the government 
metaphorically as a ‘container’ (“when we arrived in government...”) rather than a 
specific group of human actors who could be held responsible. He frames ‘waste’ as a 
Villain (or perhaps as some kind of a dangerous wild animal) and the government as a 
Hero (perhaps a gunman) who “hunts it down” and “eradicates” it. 
In lines 3–4, the Minister backs up his claim by using a particular conclusion rule, 
topos of numbers, by suggesting that a given statistical figure (£3.75 billion allegedly 
saved in ten months) serves as a proof that the govrnment has not wasted money and 
should not be blamed. However, the Minister does not directly counter the central 
accusatory claim put forward by The Times that “more than £31 billion of taxpayers’ 
money has been wasted across government departments in the past two years”. Thus 
he may be seen as committing a ‘straw man’ fallacy and violating a pragma-dialectical 
rule of reasonable discussion that requires the debater to use correct reference to 
previous discourse by the antagonist. 
In lines 5–7, the Minister represents government’s activities at a high level of 
abstractness (“renegotiating contracts”, “tackling vested interests”, “cutting back on 
spend”) thereby making it more difficult to understand the exact nature of the 




and therefore function as a kind of appeal to authority. In addition, he casts the 
government as a selfless Hero by claiming that the work of the government ‘has not 
been easy’ nor ‘glamorous’. 
Excuses involve admitting the harm or loss – at least partially –, often accompanied 
by mitigation (“We acknowledge that there seems to be a minor problem”) and giving 
possible reasons or explanations for the blameworthy si uation. These explanations 
may play on audience’s emotions, especially their feelings of compassion 
(argumentum ad populum, argumentum ad misericordiam), for instance by claiming 
that “events were beyond our control”, or, that “these were unforeseeable 
circumstances”, or claiming ignorance and victim-hood as someone suffering from an 
unfortunate lack of relevant information (“no one told me...”), possibly evoking the 
Bad Apple frame. 
While admitting that harm has been done, excuses may involve various types of denial: 
“It was an accident” (control-denial), “You have misunderstood us” (intention-denial), 
“We did not do that, in order to cause this...” (goal-denial). Officeholders may attempt 
to obscure agency (“It appears that some damage has been caused”) and impersonalise 
the victims (“This country suffers from...”). Excuses do not involve explicit 
expressions of the acceptance of blame and are thus clearly distinct from apologies 
(for some characteristics of political apologies, see Harris, Grainger, & Mullany, 
2006). 
To illustrate an analysis of an excuse, I use a short extract from a prominent 
newspaper article that came out at a time when the rec nt financial crisis in the UK 
became most acute. On 8 October 2008, the UK government announced a major 
package to support the banking sector, up to an aggregate total of £500 billion in loans 
and guarantees. Two days later, the Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Gordon 
Brown published an article titled “We Must Lead theWorld to Financial Stability” in 
The Times, where he justified the bank rescue plan of his government, but also argued 
that his government cannot take full responsibility for solving the crisis in the UK – 
and thus should not be blamed. Brown writes: 
1 When I became Prime Minister I did not expect to make the decision,  




3 for the Government to offer to take stakes in our high street banks, 
4 just as nobody could have anticipated the action taken in America. 
Here, Brown’s argumentative shortcut to concluding that the UK government should 
not be blamed could be called topos of ignorance and explicated as follows: “If a 
threat is unforeseeable, then those who failed to foresee it and take precautions should 
not be blamed”. Brown uses ad populum argumentation in line 4 by claiming that 
“nobody” could have predicted the need to rescue high street banks in the UK and US. 
He somewhat diffuses possible personal blame by mentioni g one of the members of 
his Cabinet, Alistair Darling (line 2), who was responsible for economic and financial 
matters of his government, and referring to “America” as another country where the 
government had supposedly taken similar actions. Brown thus realises his excuse 
mainly by representing the financial troubles in the UK as completely unforeseeable 
and beyond his complete control. 
Justifications essentially involve positive self-presentation by trying to turn blame 
into credit: “What the media describes as a failure is actually a major victory” or “We 
had to make some difficult decisions which will lead to gains in the future”. The 
related argumentation may be based on parading one’s wn qualities (argumentum ad 
verecundiam), playing on the audience’s emotions (argumentum ad populum), and the 
use of inappropriate argumentation schemes or the incorrect application of 
argumentation schemes (e.g., false analogies; post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy). 
Moreover, possible blame takers may evoke a ‘Rescue narrative’ frame and cast 
themselves within that frame as Heroes or Helpers. 
Justifications may include various types of denial, apparently with an exception of 
control-denial: the blame taker usually claims responsibility for the actions or events 
that are presented as positive. Still, the blame tak rs may attempt to obscure agency 
and to present the victims as winners (“The economy cannot be fixed overnight but we 
will restore optimism and hope”). Justifications could also make use of the full range 
of legitimations, based on authority (“We proceeded according to the law adopted by 
the Parliament”), moral evaluation (“Our actions are based on Britain’s values”), 
rationalisation (“This helps to get our economy back on its feet”), and mythopoesis 
(e.g., telling a cautionary story what could have happened if a particular decision had 




To illustrate how justifications could be analysed within this blame avoidance 
framework, I use another extract from the same Prime Minister Gordon Brown’s 
article (published in The Times on 10 October 2008) where he justified the bank 
rescue plan of his government. Here are the first th ee sentences from his article: 
1 The banking system is fundamental to everything we do.  
2 Every family and every business in Britain depends upon it.  
3 That is why, when threatened by the global financial turmoil  
4 that started in America and has now spread across the world,  
5 we in Britain took action to secure our banks and financial system. 
In terms of argumentation, Brown presents government’s decision to support banks as 
unquestionably necessary, using field-dependent warrants that are backed up by the 
presumedly common knowledge that “the banking system is fundamental to 
everything we do” (line 1). I suggest that the specific warrants in use here may be 
called the topos of threat to the banks (“if banks have problems then it poses a threat 
to everybody and one should do something to secure the banks”) and the topos of 
government as a protector (“if threats to everybody emerge then the governmet 
should do something to protect the people against them”). 
In terms of representation, Brown describes banks as influential agents that are central 
to and essentially ‘good’ for the society as a whole. He uses ‘banking’ as a general 
term; no distinction is made between banks acting within real economy (e.g., financial 
intermediation, insurance) and banks engaged in speculative/fictitious transactions. 
“Global financial turmoil” is represented as an agent that threatens the UK (line 3). In 
terms of framing, such representation implies that e people and the banks in the UK 
should be seen as victims of that (abstract) turmoil. “America” is referred to as the 
origin of the crisis, thus externalising the cause of the crisis (line 4). “Global” and 
“spread across the world” are used to suggest that he problems are universal and not 
specific to the UK. The use of “we in Britain” (line 5) evokes a comparison or 
opposition between the UK and (supposedly) all the ot r countries in the world. 
Thus, from the outset, Brown establishes a typical dr matic frame that implies that 
there is a Villain (global financial turmoil from America) who threatens the Victims 
(families, businesses, and banks in the UK), and a Hero (UK government) who takes 




positive self-presentation of the government and used to mitigate possible blame for 
either causing or not sufficiently alleviating the financial crisis. 
Problem denial + counter-attack may involve justifications or excuses (as described 
above) accompanied by negative other-presentation. The argumentation could be 
based on victim-victimiser reversal (trajectio in alium), discrediting opponent 
(argumentum ad hominem), threatening the opponent (argumentum ad baculum), and 
symptomatic argumentation applied to shift blame (e.g., post hoc, ergo propter hoc 
fallacy). Blame takers could try to relativise and trivialise the problem through the use 
of (possibly fallacious) comparisons or equating strategies: “This is how all 
governments have dealt with the issue” or “Yes, we made a mistake, but other 
institutions failed, too”.36 Officeholders may try to cast themselves as Victims within a 
‘Rescue narrative’ frame by claiming that their (possibly blameworthy) action serves 
the goal of self-defence and pointing a blaming finer at some outside actor as a 
Villain. Also, the Bad Apple frame may be evoked by referring to an alleged villain 
within the organisation. 
All types of denial could be used, including the strongest forms: blaming the victim 
and victim-victimiser reversal. Nomination and predication is used strategically for 
constructing the blame makers as an out-group and for attaching negative attributions 
to them (“We are victims of the negatively biased media coverage”). Systematic re-
attribution of responsibility of actions in officeholders’ interest can be interpreted as 
an attempt to manipulate audience’s episodic memory. 
To illustrate how to analyse instances where problem d nial is put in action in 
conjunction with negative other-presentation, I examine another extract from the UK 
Cabinet Office’s news release in response to the article entitled ‘Whitehall waste: the 
£31 billion cost of failure’. In his statement, Minister for the Cabinet Office Francis 
Maude says: 
1 And I am not alone in highlighting all the good work we have done so far;  
2 the Public Accounts Committee recently recognised and welcomed  
3 our transparent approach to savings. 
                                               
36 The use of ‘yes-but’ argumentative pattern for shifting responsibility has been highlighted by De 




4 Meanwhile other countries, especially in troubled Europe,  
5 are now looking to us for how this is done. 
In lines 1–3, the Minister uses ad populum argumentation and authority legitimation 
in service of positive self-presentation of the government. He supports the position 
that the government should be praised (or at least not blamed) for its financial conduct 
by claiming that a collective actor who apparently holds high status in society – a 
parliamentary committee – has given the government a positive evaluation. In terms 
of representation, Maude nominalises government’s ac ion: “our transparent approach 
to savings” (line 3). This nominalised construction s remarkable for its ambivalence. 
On the one hand, it presupposes that the government is ac ing transparently and is 
saving money – both of which are supposedly regarded as worthy of public praise 
rather than blame. On the other hand, it is sufficiently vague to permit an opposite 
interpretation: one could “have a transparent approach to savings” but actually not 
save any money. 
In lines 4–5, the Minister juxtaposes the actions of the UK government with those of 
the other countries, evoking an ‘Us vs Them’ oppositi n’. The suggestion that other 
governments regard the UK as a positive example (or perhaps a mentor or a role 
model) is not supported by any data – it ultimately r ies on a presumption that his 
audience is likely to agree with statements that reffi m positive ingroup feelings. The 
perceived opposition is intensified by negative other-presentation: “troubled Europe” 
(line 4) is a salient linguistic construction that is based upon a presumption that the 
audience regards “Europe” as an outgroup (i.e., that the UK citizens do not belong to 
“Europe”) and also implies that the UK is not financially “troubled” (problem denial). 
This kind of discursive triggering of group polaristion may be regarded as 
manipulative, if it is carried out systematically with the purpose of deflecting blame 
for possible financial misconduct of the government. 
Drawing a line is realised as a quick acknowledgement of the problem (“Mistakes 
have been made”) and a possibly preemptive apology, sometimes accompanied by 
more or less explicit positive self-presentation (“Unlike many other leaders, I am 
willing to acknowledge my mistakes. I apologise.”). 
By apologising quickly, the officeholder(s) may tryo avoid further discussion, thus 




evading the burden of proof). The arguments used in conjunction with the apology 
may be chosen to play on the audience’s emotions (argumentum ad populum) and 
contain claims which are irrelevant to the topic under discussion (ignoratio elenchi). 
This choice can be regarded as manipulative if it is calculated to give an appearance of 
moral superiority, honesty and sincerity, thus possibly disarming critics. 
An attempt to draw a line may be illustrated by a recorded broadcast statement by 
Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal Democrat Party leader, published on 
YouTube on 19 September 2012 and aired on television n the UK later that month. 
Clegg’s statement contained an apology for not keeping his party’s pre-2010 election 
promise to oppose increasing university tuition fees. This cannot be strictly regarded 
as apologising early or preemptively because the controversial decision to raise the 
maximum university tuition fees in England from £3,375 to £9,000 per year was 
backed by the members of the UK parliament (including Nick Clegg and 27 other 
Liberal Democrats) already in December 2010. However, th  fees were actually 
increased from September 2012 and Clegg may have tried to use that occasion as an 
opportunity to symbolically ‘win back trust’ of some disappointed citizens by 
seemingly leaving his blameworthy deeds behind and moving on. Here is an extract 
from Clegg’s statement: 
1 I shouldn’t have committed to a policy that was so expensive  
2 when there was no money around.  
3 Not least when the most likely way we’d end up in Government was in coalition  
4 with Labour or the Conservatives, who were both committed to put fees up.  
5 I know that we fought to get the best policy we could in those circumstances. 
6 But I also realise that isn’t the point. There’s no easy way to say this:  
7 we made a pledge, we didn’t stick to it – and for that I am sorry. 
8 When you’ve made a mistake you should apologise.  
9 But more importantly – most important of all –  
10 you’ve got to learn from your mistakes. 
11 And that’s what we will do.  
12 I will never again make a pledge unless as a party we are absolutely clear  
13 about how we can keep it. 
In lines 1–4, Clegg first admits to a particular fault: he acknowledges that he should 




actually “no money around” (line 2) to finance that policy, and (b) the possible 
coalition partners opposed that policy so it was unlikely that the fees could be capped. 
This acknowledgement is ambivalent. On the one hand, it pertains to Clegg’s pre-
election misjudgement, for which he actually gives no reasons – he merely says that 
he should have behaved otherwise. On the other hand, it can be also interpreted as an 
excuse for making his current policy choices in the government as he presents two 
reasons for raising the tuition fees. Secondly, Clegg frames himself as a Hero who 
“fought to get the best policy” (line 5), thus in effect implying that the Conservatives, 
who resisted his policy in the coalition government, should be seen as Villains. 
Notably, however, Clegg does not refer to any Victims – for instance, the students 
who were forced to pay higher fees have been omitted from the statement. Hence an 
element that is often expected of a full apology – an expression of concern for all of 
those who suffered from the offense – is missing here. 
In line 7, Clegg apologises by saying “I am sorry”. However, he limits his apology to 
a specific component of his offence: he apologises for not keeping a promise; he does 
not apologise for supporting the decision to raise tuition fees. He does not direct his 
apology to those people who may feel deterred from seeking higher education because 
going to a university has become much more costly. In terms of social actor 
representation, Clegg notably switches between using first person singular and plural 
pronouns ‘I’ and ‘we’, which seems to make blame less targeted as it is not really 
clear exactly to whom ‘we’ may refer. 
In line 8, Clegg first recites an imperative (“When you’ve made a mistake you should 
apologise”) that mainly seems to serve as an indication of his moral high ground. 
Secondly, he asserts that is it “most important of all” to learn from one’s mistakes 
(lines 9–10), and then claims to perform this learning by promising to refrain from the 
particular kind of behaviour that he claims to regret – making pledges that cannot be 
easily kept – in the future. However, he does not offer any compensation for the 
possible harm that his wrongdoing may have caused to particular people. By 
emphasising the importance of “learning” (that is relatively easy to do), he 
backgrounds the importance of compensation (which may be difficult and costly to 
provide). By focusing his talk on his future actions (using the future tense as in “that’s 
what we will do” in line 11), he backgrounds his past wrongdoing. By seemingly 




to give an appearance of a person with a good charater nd high moral standards – 
which ultimately is an act of positive self-presentation. Thus this statement cannot be 
seen as a full apology, but merely an attempt to defuse some blame and attract 
sympathy. 
Changing the subject is realised mainly in two ways: via topic control, which may 
involve violations of the maxim of relation, for instance, providing distracting 
information which is irrelevant to the accusations, or by a manipulative strategy of 
making use of recipients’ vulnerabilities – choosing such a time for communicating 
when the potential critics are most likely distracted by other actions, thus ‘burying’ 
information.  
The fallacies may include provision of irrelevant arguments (ignoratio elenchi) and 
talking about unrelated problems raised by (possibly imaginary) opponents (straw 
man). From a cognitive point of view, changing the subject is based on manipulating 
Short Term Memory-based discourse understanding: the blame taker uses text and talk 
and imagery to draw recipient’s attention to information X rather than possibly 
blameworthy information Y. 
To illustrate the use of this blame avoidance strategy, I analyse an excerpt from a 
transcript of a press conference given by the UK Prime Minister David Cameron and 
the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg on 7 January 2013. This widely covered press 
conference was designed and performed by the government as part of launching its 
‘mid-term review’ – an important self-assessment document comparing the 
commitments made in its programme two and a half years arlier to the policies it had 
actually carried out to date. The press conference was as a major proactive attempt at 
positive self-presentation of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition. However, 
the format of a press conference provides the participating journalists an opportunity 
to directly confront the Ministers with questions tha  draw attention to negative and 
possibly blameworthy phenomena instead. Here I focus n three conversational turns 
that took place after both David Cameron and Nick Clegg had finished their short 
speeches: a journalist asks an inquisitorial question, he Deputy Prime Minister Nick 
Clegg replies, and at some point the journalist interferes to repeat his question. 
1 ##Question 




3 people are going to wonder what the point of it is tonight.  I can tell you the one 
4 thing they do want to know, which is what’s going to happen to the economy this  
5 year.  Can you both give us a picture of where you think we are?  Is a triple-dip 
6 recession possible?  Likely?  Are you really both confident that the economy is going 
7 to grow this year?  If not, why not?  Are you contemplating other measures if it  
8 doesn’t come out the way you want? 
9 
10 ##Deputy Prime Minister 
11 The first thing I’d say is that we’ve been very open with the British people about  
12 the fact that the time needed to get the job done, that the time needed for the 
13  economy to heal fully, is taking longer than frankly anyone expected.   
14 We’ve been very open about that.   
15 We’ve actually said that dealing with the structural deficit, balancing the books, is  
16 going to take longer.   
17 We couldn’t have been more open that it is going to take longer and it does mean  
18 that the next parliament, the next government, will need to complete  
19 the job that we have initiated, but we’ve made huge strides. The deficit is 25% lower.   
20 Now, hang on; it’s important. 
21 
22 ##Question 
23 My question was about are you confident, both of you, that we are on the track to  
24 growth. 
In his first turn (lines 2–8), the journalist uses mock politeness by delivering an 
obviously insincere compliment and an expression of gratitude: “This is a very nice 
document. Thank you for giving it to us”. He follows it up with a string of questions 
about the economic forecast for the country – an issue that, as he implies, the 
ministers had chosen to neglect in their presentation. 
In response, the Deputy Prime Minister Clegg starts to alk at length about how ‘open’ 
the government has been, instead of addressing the questions actually raised by the 
journalist. Clegg thus instantly tries to avoid blame in this conversational situation by 
committing an argumentative ‘straw man’ fallacy. It may be argued that the choice of 
this particular manoeuvre was encouraged by the fact th t the journalist asked multiple 




for sidestepping a straightforward reply. The repeated (in lines 11, 14, and 17) use of 
the word ‘open’ (which tends to have a generally positive connotation in discourses 
about government) seems to indicate that the speaker is anxious to persuade the 
audience that he is talking honestly. Moreover,  he att mpts to shift at least some of 
the responsibility for the economic situation in the country away from the current 
government by stating that “the next parliament, the next government, will need to 
complete the job that we have initiated” (lines 18–9), disregarding that the questions 
asked were about the current year. 
Restricting information  can be described pragmatically as a violation of the maxim 
of quantity: the officeholders choose not to provide certain information about issues 
which may attract blame (e.g., misuse of the public funds, or misconduct of public 
service providers) and therefore their contribution  public discussion may be seen as 
not as informative as required. When justifying these restrictions, officials often make 
use of the topos of law (for instance, “This information is classified under the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954”) and the legitimations are mainly based on authority. 
As an illustration of analysis, I use another excerpt from the transcript of the press 
conference by David Cameron and Nick Clegg on 7 January 2013. Here, a journalist 
has asked them if they are both confident that the UK economy is “on the track to 
growth”. First, the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg ives his answer and then the 
Prime Minister David Cameron has a turn: 
1 ## Deputy Prime Minister 
2 I don’t think anyone should start making foolish statistical predictions about  
3 what’s going to happen to something as unpredictable as the global economy,  
4 but we’re doing the right reforms and implementing the right changes  
5 to ensure that healing process continues. 
6 
7 ## Prime Minister 
8 I’ll just add - and I agree with every word of that - but I’ll just add to that point that 
9 we don’t now make our own forecasts.   
10 We’ve given that to the Office for Budget Responsibility.   
11 They are forecasting growth this year, as are almost every other economic forecaster.   




Here, Clegg first implies that economic forecasts should not be talked about by 
labelling anyone who would do this ‘foolish’ (line 2). He not only avoids giving a 
substantial reply to the journalist’s question but also, by implication of suggesting that 
answering the particular question would be ‘foolish’, could be seen as ridiculing both 
the question and the one who asked it. Clegg follows this up with some 
straightforward positive self-presentation in line 4 (“we’re doing the right reforms”) 
that is not supported by any data. 
Cameron then indicates that he and Clegg should not be expected to talk about the 
economic outlook for the UK, because the responsibility to make economic forecasts 
has been given by the government to a specific agency: the Office for Budget 
Responsibility (line 10). Both ministers apparently regard talking about economic 
forecasts as something that may attract blame – especially if their predictions later 
turn out to be wrong. Therefore they have preemptively established a separate unit that 
they can conveniently use as a blame ‘lightning rod’: the ministers can choose not to 
provide possibly ‘inconvenient’ information themselv s by claiming that officially 
this is a task for someone else (topos of law). Notably, Cameron represents the Office 
for Budget Responsibility as an ‘outgroup’ by using third person plural pronoun ‘they’ 
(“they are forecasting growth”), thus further distancing himself from the forecast. 
Moreover, the name of the unit – Office for Budget R sponsibility – is salient, 
because it implies that the unit takes responsibility for the budget, thereby seemingly 
removing (at least some of ) the responsibility for financial outcomes from the rest of 
the government. 
‘Lying doggo’ (a British informal term for ‘being in hiding and keeping quiet’) as a 
blame avoidance strategy basically means opting out of conversation or opting for 
one-way communication. In this case, officeholders do not regard opponents as 
serious partners in the discussion and do not defen their standpoints (“No comment”), 
thus violating the essential pragma-dialectical rules which should grant the parties 
with conflicting views the freedom to argue and the obligation to give reasons. 
Admittedly, silence can be a difficult phenomenon t study and exemplify in linguistic 
terms as it seems to involve no text or talk. However, the strategic uses of silence in 
political communication can be sometimes interpreted by analysing metadiscourses 




someone’s discourse (Schröter, 2013). Here is an exmple of such metadiscourse. On 
21 June 2012, the BBC News ran a story titled ‘Cameron ducks Gary Barlow tax 
avoidance question’. The article points out that when comedian Jimmy Carr and 
(Conservative Party supporting) musician Gary Barlow were both accused of using 
tax avoidance schemes, then the Prime Minister David Cameron publicly criticised 
Carr but did not say anything about Barlow. Cameron opted out of discussing this 
topic simply by saying that he was not going to give a “running commentary” on 
people’s tax affairs. 
Working behind the scenes is most directly related to linguistic and non-linguistic 
forms of coercion and bribery and is often aimed at silencing the opponents. It may 
involve administering systematic personal attacks on p tential blame makers 
(argumentum ad baculum, argumentum ad hominem), sometimes threatening them 
with legal sanctions (topos of law) or with humiliation, that is, offending their positive 
face. This strategy is manipulative as its goal is to induce less powerful groups into 
tending to accept the arguments of a more powerful o ganisation. 
It is very difficult to obtain concrete textual examples of such covert interactions.37 
However, compelling evidence of behind-the-scenes relationships between 
government officeholders and the press has emerged, for example, from a 2012 
independent inquiry in the UK, commonly known as the Leveson Report. The report 
was commissioned by the UK Government to cover the culture, practices and ethics of 
the press in its relations with the public, the police, and politicians. In the executive 
summary of the report, Lord Justice Leveson, who led th  inquiry, concludes that over 
several decades the political parties and the governm nt “have had or developed too 
close a relationship with the press in a way which as not been in the public interest” 
and adds that “in part, it has been a matter of going too far in trying to control the 
supply of news and information to the public in retu n for the hope of favourable 
treatment by sections of the press” (The Leveson Inquiry, 2012: 26). Therefore an 
analyst of discursive strategies of blame avoidance i  government should give due 
consideration to a possibility that some important moves in the blame game at hand 
may be unobservable and extra-linguistic. 
                                               
37 There are only a few linguistically informed empirical studies that focus on analysing backstage 




4.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have tried to develop a systematic approach to dissecting and 
interpreting communicative aspects of blame avoiding behaviour in government in 
terms of specific discursive strategies. At times, officeholders use intricate and 
creative ways of shifting blame, backgrounding blameworthy phenomena in their 
text and talk, or making blame seem less targeted. The proposed framework could 
help discourse analysts see certain linguistic featur s in government 
communication not only as constitutive elements of discursive strategies (ways of 
arguing, attributing, mitigating, etc.) but possibly a so as elements of particular 
broader socio-political macro-strategies – ways of avoiding blame. 
Admittedly, my framework has at least two limitations. First, it is tentative and not 
necessarily comprehensive. Further empirical studies of text and talk patterns of 
executive government institutions or particular officeholders who try to avoid 
accusations of wrongdoing could point to specific discursive choices which may not 
fit under any of the proposed categories. Also, as my example analyses have proven, 
in real life situations we should expect to observe simultaneous or mixed use 
(blending) of several discursive strategies of avoiding blame risk. Furthermore, some 
of the reactive discursive strategies may be applied only together with non-discursive 
anticipative practices of blame avoidance (e.g., establi hing the Office for Budget 
Responsibility and then using it as a ‘lightning rod’ for blame in public text and talk). 
I will discuss how to interpret some of the combinations of verbal and non-verbal 
defensive strategies further in Chapters 6 and 7. 
The second caveat or challenge is that the heuristic can only be effectively used in 
conjunction with additional systematic analysis of the components of the blame game 
wherein the strategies are enacted, such as the subject matter of a blame event or a 
blame risk, the actors, the magnitude of harm caused or the seriousness of a violation, 
and so forth. The context of a blame game, as mentioned in the previous chapter, may 
be operationalised by breaking it down into several layers of analysis (following 
Wodak, 2011; see Appendix A). The context entails intertextual and interdiscursive 
relationships, for instance, capturing the dynamics of interaction and taking into 
consideration the many genres in which the described strategies may occur. In future 




different participants of the blame game in particular genres of executive governance, 
like face-to-face interactions, policy documents, official news releases, personal 
emails, speeches, blog posts, interviews, and so on.38 The context entails extra-
linguistic institutional and situational variables, uch as the preferred ways of 
sustaining domination within the blame taking institution, the formality/informality of 
the situation, and – probably most saliently – whether he text and talk about blame 
are publicly mediated or remain solely in the backstage. It is also evident that some 
blame avoidance strategies are more overt and can be more easily detected by 
analysing micro-processes of discourse while others are more hidden (e.g., behind-
the-scenes work). Hence, additional attention should be given to coercion as a central 
strategic function of exercising administrative power.39  The context of a blame game 
also entails its broader historical and socio-political backdrop, for instance, the 
financial crisis and austerity politics in the UK in my study. I introduce more socio-
political contextual information in the following chapter, where I take a closer look at 
how a blame game was played out between the then Leader of the Opposition David 
Cameron and the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown during the outset of a financial 
crisis in the UK in 2007 and 2008. 
                                               
38 See, for instance, how Wodak (2006b) analyses sequences of ‘strategies of remembering’ the war 
crimes in interviews carried out in Austria. 
39 As I noted in Chapter 1, Chilton (2004, pp. 45-46) describes coercion as a main category of ‘strategic 





5. ‘A reckless prudence’ versus ‘global financial turmoil’: 
An analysis of the opposition–government blame game in 
opinion articles 
On 14 September 2007, Northern Rock, one of the UK’s largest mortgage lenders, 
suffered from the biggest run on a British bank in more than a century. Panicking 
depositors withdraw £1 billion after the BBC revealed that Northern Rock had asked 
for emergency financial support from the Bank of Engla d. In the UK context, this 
can be regarded as the ‘materialising’ of the emerging financial crisis, because up until 
then the reported subprime mortgage market problems in the United States had not 
been perceived as a threat to the UK (Koller & Farrelly, 2010).  
Two days after the collapse of Northern Rock, David Cameron, the then opposition 
leader and the head of the Conservative Party, published an article in Sunday 
Telegraph, titled “These are the Fruits of a Reckless ‘Prudence’”, in which he argued 
that the Labour government that had been in power for ten consecutive years by that 
time, should be blamed for the damage caused by the crisis in the UK. From then on, 
as the financial crisis evolved in the UK, the membrs of the Conservative opposition 
systematically talked and wrote about the crisis as the ‘Labour’s debt crisis’ – and this 
usage persisted after the Conservatives took over the leadership of the UK government 
following the 2010 elections (Hay, 2011, 2013; Fairclough & Fairclough, 2012). 
The global turmoil in the financial industry in the late 2000s engendered a multiplicity 
of competing blame narratives. For example, the British economist Howard Davies 
identified 38 different strands of explanations regarding potential culprits in the blame 
game related to the financial crisis. He observed that the imperative of blame 
avoidance accounted for the proliferation of various accounts. 
It is perhaps not surprising that such a plethora of explanations should have been 
articulated. We are all influenced by our perceptions, prejudices and interests. 
Central bankers are not likely to volunteer that weak monetary policy was at the 
heart of the problem. . . . Politicians are not likely to say that they were guilty of 
fuelling the fire with ill-considered social interventions. Regulators rarely 




up and acknowledge that it was their short-term greed and recklessness which 
was to blame. (Davies, 2010, p. 5) 
It is not surprising that David Cameron chose to use the bank run as an opportunity to 
place blame for the crisis particularly on the Labour government and not on anyone 
else. In modern Western democracies, the politicians who are campaigning for power 
– leaders of opposition parties and members of shadow cabinets – are generally 
engaged in blaming the incumbent government and its individual officeholders 
(Weaver, 1986). Opposition’s goal is to erode the credibility of those in power by 
drawing public attention to stories about how rulers’ bad deeds and bad character has 
caused some harm, loss, or failure, or would increase the possibility of such negative 
occurrences. They are usually ‘on attack’ as they attempt to change the status quo and 
gain power. Accordingly, the officeholders who are in power, including prime 
ministers and members of their cabinets, are predominantly engaged in blame 
avoidance. Their goal is to maintain a reasonable lev l of public trust and credibility 
by justifying and explaining their (in)actions and fending off attributions of bad 
character. They are often ‘on defence’ as they attemp  to sustain their power and 
maintain the status quo. 
Such opposition–government blame games may revolve around specific instances of 
personal transgression, such as an executive officehold r’s abuse of power, financial 
or sexual misconduct, or her inappropriate speech act. However, blame games could 
also be understood as dramaturgical performances, staged for particular audiences, 
where particular actors – blame makers and blame takers – present and defend their 
strategic definitions of what constitutes “a good way of governing”, “a good policy”, 
“a policy failure”, or “a social problem”. Government blame games often involve 
much more than mere personal attacks and defences. Th y have broader political 
functions. Stories and arguments about blame can be used to “challenge or protect an 
existing social order”, “legitimise and empower particular actors as ‘fixers’ of the 
problem”, and “create new political alliances” (Stone, 2012, p. 224). 
Governments’ motivation for focusing on self-preservation becomes particularly 
salient during the times of economic recessions because incumbent parties face an 
increased risk of being punished by disgruntled voters at the next elections (Weaver, 




October 2008, the Labour government announced a major p ckage to support the 
banking sector, up to an aggregate total of £500 billion in loans and guarantees. Two 
days later, the Prime Minister and Labour Party leader Gordon Brown published an 
opinion piece, titled “We Must Lead the World to Financial Stability”, in The Times, 
where he not only justified the bank rescue plan of his government, but also defended 
it against blame by suggesting that his government has limited capacity to alleviate the 
financial instability in the long run due to the global nature of the crisis. Brown’s 
defensive stance may have been justified, because the financial crisis started in the 
United States, the UK was interdependent with the United States in terms of both 
finance and trade, and the fragility of the UK economy predated the rule of the Labour 
government (Hay, 2010, 2013; Hay & Wincott, 2012). 
As already noted in Chapter 1, opinion pieces in newspaper articles can be used by 
government officeholders as genres of reactive blame voidance. Using such a 
newspaper genre enables them to present and develop th ir ersuasive arguments 
more substantially and independently from an immanent external interference by 
political opponents, interviewers, or editors (as would be the case if they were 
presenting their messages, for instance, during the Question Time in the Parliament, 
via TV interviews or journalistic articles).40 However, the genre of an opinion piece 
also has important limitations: The performers of such written discourses cannot use 
non-textual rhetorical devices like intonation or bdy language to elicit particular 
audience effects (unlike in political genres that use sound and images, such as 
podcasts or posters). Neither can they receive instant audience feedback and use it for 
their advantage (this could be the case in live public speaking situations, e.g., an orator 
can enjoy a long applause). Moreover, the audience of these pieces can take their time 
to read and re-read the article, and pay more attention to the logical appeal and 
consistency of the argument. Thus it seems reasonable to focus my analysis on the 
strategies of argumentation used in such articles. 
                                               
40 In the UK, the weekly session of the Prime Minister’  Questions at the House of Commons is a 
parliamentary institution which has increasingly become a rowdy verbal battle between the Leader of 
the Opposition and the Prime Minister (Bates, Kerr, Byrne, & Stanley, 2014). Broadcast interviews 
with politicians often involve aggressive questioning by journalists who seek celebrity status through 




In the previous chapter, I analysed excerpts from Gordon Brown’s article to exemplify 
the use of excuses and justifications as discursive strategies of blame avoidance. 
Below, I attempt to reconstruct his defensive argument, published at the peak of the 
crisis, in more detail, and juxtapose this with an opposing offensive argument 
presented in an earlier opinion piece by the Leader of the Opposition David Cameron. 
I seek to identify and interpret the reactive defensive discursive moves used by the 
Prime Minister in response to blame making of the opposition in the context of 
escalating economic problems and the falling public support to the government.  
By doing so, I continue my investigation into reactive blame avoidance in the public 
(RQ 3) that I launched in the previous chapter, but with greater focus on argument 
structures and competing accounts of the crisis as a blame event. 
5.1 The argument model of the blame game 
The basic goal of the government blame game is to persuade an audience (e.g., the 
readers of a newspaper) that someone in question, such as a government or a concrete 
officeholder, either should or should not be blamed. Presenting arguments is one of 
the possible ways of achieving this. Argumentation ca be defined as a 
linguistic/cognitive action pattern of problem-solving that is characterised by a 
sequence of speech acts (e.g., expressive, declarative, ssertive, commissive, 
interrogative, directive) that are used to convince somebody of the acceptability of a 
standpoint by challenging or justifying controversial validity claims about truth and 
normative rightness, that is, questions of knowledge and questions of what should or 
should not be done (Reisigl, 2014). 
From the argumentation analytic perspective, both blame makers and blame takers 
may use argumentative moves to manipulate the audience’s perception of a possibly 
negative event and the perception of agency for a neg tive event (i.e., what is true), 
and convince the audience that a particular agent should or should not be blamed (i.e., 
what is normatively right to do). For example, a blme maker may claim that a 
particular event (e.g., a bank run) was negative, and that the incumbent government 
deserves blame, because it did not take any action despite having both an obligation 
and capacity to prevent this event. On the other hand, n officeholder who avoids 




harm has been done, or that the negative event has been caused unintentionally or by 
someone else, or that the event was unpredictable. 
The basic elements of arguments that underlie such claims can be delineated based on 
Toulmin’s (2003) functional model for analysing arguments.41 Within his model of 
argument, 
• claim is contestable statement that has to be justified, 
• data are facts, evidence, or reasons given to support a particular claim, 
• warrant connects particular claims and data; it is often based on values that are 
assumed to be shared with the listener and is not always expressed explicitly; it 
can be explicated in the form “if x, then y” or “y, because x”; 
• backing is a statement that is used to give additional support to the warrant,  
• qualifier is a phrase that may be added to the claim to indicate its strength (e.g., 
‘usually’, ‘sometimes’, ‘under these conditions’), and 
• rebuttal is a counter-argument or exception to the claim. 
Each argument must contain at least the first three of these elements, even though 
sometimes any of these elements may remain unexpressed (Kienpointner, 1996). In 
arguments over blame, the claims are typically made about the harmfulness (or more 
broadly – negativity) of an event, the cause(s) of the event, and the (degree of) 
blameworthiness or otherwise of an actor, such as a government or a concrete 
officeholder. Data, accordingly, are evidence presented to support such claims. For 
example, this may include evidence of whether or not a negative event took place, 
how much harm was caused, whether or not a causal link exists between the negative 
event and the blame taker, whether or not the blame t ker had an intention to cause the 
negative event, and whether or not the blame taker had the capacity and obligation to 
avoid the negative event from occurring. I present a simplified functional argument 
model of attributing and avoiding blame in Figure 5.1 below.42 
                                               
41 Notably, Toulmin’s model has been long adopted in public policy analysis (e.g., Dunn, 1981), but has 
not been widely applied to government blame games. 
42 The simplified Toulmin model has been advanced as a u eful analytic device by Kienpointner (1996), 





Figure 5.1. The basic functional argument model of attributing and avoiding blame 
Even though this layout of an argument seems simple, the actual arguments used in 
blame games, either in opinion articles or other genres, may be rather complex and 
thus difficult to unpack. There are at least two reasons for this.  
First, the elements in the argument are often left implicit, as the arguer expects the 
audience to ‘fill in the gaps’ based on an assumed common ground. For example, a 
blame maker may say that the government should be blamed (claim), because 
whenever a policy fails, the government deserves blame (warrant). In this case, the 
blame maker does not provide any data and expects the audience to be able to infer (or 
perhaps make up) the evidence that would support the claim in this particular case. To 
bring another hypothetical example, an officeholder may say in response to an 
accusation that she did not intend to cause any harm (data). In this case, the 
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officeholder makes neither the warrant nor the claim explicit. She expects the 
audience to supply both the conclusion rule (“if an actor causes harm unintentionally, 
then she does not deserve blame”) as well as the conclusion (“therefore this 
officeholder should not be blamed”). Moreover, arguments may involve allusions, that 
is, indirect references to presumably shared experiences and understandings that invite 
the audience to assign a particular meaning to an actor or an event. Hence, analysts 
may need a lot of non-linguistic contextual knowledg  to grasp what kind of common 
ground with the audience at hand the arguer presume, and how this knowledge can be 
exploited for the purposes of persuasion. 
The second complicating factor for analysts of arguments over blame is that the claim 
that someone deserves or does not deserve blame may be supported by a chain of 
arguments. For example, a blame maker may treat data about the magnitude of a 
negative act and data about the causal link between the egative event and the 
government as separate claims that need to be supported first, and construct separate 
sub-arguments to support each of these (using certain sub-data and sub-warrants). 
Only after these data have been supported, the blame maker may move on to make the 
main claim: the government should be blamed for causing the negative event. To put 
it differently, both blame making and blame avoiding may involve, in the first 
instance, defending epistemic propositions about what is or is not true, and only 
thereafter normative propositions about what should r should not be done. When the 
players in the blame game provide many sub-arguments, the complexity of the 
argument structure increases accordingly.43 
Argumentation is always related to a particular topic. Hence, it is necessary for 
discourse analysts to look beyond general (functional, formal, abstract) aspects of 
argument and try to discover the topic-related argumentation schemes (Reisigl, 2014). 
Following the discourse-historical approach to analysing political argumentation 
(Reisigl & Wodak, 2001; Reisigl, 2014), I pay particular attention to the use of topic-
specific warrants or topoi in blame games. Topoi, as explained earlier, can be seen as 
                                               
43 Moreover, especially during prolonged arguments that unfold between adversarial parties over longer 
periods of time, the arguers may repeatedly alter any of the elements in their argument so that these 
would have a better ‘fit’ with other elements. For example, a blame maker may propose that the 
government deserves blame, but during the course of the debate realise that the data she can provide 
allows her to blame only a particular officeholder. So she may choose to revise her claim accordingly, 




quasi-argumentative shortcuts, content-related conclusion rules that connect 
argument(s) with the claim, but whose plausibility can be relatively easily questioned 
(see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, pp. 74-80; Reisigl, 2014, pp. 77-79). To unpack such 
condensed arguments, one has to specifically look fr the use of (presumably) 
collectively shared context-specific symbols – something that is already accepted by 
the target audience. For instance, if a person defen ing a claim presents a lot of 
statistical figures (disregarding their actual truth validity) then the warrant may be 
interpreted as the topos of numbers: sufficient numerical evidence is taken by the 
particular audience to mean that the claim has been‘demonstrated’ to be true. 
From a normative point of view, certain uses of such conclusion rules may be 
considered to be fallacious when these do not meet th  pragma-dialectical criteria for 
rational dispute (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Reisigl, 2014). However, it may 
be very difficult to distinguish between sound and fallacious arguments, because 
doing so requires considerable topic- and field-related knowledge, for instance, about 
the intentions, capacities, and obligations of a particular blame taker in particular 
socio-historical and institutional settings. Moreovr, evaluation based on pragma-
dialectical rules may seem inadequate if players in the blame game regard their 
interaction primarily as an eristic dialogue, that is, “a combative kind of verbal 
exchange in which two parties are allowed to bring out their strongest arguments to 
attack the opponent by any means, and have a kind of protracted verbal battle to see 
which side can triumph and defeat or even humiliate the other side” (Walton, 1998, p. 
181). Arguing for the sake of conflict, instead of resolving a conflict and reaching a 
consensus with the incumbent, may seem like an essential modus operandi for the 
opposition. Members of the opposition may regard defeating or humiliating the 
incumbent in a blame game as a necessary strategic st p towards the resignation of an 
officeholder or the whole government (perhaps via a motion of no confidence 
following a scandal), or the defeat of the ruling parties at the next elections. In a 
similar vein, members of the government may not be interested in having a rational 
debate with the opposition, but rather choose to systematically ignore or cast doubt on 
opposition’s standpoints, perhaps by claiming that ese merely express the 
incompetence and bad intentions of the members of the opposition. 
In the next sections, I will present the diagrams of the arguments put forward by 




of warrants (or topoi) the former uses to attach, and the latter to deflect blame for the 
financial crisis in the UK. The full texts of these articles are provided in Appendix 
D.44 
5.2 The opposition leader’s argument: The government deserves blame 
The opposition leader David Cameron uses a chain of arguments that support the 
claim that the UK government should be blamed for the ongoing crisis. I will first lay 
out his central epistemic sub-argument: that the UK economy has become vulnerable 
to the crisis because of “a huge expansion of public and private debt” over the past 
decade (Figure 5.2).  
Cameron writes:  
56 This Government has presided over a huge expansion of public and private debt  
57 without showing awareness of the risks involved. 
58 Though the current crisis may have had its trigger in the US, over the past decade  
59 the gun has been loaded at home. Under Labour our economic growth has been  
60 built on a mountain of debt. And as any family with debts knows,  
61  higher debt makes us more vulnerable to the unexpected. In short,  
62 the increases in debt in the UK have added a new risk to economic stability. 
Here, the relationship between claim and data is cau al: a particular negative situation 
that is argued to exist (a country’s vulnerability to the crisis) is the result of a 
particular factor (expansion of public and private debt in the country). The warrant is 
based on analogy, as it is backed up by an assumption that if debt makes a family 
vulnerable, it also makes a country vulnerable. Cameron suggests that every person 
who has (had) debt in their family should also understand the risks related to debt on 
the state level. Debt on a micro-economic (family) level and debt on macro-economic 
(state) level are presented as essentially similar and easily comparable.  
                                               
44 Even though the general comparison of the articles by Brown and Cameron is not really at issue in 
my analysis, it is worth pointing out some similarities in terms of their field of action, genre, and 
medium. Both articles serve the function of formation of public attitudes, opinion, and will (for this 
distinction, see Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, p. 91). Both articles are relatively lengthy opinion pieces: The 
length of Cameron’s article is 1,062 words, and Brown’s 945 words. And both articles were published 
in generalist, national, non-tabloid newspapers with s milarly large readerships: the circulation figures 





Figure 5.2. Cameron’s sub-argument that the UK economy has become vulnerable 
No actual evidence is provided to support the proposition that debt always has the 
same consequences, either for a family or a country’s economy. The backing – “as any 
family with debts knows” – relies on argumentum ad populum: It is presumed to be 
true because many people believe so.  
The data that Cameron presents in lines 63–68 are mostly based on selected statistical 
evidence. The bulk of this evidence pertains to the increase in private debt (points 1–5 
listed under Data in Figure 5.2); public debt receives somewhat less attention (points 
6–7 listed under Data in Figure 5.2). All of these points are stated as unmodalised, 
categorical truths. The evidence is selected and presented in such a way that is most 
likely to evoke a sense of danger. The implicit conclusion rule could be reconstructed 
as an emotional appeal to threat: for example, “if we owe more than we earn then it 
Data 
 
UK has seen “a huge 
expansion of public and 
private debt” during the 
past decade: 
 
1) The level of personal 
debt has trebled to £1.3 
trillion 
2) People in the UK owe 
more than the entire 
national income 
3) Mortgage payments are 
at their highest for 15 years 
4) Insolvencies have 
quadrupled and are at 
record levels 
5) Someone goes bust in 
the UK every seven minutes 
6) The government is 
borrowing £35 billion a year 
7) The UK government is 
borrowing more than any 
other in Europe 
Sub-Claim 
 
Over the past decade, 
the UK has become 




Large public and private 
debt makes a country 




“As any family with debts 
knows, higher debt 
makes us more 





makes us vulnerable and this should be stopped”. The comparison of selected 
statistical indicators in the UK to those of other countries serves the same purpose. 
The conclusion rule can be restated in the following way: “If a government is 
borrowing more than other European governments then i  is dangerous and should be 
stopped.” In other words, his data have been strategically selected to modulate the 
audience’s perception of the magnitude of a negative event and advance from a claim 
of debt-induced vulnerability to an (implied) call to blame and oust the government. 
Cameron’s overall argument that blame for the crisis in the UK should be placed on 
the Labour government is sketched out in Figure 5.3 below. Cameron implies that the 
Labour government deserves blame on the grounds that the Labour government “has 
presided over a huge expansion of public and private debt without showing awareness 
of the risks involved” (lines 56–57). The conclusion rule that leads to the attribution of 
blame to the government could be called the topos of government as a protector and 
explicated as follows: “A government in office an and should limit a country’s 
vulnerability to financial crises”. The use of this conclusion rule stands on the 
assumption that the audience shares the view that (a) governments have a particular 
capacity: they can limit public and private debt if they wish to do s, and (b) 
governments have a particular obligation: they should always limit (excessive) public 
and private debt. In other words, Cameron suggests tha  the government should be 
regarded as having full control over risk factors related to financial crises and could 
therefore be legitimately blamed for failing to take steps to anticipate and avoid crises. 
A comparison with other governments serves as a backing for his warrant. Importantly, 
by doing so, Cameron narrows down the scope of the argument: he suggests that the 
financial turmoil should be understood as the ‘Labour’s debt crisis’ (see Hay, 2013) 
rather than a broader systemic problem that affects many countries. Moreover, it may 
be interpreted as an attempt to imply that the introduction of Conservative policies, 
such as sustained reductions in public spending and cuts in welfare state benefits, is 
the only possible solution to the crisis in the UK. 
Cameron briefly mentions a possible counter-argument or a reservation to his 
standpoint that the Labour government should be held accountable for the financial 
crisis in the UK. He writes, “Though the current crisis may have had its trigger in the 
US” and then quickly dismisses this point by stating hat “over the past decade the gun 





Figure 5.3. Cameron’s argument that the Labour government deserves blame 
metaphorically as a gunshot: ‘loading of a gun’ presumes intentional human action, 
and ‘at home’ stands for the UK, hence the use of this metaphor supports his overall 
claim of Labour government’s control and intentionality in relation to the crisis. This 
rebuttal here should be seen as a demonstration of irrelevance rather than an 
acknowledgement of some of the merits of a different view. Note the modality of this 
claim: ‘may’ functions as a qualifier that limits it  strength, thus actually making the 
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5.3 The Prime Minister’s argument: The government does not deserve blame 
Now, I will return to an analysis of Gordon Brown’s article and show how he tries to 
avoid blame by arguing that his government deserves prai e, but its capacity to solve 
the crisis in the UK is limited. As suggested in the previous chapter, this involves 
providing both justifications and excuses. Brown presents the crisis mainly in relation 
to a global ‘turmoil’ within the banking sector (unlike Cameron who emphasises the 
increasing public and private debt in the UK). Brown rites: 
4 The banking system is fundamental to everything we do.  
5 Every family and every business in Britain depends upon it. 
6 That is why, when threatened by the global financial turmoil  
7 that started in America and has now spread across the world,  
8 we in Britain took action to secure our banks and financial system. 
The first two sentences of the article (lines 4 and5) are presented as unmitigated facts, 
as common knowledge. Brown describes banks as essentially beneficial for the society 
as a whole: The first person plural pronoun ‘we’ seems to include “every family and 
every business” in the country. However, this ‘we’ simultaneously denotes the 
political leadership of the country: his fellow members of the Labour government who 
‘took action’ by deciding to support the banks. To justify his government’s decision, 
Brown presents it as unquestionably necessary, using warrants that I have called the 
topos of threat to the banks (“if banks have problems then it poses a threat to 
everybody and one should do something to secure the banks”), and the topos of 
government as a protector (“if threats to people emerge then the government should 
do something to protect the people against them”). These implicit warrants seem to 
lead to the conclusion that the UK government has fulfilled its obligation to protect 
people, and deserves praise for helping the banks (which is represented as equivalent 
to protecting people). A possible way of laying outthis justificatory argument as a 





Figure 5.4. Brown’s argument that his government deserves praise 
However, the bulk of Brown’s article contains arguments that imply that the UK 
government’s capacity to bring about a recovery from the crisis should not be 
overestimated (Figure 5.5). In other words, he argues that he and his government 
cannot take full responsibility for solving the crisis in the UK – and thus should not be 
blamed if the ‘turmoil’ continues and has further ngative consequences for the people. 
By doing so, he constructs an understanding of the ongoing financial crisis that is at 
loggerheads with Cameron’s claims, and opens up the ossibilities for explaining the 
crisis in other terms than ‘Labour’s debt’. 
Brown uses the words “global”, “globe” and “international” repeatedly throughout his 
article to sustain the definition of the crisis as universal, complex, and not specific to 
the UK, thus suggesting that the UK government’s control over crisis management is 
necessarily limited (e.g., “But because this is a global problem, it requires a global 
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Figure 5.5. Brown’s sub-argument that his government lacks full capacity to solve the crisis 
The final paragraph of Brown’s article is remarkable for its massive stacking of words 
and phrases that universalise the crisis, foreground it as ‘global’, and drive home the 
idea that the UK government can neither be blamed for causing the crisis nor expected 
to alleviate the crisis without fully orchestrated actions of innumerable external agents:  
72 We must now act for the long term with co-ordinated national actions.  
73 The resolve and purposefulness of governments and people across the world is being  
74 put to the test. But across the old frontiers we must now redouble our efforts  
75 internationally. For it is only through the boldest of co-ordinated actions across  
76 the globe that we will adequately support families and businesses in this global age.  
Brown’s references to international meetings and his call to other governments to 
“lead the world to financial stability” similarly support the standpoint that overcoming 
the crisis should not be seen as a matter that is entirely internal to the UK. The 
conclusion rules in work here could be perhaps called the topoi of the limited capacity 
of the government, which could be restated as “if global threats emerge then no single 
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government has the full capacity to alleviate these” and “if a government does not 
have the full capacity to solve a crisis, then it does not deserve blame”.  
What Brown presents here could be categorised as a ‘complexity story’ (Stone, 1989). 
In such a story, 
images of complex cause are in some sense analogous to accidental or natural 
cause. They postulate a kind of innocence, in that no identifiable actor can 
exert control over the whole system or web of interactions. Without 
overarching control, there can be no purpose and no responsibility. (Stone, 
1989, p. 289) 
Another argumentative move of deflecting blame constitutes an excuse: Brown 
suggests that it was impossible for anyone to foresee the crisis and the particular 
actions the government had to take. For instance, he writes: 
24 When I became Prime Minister I did not expect to make the decision, along with  
25 Alistair Darling, for the Government to offer to take stakes in our high street banks,  
26 just as nobody could have anticipated the action taken in America. 
The shortcut to concluding that the UK government should not be blamed is a kind of 
topos of ignorance (“If a threat is unforeseeable, then those who failed to foresee it 
and take precautions should not be blamed”). In this case, ignorance is used as a 
valuable asset that helps the potential blame taker to deny liability (McGoey, 2012). 
To sum up, in Brown’s article the causes and solutins of the crisis are externalised: 
The crisis came from ‘America’ and the government lacks the capacity to deal with it 
on its own – the crisis can only be tackled by ‘co-ordinated actions across the globe’ 
(Figure 5.6).  
5.4 Analysing debates over blame: Argument models and beyond 
Looking at the simplified argument diagrams sketched out above, it becomes clear 
that Cameron and Brown tell their audiences two different stories about the financial 
crisis. Importantly, the stories involve different understandings of the capacities and 






Figure 5.6. Brown’s argument that his government does not deserve blame for the crisis 
Cameron internalises the causes of and solutions to the crisis. He dismisses the point 
about the foreign origins of the problem (“though the current crisis may have had its 
trigger in the US…”) and presents mainly statistical data about the UK to support the 
claim that the country has become vulnerable to the financial crisis due to excessive 
debt. By presuming that every government can and should limit a country’s 
vulnerability to financial crises by reducing debt during their term, he leads the reader 
towards the conclusion that the Labour government has failed to fulfil its obligation to 
protect the people – and hence deserves blame.  
Brown, on the other hand, externalises the causes of and solutions to the crisis. He 
emphasises the proposition that the origins of the crisis are external (“the global 
financial turmoil that started in America and has now spread across the world”) and 
presents data about the government’s actions to contain the external threat. Thereby he 
supports the implicit conclusion that the UK government has fulfilled its obligation to 
protect the interests of the country – and hence des rv s praise. However, Brown also 
presents data to modify the expectations of the readers regarding the capacity of the 
UK government to foresee and solve the crisis. He represents the crisis as a global 
problem that was impossible for anyone to foresee, and that can only be dealt with at 
the international level, involving numerous actors. Brown expects the readers to 
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conclude that if his government has not caused the crisis, and if it does not have the 
full capacity to solve a crisis, it does not deserve blame. 
My analysis shows how certain argumentative devices can be used both to generate 
blame and to deflect blame.  
• Even though both politicians deal with complex economic and political issues 
in their texts, their explicit appeals to presumed common ground are very 
simple – or even simplistic and hyperbolic – and thus possibly misleading: “As 
any family with debts knows, higher debt makes us more vulnerable to the 
unexpected” (Cameron) and “The banking system is fundamental to 
everything we do” (Brown).  
• Both Cameron and Brown use appeals to threat. Cameron presents evidence of 
certain threats that are internal to the UK so he could place blame on the 
government for causing these, while Brown talks of the external threats, so he 
could claim credit for fighting against these.  
• Both Cameron and Brown present arguments that rely on the conclusion rule 
that I have called the topos of government as a protector: a supposedly 
commonsensical understanding that the government has the duty to protect 
people against (financial) crises. Cameron uses this content-specific warrant to 
conclude that the government has failed to fulfil its obligation, while Brown 
uses it to claim that his government is doing a good j b. 
Cameron generates blame in a relatively straightforward way: he describes a certain 
harm (UK’s increased vulnerability to financial crisis) and attributes the causal agency 
for bringing about this harm to a concrete Villain – the Labour government. Brown’s 
defensive argumentation is somewhat more complex as it involves manoeuvring 
between forthright positive self-presentation (the government doing good work by 
protecting the banks and the people) and somewhat self-deprecating foregrounding of 
various limitations to his knowledge, capacity, and obligation (the harm was 
unpredictable, his government alone is not able to bring the crisis to an end, the 
obligation for alleviating the problem is diffused globally).  
Presuming that opinion pieces on serious policy issue  in non-tabloid newspapers are 
fundamentally argumentative, I began writing this analysis with an intention to focus 




the purposes of placing or deflecting blame. However, as I proceeded with my work, I 
soon realised that by zooming in on the articles’ logos – their logical appeal – I was 
liable to miss some crucial aspects of their pathos – their emotional appeal – that may 
rise, for example, from the strategic uses of metaphors, frames, and cohesive devices. 
In Cameron’s article, for instance, the overall sense that the government deserves 
blame for the crisis arises partially from the metaphorical linking of the crisis with a 
premeditated gunshot (“over the past decade the gun has been loaded at home”) and 
the idiomatic use of the word “fruit”. The headline of Cameron’s article, “These are 
the Fruits of a Reckless ‘Prudence’”, is presented in a form of an ambiguous causal 
claim; there are significant omissions: X has been caused by Y’s reckless ‘prudence’. 
The use of ‘fruits’ may allude to the idiomatic phrase “fruits of one’s labour”, which 
means the results of one’s work, and thus frame the crisis as a direct result of 
intentional human action rather than a natural or accidental occurrence. “Reckless 
prudence” is an oxymoron, juxtaposition of words that seemingly contradict each 
other, evoking the sense of a problem or a conflict. The use of quotation marks 
indicates irony, thus foregrounding the idea that tere is lack of prudence – a character 
trait which in the text of the article is attributed to the government. Hence, the readers 
are expected to fill in the gaps: they are to conclude that the crisis has been caused by 
the recklessness of the Labour government. 
In Brown’s article, the overall sense that the crisis and its causes and solutions are 
external is elicited not only by his argumentation but also by his peculiar 
overlexicalisation: the notably repetitive use of words like “global”, “across the globe”, 
“across the world”, “international”, “cross-border”.46 In addition, by focusing solely 
on the logical appeal of his text, one may overlook Brown’s construction of dramatic 
frames (Us vs Them; Villain—Victim—Hero; discussed in Chapter 4) that position 
his government on the side of the British public, suggest that his government is a Hero 
(“when threatened…we in Britain took action to secur  our banks”), and hence may 
reduce the readers’ motivation to place blame on his government. 
                                               
46 Notably, references to globalisation were relatively frequent in the rhetoric of the Labour Party even 
before the onset of the financial crisis. Based on her analysis of a 278,586-word corpus of various text 
collected from the Labour Party from 1994 to 2007, L’Hôte (2014) concludes that “while globalisation 
is framed as an agent of progress in discourse, its negative aspects are given significant representatio  
in new Labour discourse”, and that these negative asp cts “are used as a rhetorical threat in order to 




It is also notable how both politicians make normative statements that attribute 
obligation to certain actors, thereby possibly affecting the readers’ perception of 
whether the agency for dealing with the crisis is internal or external. Cameron makes 
such statements specifically about the Labour governm nt, for example, “the 
Government should move quickly to answer the short term questions” (line 18). 
Brown, however, targets similar command-like statements externally at various 
institutions outside of the UK, for instance, “every bank in every country must meet 
capital requirements that ensure confidence” (line 34) and “the Financial Stability 
Forum and a reformed International Monetary Fund should play their part not just in 
crisis resolution but also in crisis prevention” (lines 63–65). Besides providing support 
to an idea that the locus of blame is either internal or external, the use of normative 
statements or imperatives could be seen as an indicator of the relatively greater power 
of the producer of the utterance. Such confrontation l displays of power could 
perform several functions in government blame games. The members of the 
opposition may choose to do this to add authority to their blame attacks and present 
themselves as worthy rivals to the incumbents. The officeholders under attack may 
produce a lot of normative statements and commands based on the calculation that 
those who give orders to others are generally not perceived by the observers as blame 
takers. 
5.5 Concluding remarks 
I hope to have demonstrated that reconstructing the competing argumentation schemes 
can be a helpful step in interpreting public debates over complex issues of blame, such 
as opposition–government blame games in opinion articles about the causes of and 
solutions to certain social or economic problems. Doing so helps to explicate and 
compare the conflicting claims of blame makers and blame takers, as well as the data 
that they present to support the claims, and the topic-specific conclusion rules (topoi) 
that they hope would lead the audience to accept a particular conclusion. However, the 
analysts should also look beyond basic argumentatio s rategies and seek to 
understand, first of all, the broader context and specific political interests framing the 
debate, and second, how blame is attached or deflected using other kinds of persuasive 
devices, such as metaphors, lexical cohesion, and wys of framing and positioning, 




6. Anticipative discursive blame avoidance: An analysis of 
government communication guidelines 
In the two preceding chapters, I tried to operationalise certain discursive strategies of 
blame avoidance that could be seen as mainly reactiv : I looked at how officeholders 
responded to public blame in the frontstage of governm nt communication (RQ 3). In 
this chapter, I will shift my attention to identifying and interpreting anticipative 
discursive blame avoidance, that is, defensive strategies used by government 
communicators before actually receiving blame for a transgression (RQ 4). 
Anticipative blame avoidance differs from its reactive counterpart in two important 
respects: Anticipative blame avoidance remains large y in the backstage of 
government (i.e., the defensive moves are not played out in the public), and no easily 
observable sequences of blaming and defending take pl c between blame makers and 
blame takers. Hence, to spot anticipative blame avoid nce in the first place, one 
should seek out extra-linguistic contextual information (via fieldwork, and by 
consulting institutional documents and political scien e literature) about potential 
blame threats or blame risks that government communicators might face in particular 
situations, and about more or less conventional ways of acting that could supposedly 
minimise these risks. 
One very common anticipative strategy of avoiding blame in public administration is 
the adoption of written professional codes and operational guidelines. Such documents 
are used to automate work procedures, thus curbing the personal discretion of each 
officeholder and diffusing individual responsibility for causing possible mistakes 
(Hood, 2011). In some countries such as the UK and Sweden, governments have 
devised more or less formal sets of rules that regulate the day-to-day work of 
professional government communicators – officeholders who are tasked with 
communicating with the public on behalf of the government and/or advising political 
heads of government departments on communication issues (Canel & Sanders, 2013). 
The tasks of government communicators typically include producing and publicising 
text, talk, and images about policies, public services, and institutional arrangement of 
the government, and giving advice and orders to people, for instance, on how to 
submit annual tax returns. However, government communicators may also be tempted 




some knowledge, or misrepresenting the situation, fr example, by lying, verbal 
evasion, or the use of euphemisms. Even though government communication 
guidelines are likely to have a noticeable effect on he overall transparency, 
accountability and inclusivity of government, there has been no detailed analysis, to 
my knowledge, of how blame risks are discursively constructed and mitigated in such 
normative texts. 
In this chapter, I take a step towards filling that g p in knowledge. I focus on textual 
examples from the communication propriety guidelines published by the UK Cabinet 
Office in 2014, and discuss how such documents (a) reflect officeholders’ concern 
about particular historically rooted blame risks, and (b) are constructed in such ways 
that would supposedly make it easier for government communicators to ward off 
future blame firestorms. Superficially, communication guidelines may seem like 
essentially benign instruments that could improve int ractions between the 
government and the public by setting standards for in mation exchange. In this 
chapter, however, I wish to provide support to the view that communication policy 
documents may also be interpreted as complex devices of anticipative blame 
avoidance and positive self-presentation, employed by government communicators to 
construct and protect their professional identities. 
A useful heuristic point of departure for discursive analysis of anticipative blame 
avoidance in government is the sociological concept of habitus (Bourdieu, 1991). This 
theoretical construct has been effectively used for describing and explaining role-
specific (discursive) practices adopted by professionals, including bureaucrats and 
politicians (see, e.g., Wodak & Vetter, 1999; Wodak, 2011). Habitus encapsulates the 
idea that much of day-to-day professional behaviour is conventionalised, internalised, 
and often subconscious, comprising learned habits, se  of skills, stylistic choices, 
preferences, and perceptions into which professionals are socialised in organisations. 
Habitus is characterised by an arbitrary sense of limits to one’s behaviour: People tend 
to enforce self-censorship to meet others’ implied expectations in particular social 
settings or ‘force fields’. Fields, in Bourdieu’s terms, are sets of relations that are 
characterised by various capitals, for instance, power or advantages deriving from 
acquaintances and networks (social capital), from knowledge and skills, including 
mastery of language (cultural capital), or from materi l goods (economic capital). 




of as officeholders using their cultural capital to defend their social and economic 
capital. 
Officeholders incorporate defensive strategies habitu lly into everyday behaviour in 
certain socio-political, historical, and organisational contexts. While most government 
communication professionals may not have attended any tr ining courses that include 
‘blame avoidance’ (or anything similar) in their description, all of them get socialised 
into the unofficial ‘rules of the blame game’ in government. They become members of 
a community of practice (Wenger, McDermott, & Snyder, 2002): a group of peo l  
who operate in a shared domain of interest, who are committed to joint activities, who 
learn from each other about the ways of addressing recurring problems in their field, 
and who continuously construct and experience a shared (professional) identity. They 
acquire practical expertise in avoiding blame by imitating the successful defensive 
strategies of the other members of their professional group. They develop ‘common 
sense’ understandings of what constitutes a blame risk and how blame should be dealt 
with: what should or should not be said or done. 
To understand the habitual or conventionalised ways of avoiding potential blame in 
government communication, I need to study the sets of relations that constitute that 
field, and map out the main field-specific blame risks. Why do government 
communicators in the UK frequently become targets of blame attacks from various 
critics like journalists, politicians, and scholars? 
6.1 Government communicators as blame takers: Historical and institutional 
contexts 
Blame is often triggered or aggravated by various and, t times, conflicting 
expectations – held by both government outsiders and insiders – related to the 
professional role of a government communicator. The rol  of government 
communicators has two sides. On the one hand, they are government employees, and 
in the case of the UK, members of the Civil Service with a tradition spanning over 150 
years. On the other hand, they are public relations practitioners (even though they 
usually do not use this label) and the roots of their occupation are in the corporate 
propaganda profession that emerged more than a hundred years ago in the United 




communicators face can be traced by exploring the (controversial) histories of, and the 
inherent tensions within these two fields of social action – civil service and public 
relations – that intertwine in their profession and i form their occupational habitus. I 
will address these in turn. 
Civil service and blame 
The modern civil service has its origins in the mid-19th century bureaucratisation of 
the British government. Due to the growing number and complexity of tasks it had to 
fulfil, the government was recommended to recruit employees to a unified Civil 
Service rather than separate departments, to establish  hierarchical division of labour 
to increase efficiency of its work, and to select and promote its employees based on 
merit rather than through political or aristocratic patronage (Lowe, 2011). Today, 
these principles are regarded as traditional pillars of British public administration. The 
vast majority of communicators employed by the UK government inhabit various 
hierarchical positions within the Civil Service. They are increasingly subjected to 
professional evaluation and training as preconditions for advancing to higher positions 
in the hierarchy. And, as is the case with all civil servants in the UK, their work is 
bound by the imperative of political neutrality: they are expected to “carry out their 
duties for the assistance of the Administration as is duly constituted for the time being, 
whatever its political complexion” (Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, 
p. 4). This means, among other things, that when governments change, permanent 
government communicators usually remain in office and have to ‘accommodate’ new 
ministers, new policy preferences, and the shifting demands of the temporary political 
leadership. 
The complex power dynamics between civil servants, their ‘political masters’, and the 
public have received a lot of critical academic attention. The German sociologist Max 
Weber (1905/1958) famously warned that bureaucracy is haracterised by the 
mechanistic and impersonal application of rational rules that would lead to a 
dehumanised society resembling an ‘iron cage’. According to Weber, one of the main 
traits of bureaucratic organisations was the normative separation of administration and 
politics. However, the boundaries between bureaucrats (as expert administrators) and 
politicians (as strategists and policy makers) have become increasingly blurred, and 




Wodak, 2000; Wodak, 2011). Bureaucrats with technical expertise – technocrats – 
may use their increased power to exclude the majority f the population from 
democratic discussion over societal values (Habermas, 1968). 
The American sociologist Robert K. Merton (1940) observed that bureaucrats focus 
on rigid ritualistic rule-following (which indicates timidity and conservatism), 
meanwhile often losing sight of the actual goals of the government. He claimed that 
bureaucrats develop informal ingroup ties and are likely “to defend their entrenched 
interests rather than to assist their clientele and elected higher officials” (Merton 1940, 
p. 564). A somewhat similar view is reflected in the work of the American Public 
Choice theorist William Niskanen (1994) who maintaied that bureaucrats are selfish 
and primarily seek to increase the power of their off ces. Bureaucrats are, according to 
Niskanen, unable to define or serve the public interest; they only try to protect their 
jobs and pay by pleasing those individuals (‘sponsors’) who have a right to promote or 
fire them. 
From the blame avoidance perspective, being part of the Civil Service means that 
government communicators are vulnerable to such traditional streams of criticism 
directed at bureaucracy and bureaucrats. Western societies seem to be characterised by 
a culturally shared negative attitude towards government officeholders who are 
perceived as concerned primarily with ‘self-preservation’ and ‘image-building’, and 
much less with having honest conversations with people and solving citizens’ 
substantial problems. This attitude arises, at least p rtially, from the increased public 
awareness about the officeholders’ use of devious public relations management 
techniques. 
Public relations management and blame 
Organisational public relations management as a profession historically emerged in 
the United States at the beginning of the 20th century (Cutlip, 1994). The first public 
relations professionals facilitated the positive media coverage of big corporations and 
helped them to increase their sales using various propaganda techniques. The use of 
these techniques expanded and became a part of central government’s functions 
during the First World War, when political leaders in several countries, including the 
UK, established official propaganda agencies to support their war efforts. The British 




activities during and between the world wars have be n thoroughly studied (Balfour, 
1979; Grant, 1994; Messinger, 1992; Ogilvy-Webb, 1965; Sanders & Taylor, 1982; 
Seymour-Ure, 2003).  
During the second half of the 20th century, in parallel with the overall rise of 
‘promotional culture’ and political marketing, public relations in Britain developed 
into a pervasive service industry (L’Etang, 2004; Moloney, 2000, 2006). The use of 
image repair techniques to protect the reputation of political leaders and bureaucratic 
institutions became to be seen as a constitutive elem nt of responding to political 
scandals and crises (see, e.g., Boin, ’t Hart, Stern, & Sundelius, 2005; Boin, 
McConnell, & ’t Hart, 2008). By the 1980s, the British government was described as 
being obsessed with ‘media management’, orchestrating its publicity efforts, and 
‘selling its policies like corn flakes’ (Franklin, 1994). 
Since the 1990s, British political journalism has been characterised by ‘demonology 
of spin’ (McNair, 2004). Many commentators have eagerly pointed out specific 
communicative tactics that officeholders have used to promote themselves and bypass 
criticism (e.g., Jones, 1995; Gaber, 2000; Quinn, 2012), and ‘spin’ has often been used 
as an overarching term referring to any sort of communication activities by a 
government (Andrews, 2006). Critics have also pointed out that the use of 
promotional language makes dialogue difficult (Fairclough, 2000), and the prevailing 
approaches to political marketing management do not fit with democratic theories 
(Henneberg, Scammell, & O’Shaughnessy, 2009). 
Caught between politicians and the public 
Officeholders differ in terms of what kind of resources and options they have for 
dealing with various streams of blame, depending on what kind of position they 
occupy in the hierarchical power structure of the Civil Service. Hood (2011, pp. 24–43) 
suggests that within public administration, three ‘worlds’ of players in government 
blame games can be delineated: 
1. ‘ top banana world’: leadership, people with celebrity status and often under 
media attention, who possess abundant resources for handling blame; 
2. ‘front-line world’: service delivery professionals, street-level burea crats, who 





3. middle managers, regulators, advisers, intermediaries: a large number of civil 
servants who are usually less visible to the public. 
Communication professionals employed by the British government mostly fall under 
the latter two categories. A considerable share of them are advisers and intermediaries 
who usually remain out of the public eye: they write official press releases; post 
anonymous updates to institutional websites and social networks; monitor the results 
of public opinion surveys and the content of news and social media; plan, procure, and 
evaluate marketing and advertising campaigns; organise events (e.g., press briefings); 
and provide communication advice and services (e.g., speech writing) to top 
officeholders. Each one of these tasks involves different risks of failure and thus of 
receiving blame. However, because these professional  stay in the backstage of 
government, they are likely to receive blame from their internal supervisors (e.g., 
ministers, permanent secretaries, directors) or colleagues rather than directly from 
government outsiders like journalists and opposition p liticians. Thus they may have a 
strong incentive to perform in such ways which reduce their (potential) 
blameworthiness in the eyes of their bosses and other members of their professional 
ingroup.47 
Spokespersons of the central government departments could be seen as belonging to 
the ‘front-line world’ since they interact daily with journalists as ‘customers’ and 
provide them with content for news stories. Spokespersons may not be as much in the 
media limelight as the ‘top bananas’ like the minister  and other heads of major 
executive agencies, but they certainly receive more close and constant personal 
attention from the press than most other front-line civil servants like tax collectors or 
planning inspectors. Spokespersons may be cross-examined or heckled by reporters at 
press briefings and some of them may become infamous among journalists for their 
attempts to hide, obfuscate, or misrepresent possibly embarrassing information about 
government. To be able to do their job, they have to develop special skills in defusing 
direct blame attacks targeted at themselves, their ministers and colleagues. A couple 
of Prime Minister’s spokespersons have risen to a celebrity ‘top banana’ status: 
                                               
47 A senior government communicator said to me in an interview that government communicators in 
the UK “ask ministers…twice a year to feed back on their experiences working with government 




Margaret Thatcher’s Press Secretary Bernhard Ingham and Tony Blair’s Press 
Secretary Alastair Campbell wielded exceptional power, influenced major policy 
decisions, and were often seen as speaking on behalf of the whole government 
(Franklin, 1994; Gaber, 2004). 
Government communicators who occupy Senior Civil Servic  positions and work 
with ministers need to negotiate complicated relationships between civil servants and 
politicians. In the UK, ministers are seen as being accountable to Parliament for 
everything that happens in their departments. Therefore, as some critics have pointed 
out, civil servants tend to lack a sense of personal responsibility for their actions. For 
example, the Institute for Public Policy Research has suggested that 
the doctrine of ministerial responsibility engenders an accountability-deficit in 
British government. It allows Ministers and civil servants to “duck and dive” 
behind one another… Ministers often feel aggrieved for having to take 
responsibility for everything that takes place in their large and complex 
departments, while civil servants use the doctrine of ministerial responsibility 
to avoid having to be held to account. (House of Commons, 2007, section 3, 
para. 6) 
Ruling politicians expect that government communicators – like all the other civil 
servants in their departments – do their job in such ways that do not irritate the public: 
they should not attract blame to government by wasting money (politicians like to 
show that their departments are efficient) or by failing to achieve certain policy goals 
(politicians want to be seen as always being in control and successful). At the same 
time, however, government communicators may be treated by the ‘top bananas’ 
essentially as professional providers of ‘blame shilds’, or, in some cases, as useful 
free ‘extensions’ of their political party’s communication machineries. The attempts 
by ministers and their political advisers to use public resources – the work of 
government employees and the money from the state budget – for the purposes of 
party political propaganda have attracted particularly intense public criticism. 
Moreover, the conflictual relationships between temporary and permanent 
officeholders in the backstage of government have been famously caricatured and 
satirised in popular media, for example, in the BBC television series Yes Minister and 




as self-interested actors who engage in sinister machin tions (van Zoonen & Wring, 
2012). 
Within the British political tradition, a peculiar way of responding to larger waves of 
criticism targeted at government communication has been to launch an official 
investigation into various problems related to its practices, often carried out in the 
aftermath of some political scandal. Between 1997 and 2011, eleven investigations 
were initiated by the Parliament or the government, scrutinising the ways government 
communication was organised and performed, and the kinds of relations permanent 
government communicators had with politicians, political advisers, and journalists 
(Sanders, 2013). Blurring of government and party communications was one of the 
concerns that came up in several of these reports and it is still a source of significant 
tensions in the field (Gregory, 2012).48 
The adoption of written communication guidelines and codes of conduct may be seen 
as one of the responses to the criticisms and tensions outlined above. The professional 
guidelines produced by the UK Cabinet Office include, among others, documents that 
prescribe to all government communicators in Britain specific sets of (1) general 
standards of propriety, i.e., directions as to how they should conduct themselves in 
their day-to-day work, (2) professional skills – abilities, competencies, knowledge – 
that they have to possess when employed in a particul r position in a government 
agency, and (3) ways in which they should evaluate their communication activity 
(Cabinet Office, 2012, 2013, 2014). Notably, the authorship of these texts is usually 
not attributed to particular individuals: each of these has most likely been written and 
reviewed by several people working within government. Thus the guidelines 
seemingly embody ‘objective’ (i.e., non-personalised and therefore supposedly 
unbiased) technical knowledge of what government communicators are expected to do: 
how they should carry out their work, what kind of knowledge they should seek, and 
what kind of professional relationships and attitudes they should develop. 
                                               
48 For example, the Mountfield Report of 1997 admitted that government communication may 
sometimes carry political advantages for the party in power, and stressed the importance of having 
ethical guidelines for government communication activity (House of Commons, 1998). A report by the 
Committee on Standards in Public Life (2003) called for guidance clarifying the complicated 
relationship between politically appointed special advisers who advise ministers in the interests of their 
political party, and civil servant communicators who are expected to remain politically impartial. The 
Phillis Report of 2004 recommended that Civil Service impartiality should be reinforced to rebuild the





A senior UK government communicator (G. C.), whom I interviewed for this study, 
explained that the guidelines are used for training ewly appointed government 
communicators: They attend an induction programme wh re 
everybody has an introduction on propriety, everybody has an introduction on 
the Civil Service Code, everybody has an introduction on the GCS 
[Government Communication Service] Handbook. Those thr e are the kind of 
corner stones of the behaviours that we expect. (G. C., personal 
communication, April 28, 2015) 
My interviewee also said that while the Government Communication Service team at 
the Cabinet Office tries to coordinate and monitor the implementation of the 
guidelines by professional communicators across government departments, the duty to 
ensure compliance with the guidelines lies primarily with the Director of 
Communications of each department. 
While explicitly targeting government employees, the guidelines have been made 
accessible on the public website of the Government Communication Service, so it 
may be argued that to some extent the documents serve the purpose of managing the 
public impression of the communication profession in the British government. 
Guidelines may function as (semi-)formal devices of managing both politicians’ and 
citizens’ expectations towards the behaviour of government communicators. The 
guidelines position government communicators in relation to other groups both inside 
the government (ministers, special advisers, civil servants) and outside the 
government (legislators, journalists, political oppsition) by describing in which ways 
they are similar or dissimilar.  
In the following section, I first discuss some discursive characteristics of these 
documents, and then examine more closely certain potentially defensive strategies 
within the Government Communication Service Propriety Guidance – a document that 
deals most directly with the professional ethics of g vernment communicators in the 
UK and hence addresses certain acts that may be considered blameworthy in their 
field. An important assumption I make in my analysis i  that when government 
communicators write such guidelines on professional conduct, they necessarily pay 
attention (more or less consciously) to the previous experiences they and the fellow 




– including experiences of being blamed for doing or n t doing certain things. In other 
words, the producers of the professional guidelines enact their occupational habitus 
and seek to construct a positive professional identty for themselves and their ingroup. 
In the process, they employ certain discursive strategies that may be interpreted as 
defensive moves meant to minimise the field-specific blame risks. Hence, I approach 
these documents as useful empirical data that contain discursive traces of anticipative 
blame avoidance.49 
6.2 ‘The border of propriety’: Blame avoidance in the UK government 
communication guidelines 
The producers of the professional guidelines seem to an icipate potential blame in two 
interwoven ways. First, they use language to construct a positive (i.e., blameless, 
virtuous) professional identity for their ingroup, presumably thereby discouraging 
potential blame makers from expressing their criticism. Second, linguistic features of 
the guidelines help protect the officeholders from future blame attacks by discursively 
constraining their field of action and limiting their perceived causal agency – and 
hence also their blameworthiness whenever something goes wrong. 
If examined through the lens of blame/avoidance, th discursive construction of a 
positive professional identity basically involves the use of linguistic resources (e.g., 
lexical choices, discursive strategies) to depict cer ain social actors as belonging to a 
unique category of experts who do highly skilled work that serves an important social 
function – and who therefore deserve public praise rather than blame. As is the case 
with any kind of group identity building, language is used to demarcate the lines of 
difference between an ingroup and an outgroup, between ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (De Fina, 
2011; Wodak, 2011). On the one hand, this involves strategies of assimilating: for 
                                               
49 For a researcher, it seems, it would not be feasible to ask the writers of these guidelines which 
elements in the guidelines were meant to be defensiv  (these people are not accessible, and would most 
likely deny that any of their discursive choices were related to avoiding blame). Therefore, an indirect 
way to identify defensiveness in the language of the guidelines is to study the field-specific blame risks, 
that is, to find out about the histories of attacks and controversies that government communicators have
had to endure in the past, and then try to identify the particular discursive strategies used in the 
guidelines in relation to these risks. My understanding of the field-specific blame risks derives in part 
from my personal experience: Before I began working o  this thesis, I was employed as a civil servant 
at a government office for 10 years and participated in the writing of several communication guidelines 




example, calculated ways of naming (referential or nominational strategies) that are 
used for membership categorisation, and particular ways of representing social actors 
that are used for collectivising them. On the other hand, this involves trategies of 
dissimilating: for example, adversarial framing of a discursively constructed outgroup 
as a Villain and the ingroup as a Hero or a Victim.50 
The perception of agency for potentially negative future deeds or outcomes can be 
anticipatively manipulated by using a variety of linguistic strategies which I have 
already described in Chapter 4: strategic ways of arguing (e.g., appeals to law), 
framing (e.g., depicting someone else as a Villain), denying (e.g., control-denial), 
representing social actors and actions (e.g., collectivising actors, deagentialising 
actions), and legitimising (e.g., referring to an impersonal authority). In addition, 
ambiguity of the guidelines can serve the purpose of limiting blame, sometimes 
possibly allowing government communicators to bypass their professional propriety 
rules without punishment. 
The general defensive disposition of officeholders is ometimes rather explicitly 
indicated in the text of the guidelines by what I call the lexis of blame/avoidance – 
evaluative nouns (e.g., ‘problem’, ‘issue’, ‘obstacle’), and adjectives (e.g., ‘negative’, 
‘improper’) that are used to categorise particular w ys of acting or particular situations 
as undesirable: as threats to the positive self-images of government communicators 
both individually and as a collective group. Related to this, imperative language – dos 
and don’ts – is used to direct and constrain certain aspects of the future behaviour of 
government communicators so that they would supposedly be less likely to attract 
blame.  
Below I present a more detailed analysis of the discursive constructions of the 
government communicators’ professional identity andtheir main blame risks, together 
with concrete textual examples taken from the communication propriety guidelines of 
the UK Coalition government. 
                                               
50 Strategies of assimilating and dissimilating have be n previously described by Wodak, de Cillia, 
Reisigl, & Liebhart (2009) in relation to the discursive construction of national identities. I use th
notions of Villain, Victim, and Hero following Lakoff (2008) to refer to the stereotypical characters of a




Constructing a professional identity 
Appeals to unique expertise and professionalism may be interpreted as defensive 
rhetorical moves that people in various occupational domains employ to claim 
autonomy and avoid blame. Professionalisation of an occupation could be defined as 
“a process of social crystallisation of expertise allowing the expert to ‘practice in 
peace’” (Fournier 1999, p. 302). The production of various complex codes and 
guidelines for government employees fulfils the function of signalling their 
professionalism – and thus also their claim for higher prestige in society. 
The authors of the guidelines have foregrounded expertise by increasing the 
complexity of the texts – and thereby possibly excluding potential ‘non-expert’ 
readers. First, the texts often mention various other codes, guidelines and legal acts 
that government communicators are expected to famili rise themselves with and 
adhere to.51 For example, the Government Communication Service Propriety 
Guidance (Cabinet Office, 2014) includes, among others, references to the 
Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010, the Civil Service Code, the 
Ministerial Code, election and referenda guidance, guidance for departments on 
sponsorship, social media guidance for civil servants, Government Communication 
Service evaluation guidance, Efficiency and Reform Group Advertising, Marketing 
and Communications Request Form Guidance, the Communications Act 2003, 
Ofcom’s Broadcasting Code, the Contempt of Court Act 1981, the Children and 
Young Persons Act, the Data Protection Act, the Freedom of Information Act, the 
Welsh Language Act 1993, the Disability Discriminaton Act 1995, and the guidance 
on copyright in works commissioned by the Crown. 
Unsurprisingly, the propositions in the guidelines most commonly rely on the topos of 
law – an argumentative shortcut that (implicitly) says that “if a law or otherwise 
codified norm prescribes or forbids a specific politico-administrative action, the action 
has to be performed or omitted” (Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, p. 79). This flood of explicit 
intertextual references may leave a reader with an impression that nearly every aspect 
                                               
51 Indeed, some degree of explicit intertextuality is necessary in most kinds of government documents. 
However, non-expert readers may easily feel overwhelmed when presented with too many references to 




of the work of government communication professionals is carefully legally or 
officially regulated – and therefore perhaps less open to critical reflection. 
Second, the guidelines make use of profession-specific a ronyms and jargon. Here is 
an example from the Propriety Guidance: 
(1) Now in its fourth edition, the DM Code is the direct marketing industry’s most far-
reaching set of best practice guidelines, incorporating the CAP Codes, PhonepayPlus 
Code of Practice, and FSA Principles for Businesses, as well as  relevant legislation. 
It is presumed that government communicators as expert readers know what ‘DM’, 
‘CAP’, ‘PhonepayPlus’ and ‘FSA’ stand for. The use of unconventional lexis serves to 
underline the specialised knowledge that the intended readers allegedly possess, and 
sets them apart from ‘non-expert’ outgroups. 
The construction of professional identity in the text of the guidelines also involves the 
employment of a variety of categorisation and assimilation devices. The idea that 
individuals who communicate on behalf of the governme t belong to a certain 
category (e.g., ‘government communicators’, ‘civil servants’, members of their 
respective departments, or advisers to their respective ministers) can be either 
foregrounded or backgrounded, leading to different understandings of their loyalties 
and obligations. 
Throughout the guidance documents produced by the Cabinet Office, government 
communicators are represented as a unified and unique group of positive actors. First 
of all, the use of the collective reference ‘governme t communicators’ (and in some 
cases also ‘media officers’ as their sub-group) is salient in all of the official texts. This 
seems to carry a less negative connotation compared to other possible ways of 
referring to government employees charged with public communication tasks, e.g., 
‘public relations practitioners’, ‘discourse technologists’, or ‘spin doctors’. The latter 
terms are used by various critical commentators often interchangeably as (near) 
synonyms to refer to such officeholders. The same applies to the singular label 
‘government communication’ that is used to refer to the profession and the plural 
‘government communications’ that signifies the content or the ‘output’ of their work: 




instance, ‘government public relations’, ‘political marketing’, or ‘government 
propaganda’ that are often found in academic literature. 
Second, the fact that ‘government communicators’ belong to Civil Service may be 
more or less foregrounded in the text. In some of the guidelines, the label ‘civil 
servants’ is at times used interchangeably with ‘government communicators’. For 
example, on page 3 of the Government Communication Service Propriety Guidance it 
says: 
(2) This guidance has been developed by the Government Communication Service to 
inform all government communicators of their responsibilities and provide advice for 
specific situations they may encounter. 
On the next page, however, it says: 
Government Communication Service Propriety Guidance defines how civil servants 
can properly and effectively present the policies and programmes of the government 
of the day. 
On some occasions, ‘government communicators’ are explicitly framed as a sub-
category of ‘civil servants’. This seems to be mainly used as a part of emphasising 
their dissimilarity with politicians. Here is a sent ce from the Propriety Guidance 
that illustrates this: 
(3) Like all civil servants, government communicators must maintain a professional 
distance from ministers and abide by the Civil Service Code at all times. 
While this directive sounds unmitigated (“must...at all times”), the meaning of 
“professional distance” is not explained in the texts, thereby leaving more room for 
ambiguous interpretations.52 
Furthermore, government communicators may be assimilated with the departments 
where they are employed, that is, the central governm nt organisations led by 
ministers. The following extract from the Propriety Guidance shows how the 
‘department’ is at first attached to media officers by the use of possessive pronoun 
                                               
52 Arguably, some vagueness is necessary in such guidelines, as it provides space for officials’ use of 
discretion in unforeseeable situations. However, the use of vague expressions could also mean that the 




(‘their departments’), and then used so that it effectively stands for ‘media officers’ 
due to cohesion. 
(4) It is the duty of media officers to present the policies of their department to the 
public through the media and to try to ensure that they are understood. … The 
Government has the right to expect the department to further its policies and 
objectives, regardless of how politically controversial they might be. 
The systematic use of the discursive strategies of a similation – constructing 
individual employees as inseparable from collective bodies such as ‘government 
communicators’, ‘civil servants’, and ‘departments’ – has at least two effects in terms 
of blame avoidance. First, it results in a perceived s nse of belonging and peer support 
that helps each individual employee in the constructed professional community to 
better resist external blame attacks. And second, the de-personalised and (variously) 
collectivised social actor representation means that responsibility for problems that 
may occur can be more easily diffused and blame attribu ions are more likely to seem 
less targeted. 
Distinguishing between government communicators and ‘politicians’ 
Dissimilating government communicators from politicians – ministers, ministers’ 
political advisers, and party political spokespeopl – is a central theme in the 
communication guidelines produced by the Cabinet Office. I use the following excerpt 
from the Propriety Guidance’s section titled ‘Dealing with ministers’ to illustrate 
some of the ways in which dissimilating is linguistically realised. 
(5) 1 Ministers don’t always acknowledge the distinction between  
2 government communicators and their own party political spokespeople.  
3 Consequently, ministers may sometimes ask the Press Office to issue  
4 or further distribute through departmental digital channels  
5 speeches or statements that cross the border of propriety. 
6 In such cases, it is right to explore whether a compromise can be reached  
7 that will not breach propriety.  
8 If no such compromise can be found, then it will be necessary  
9 to give a polite refusal which, if necessary, will be 




In lines 1–2, ministers are described as liable to conflating the roles of departmental 
and party spokespeople. Ministers are thus framed as potential Villains, because they 
“don’t always acknowledge the distinction” that is admittedly central to the positive 
professional identity of government communicators. In lines 3–5, ministers are 
described as liable to ask government communicators to behave in inappropriate ways. 
This further reinforces the negative portrayal of ministers as Villains who are 
predisposed to “cross the border of propriety”. 
Lines 6–7 are notably vague and abstract: all actors have been deleted and the possible 
course of action is suggested in a non-imperative way. Instead of giving an 
authoritative instruction (e.g., “do not breach propriety!”) the authors of the guidance 
have resorted to a notably ambivalent descriptive statement: “it is right to explore 
whether a compromise can be reached that will not breach propriety.” This 
formulation could be seen as telling evidence of the problematic power relations 
between ministers and government communicators: the former may sometimes 
misbehave but the latter cannot easily oppose or ‘defeat’ them because of the 
subordinate position of government communicators in the departmental hierarchy. 
Government communicators may attempt to save their face when dealing with a 
‘villainous’ minister by negotiating a “compromise” (line 6) or delivering a “polite 
refusal” (line 9), and sometimes seeking additional support from the highest non-
elected officeholders in the organisation (line 10). 
What kinds of speeches or statements by ministers ar  een as “crossing the border of 
propriety”? An example of this is provided in the following excerpt from the 
Propriety Guidance. 
(6) 1 For example, if a speech by a minister included an attack on their  
2 political opponents, it would be improper for the department to issue it  
3 as an official text. The political attack would have to be omitted from the 
4 official release. If the minister wished the full speech to be issued,  




The use of the noun ‘attack’ as a description of what ministers do (lines 1 and 3) 
evokes the conceptual domain of war.53 The framing of politics as war is furthered by 
the use of the phrase ‘political battle’ in the following excerpt from the Propriety 
Guidance’s section titled ‘Announcing new policies’. 
(7) 1 In the sense that government communicators work  
2 directly with and for ministers who are politically motivated,  
3 government communications cannot be free of political content.  
4 But at all times it is essential to remember that, as civil servants,  
5 government communicators cannot join the political battle. 
6 Government communicators regardless of discipline should do nothing that  
7 leaves ministers and the department open to criticism in this respect. 
Even though it is explicitly stated that “government communicators work directly with 
and for ministers” (lines 1–2), I suggest that the m taphor POLITICS IS WAR is used 
here as a crucial linguistic device for setting politicians further apart from government 
communicators. Government communicators may have to deal with “political content” 
(line 3) but need to stay clear of “political attacks” and the “political battle” (line 5) 
perpetrated by the “politically motivated” (line 2)ministers. The use of the war 
metaphor frames ministers as aggressive warmongers. Government communicators, 
on the other hand, may be perceived by implication as ‘non-combatants’ because they 
are advised to steer away from conflict. Notably, the adjective ‘political’ is ‘not 
defined anywhere in the guidelines, so its meaning remains ambiguous, but due to its 
use within a war metaphor and as an essential attribute of politicians as Villains, it 
acquires a strongly negative connotation. ‘Political’ things seem to generate blame and 
should be avoided. By indirectly denouncing “politically motivated” behaviour, 
government communicators distance themselves from politicians and their actions.  
                                               
53 Charteris-Black (2004) concluded in his study thate domain of conflict (indicated by words such as 
‘fight’ and ‘battle’) was the most common source domain of metaphors identified in his corpus of 
British party political manifestos since the end of the Second World War. He suggested that “politicians 
employ conflict metaphors because they highlight the personal sacrifice and physical struggle that is 
necessary to achieve social goals” (Charteris-Black, 2004, p. 69). Given the POLITICS IS WAR 
metaphor, “society can be seen as composed of armies that correspond to political groups; the leaders 
of the armies correspond to political leaders; the weapons used by the army are the ideas and policies of 




In lines 6–7, the guidance given to government communicators is remarkably vague 
and ambivalent. What might, for example, “leaving ministers open to criticism” 
exactly involve? According to one possible reading, government communicators are 
constructed as being fully responsible for defending ministers against public blame by 
not joining their ‘political battle’. The unexpressed premise of this is that in any case it 
will be the minister who will be criticised whenever a government communicator in 
her department engages in a ‘political battle’. Another interpretation could be that 
communicators have to avoid any behaviour (“should do nothing”) that could attract 
blame to ministers and departments. However, the full xtent and nature of the 
forbidden actions (i.e., blame risks) remain implicit – these are treated as part of the 
tacit professional knowledge (i.e., habitus). 
6.3 Interpreting the discursive underpinnings of ‘operational’ blame avoidance 
Above, I have examined the professional guidelines that deal with certain aspects of 
government communication that may be called ‘operation l’: The written guidance 
pertains to the practical decisions as to what governm nt communicators should or 
should not do within their professional capacity. Hood (2011) claims that some of the 
most common operational approaches to limiting blame in public administration 
include what he calls ‘protocolisation’ and ‘herding’. Protocolisation refers to 
officeholders’ anticipative strategy of avoiding blame by rigid rule-following, thereby 
limiting the perception of individual agency. 
Rather than allowing common sense or ad hoc professi nal judgment to 
govern what is to be done, appropriate behaviour is stipulated by formulae, 
algorithms, computer programs, best practice guidelines, or other kinds of 
rules, turning human functionaries into some approximation of robots. (Hood, 
2011, p. 93) 
Herding means “always doing things in groups in some way, so that no one individual 
or organisation can be singled out for blame as deviant, and potential blame takers can 
find strength in numbers” (Hood, 2011, p. 92). This kind of collective behaviour may 




Based on my analysis of the government communication guidelines, I suggest that 
these two operational strategies of anticipative blame avoidance described by Hood 
involve not only particular working routines and arrangements but also particular 
patterns of language use. I conceptualise protocolisation and herding as discursive 
strategies which can be accomplished (at least partially) in text and talk by employing 
certain linguistic devices that I have identified in my analysis. I present a heuristic 
model for interpreting these strategies in Table 6.1 below. 
Protocolisation as a discursive strategy of blame avoidance is realised, in the first 
place, by producing and referring to written operational guidelines and standards. 
Within these documents, imperative language is usedto direct and constrain certain 
aspects of the behaviour of government communicators. Propositions in the 
documents are based on appeals to various official rules and legal acts (topos of law), 
and particular courses of action are legitimised with references to impersonal authority. 
Officeholders are framed as devoted rule-followers, and thus their control over 
possibly blameworthy outcomes can be denied (control-denial) as they are seemingly 
‘left with no choice’ in carrying out their tasks. 
Herding is realised discursively by employing strategies of assimilating and 
dissimilating. Strategies of assimilating are aimed at linguistically establishing 
similarity, unity, homogeneity among government communicators, and further among 
departments and all civil servants, thereby making it easier to diffuse blame within the 
professional community and reduce personal responsibility for possible failures. This 
includes representing potential blame takers as collectivised and functionalised actors 
(e.g., ‘government communicators’), emphasising their igh social status (e.g., by 
using field-specific acronyms and jargon), basing argumentative propositions on 
appeals to expertise and professionalism, and legitimis ng actions based on conformity 
(e.g., one should behave ‘like all civil servants’). Strategies of dissimilating are aimed 
at linguistically constructing differences between government communicators and the 
‘others’ (e.g., ‘politicians’, ‘ministers’, ‘special dvisers’), thereby allowing the 
former to deflect blame for certain problems by directing (at least some of) it to 
individuals or groups outside their community of practice. Particular practices are 
discouraged among the members of the ‘herd’ by using negative comparison with 
those who are constructed as ‘others’ (and sometimes framed as Villains), for instance, 




Table 6.1. Anticipative discursive strategies of blame avoidance in bureaucratic operational 
guidelines 
 Protocolisation Herding 
General description Rejecting (some of) the causal 
agency for negative deeds or 
outcomes by claiming to be 
strictly following the rules 
Making blame seem less targeted 
by spreading causal agency for 
negative deeds or outcomes 
among many actors 
Ways of arguing Topos of law Topos of expertise/ 
professionalism 
Ways of framing Framing oneself as a rule-
follower 
Framing oneself as a member of a 
group of Heroes or Victims (and 
possibly framing ‘others’ as 
Villains) 
Ways of denying Control-denial Control-denial 
Ways of representing 





Collectivising and functionalising 
oneself 





Moral evaluation legitimation 
(negative comparison with 
‘others’) 
 
Herding and protocolisation as discursive strategies of anticipative blame avoidance 
are similar as far as the ways of denying and the ways of representing social actors are 
concerned. Both strategies entail denying officeholder’s individual control/agency (in 
case of protocolisation, the control supposedly lies elsewhere, e.g., with the legislators; 
in case of herding, the agency is spread among many actors) and both entail 
collectivising and functionalising officeholders (in case of protocolisation, as ‘rule-
followers’; in case of herding, as ‘government communicators’, ‘departments’, or 
‘civil servants’), thereby making it easier to reduce personal liability for possible 
failures. 
Admittedly, protocolisation and herding should not be regarded as fundamentally ‘evil’ 
practices. Officeholders generally act with good intentions when they refer to rules or 




may sometimes amount to discursive power abuse: communicative manipulation.54 
For example, protocolisation could be seen as manipulat ve if officeholders 
calculatedly overemphasise the extent to which the work of government 
communication professionals is rigidly regulated. The commands in the documents 
may be deliberately constructed in ambiguous, mitigated, and suggestive ways, hence 
actually allowing officeholders much more discretion over what course of action to 
pursue in concrete situations. Discursive herding strategy could be manipulative if 
officeholders systematically omit or blur information about salient differences among 
the members of a professional ingroup and their actons. Within the government 
communication profession – and within the civil service for that matter – individual 
officeholders may belong to separate ‘blame worlds’ and have different reasons and 
resources for engaging in discursive self-defence or image-making. In the same vein, 
overemphasising the ‘professional distance’ between executive politicians and 
government communicators could be misleading, because they may at times be driven 
by rather similar incentives and interests. 
6.4 Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I explored how government communication guidelines could be 
interpreted as discursive devices of anticipative blame avoidance. To analyse the text 
of the guidelines in terms of defensive strategies used by their producers, one has to 
begin by exploring the blame risks that government communicators might face in 
particular situations. Government communicators in the UK are caught in a blame 
‘crossfire’ that has multiple historical and institu onal sources. They are likely to be 
criticised over various shortcomings traditionally associated with bureaucracy and 
public relations. Moreover, they have to survive in the midst of the often conflicting 
demands of the constantly competing politicians and the public expectation of a 
politically neutral civil service. 
Hence, blame avoidance could be seen as a core ingred ent of the occupational habitus 
of government communicators. They do not use discursive strategies of blame 
                                               
54 For a discussion of what may constitute ‘manipulation’ in discourse, see van Dijk (2006). He 
suggests that manipulators seek to (re)produce their power by controlling the formation of the socially 




avoidance only reactively, that is, in immediate response to an individual, clearly 
targeted accusation of causing something negative. Defensive language use is often 
anticipative, part of the everyday operating routines, calculated to preemptively 
manipulate the perception of officeholders’ individual control over possibly negative 
actions or outcomes.  
Professional guidelines produced by and for governmnt communicators as a 
community of practice should be seen as enactments of their habitus, means of 
constructing their professional identities, and devic s of limiting potential blame risks. 
The authors of the guidelines anticipate blame in two interwoven ways. First, they use 
language to construct a positive (i.e., blameless, virtuous) professional identity for 
their ingroup by emphasising their expertise and distancing themselves from 
(presumably bad) ‘political battles’. Second, they use protocolisation and herding as 
discursive strategies of collectivising and functionalising officeholders, thereby 





7. Defensive semiotic strategies in government:  
A multimodal study of blame avoidance 
In the previous three chapters, I have mainly explored the linguistic aspects of blame 
avoidance in government, that is, officeholders’ defensive uses of verbal language. In 
this chapter, I continue my investigation into anticipative blame avoidance in the 
backstage of government communication (RQ 3), but I try to look beyond spoken and 
written texts, and interpret defensive moves from the perspectives of dramaturgy 
(Goffman, 1969) and multimodality (van Leeuwen, 2014). 
Applying an analogy between life and theatre, and focusing on how individuals 
present themselves to others, seems to be a useful approach to understanding blame 
avoidance in organisations. The study of people’s prformances and impression 
management in everyday life was pioneered by the sociologist Erving Goffman (1969) 
and his analytic concepts have later been successfully applied to describe and explain 
organisational and political linguistic behaviour (e.g., Wodak, 2011). 
From this dramaturgical point of view, blame phenomena can be best grasped by 
conducting ethnographic micro-sociological studies of face-to-face interactions as 
performances by which certain people as ‘actors’ try to influenc  the other 
participants, particular audiences, or observers. Re earchers who adopt this approach 
try to understand how social relationships, social order and organisation are routinely 
performed and sustained not only by verbal interaction, but also by a set of 
‘expressive equipment’ that Goffman (1969) calls ‘front’. Front includes, most 
importantly, setting of the performance (location, physical layout, props), appearance 
of the performer (characteristics that signal her social status, for example, clothes and 
insignia of office) and her manner (facial expression  and body movements that 
indicate her interactional role, for example, as some ne who is domineering, obedient, 
or angry). 
In the context of executive government, it may be presumed that dealing with blame 
risk takes different forms depending on whether the officeholders are communicating 
publicly, that is, making their text, talk, and other symbolic resources accessible to a 
mass audience (e.g., giving a televised interview) or acting in a relatively more 




number of authorised participants who mainly belong to the same professional 
community or team as the performers themselves. The latter space, as noted earlier, 
can be conceptualised as backstage: a region where offic holders are more likely to 
relax, step out of character, and discuss and practice their public performances without 
the need to worry about being observed – and possibly criticised – by external 
audiences (Goffman, 1969). In front of an audience, however, officeholders are keen 
to control the information they give out about thems lves. They highlight certain 
positive aspects that they want the audience to notice (‘dramatic realisation’ in 
Goffman’s terms), and try to present a consistent, ‘idealised’ version of themselves 
and their actions. This involves omitting or backgrounding ‘dirty’ (problematic, ugly, 
possibly illegal) aspects of their work, and maintai ing social distance with the 
members of the audience to ‘mystify’ them.55 Idealising and mystifying, I suggest, are 
the central features of officeholders’ anticipative blame avoidance behaviour. 
The dramatic performances of government officeholders can be analysed in great 
detail in terms of how they deploy a range of multimodal semiotic resources, such as 
written and spoken language, still and moving images, acting, clothing, music, and so 
forth, to avoid, limit, or shift blame. In the follwing section, I discuss the affordances 
(i.e., perceived meaning potentials in particular situations) and possible strategic 
applications of some of these, with a special focus on the defensive uses of non-verbal 
resources. My aim is to extend the heuristic framework of discursive strategies of 
blame avoidance proposed in Chapter 4 by considering no -verbal ways of 
representing social actors and actions, framing, arguing, and legitimising. I apply 
these analytic categories to interpret the data I gathered during an observation of a 
major training event of British government communicators in June 2014. 
                                               
55 Notably, the distinction between backstage and frontstage is not always evident; people can invoke 
typical front or backstage behaviour in various interactional situations and in a variety of places. For 
example, officeholders may choose to speak and act in backstage in very formal, rehearsed ways to 
show off their acting skills or to keep up the morale of fellow actors between their frontstage 
performances. When the border between back and front seems blurred, people may choose to adopt 
what has been called ‘sidestage’ (or ‘middle region’) behaviour patterns that combine elements of both 
typical front and backstage activity (Meyrowitz, 1985). Moreover, the presence of a researcher can 
induce a change in the ‘normal’ backstage behaviour – a phenomenon which ethnographers call the 





7.1 Multimodal approaches to blame avoidance 
Ways of representing actors and actions 
When social actions – including wrongdoings – are represented by semiotic 
resources, the actual concrete actors, actions, settings, causal links, and so forth, 
are all transformed in certain ways: they are ‘recontextualised’ (van Leeuwen & 
Wodak, 1999; see also Machin, 2013). In their performances (where they use text, 
talk, images, etc.), officeholders can carry out some of these transformations 
strategically to defend themselves against receiving blame for their transgressions 
or failures. Drawing on van Leeuwen and Wodak (1999) and the insights from my 
first pilot study, I suggest that such defensive transformations may include: 
• deleting verbal, visual, and other references to perpetrators; omitting 
representations of (possible) victims as well as any loss or suffering caused by 
the perpetrators; excluding references to any transgres ions or negative 
characteristics of the possible blame takers; 
• adding linguistic, visual, and other cues that (a) emphasise the positive 
characteristics of a possibly negative event (e.g., by providing explanations 
and justifications) and/or the positive characterisics of a blameworthy agent, 
and (b) shift the audience’s attention away from a particular negative event 
and/or a particular blameworthy agent; 
• rearranging the sequence of represented events so that a particul  negative 
outcome seems not to have resulted from a particular officeholder’s (in)action; 
rearranging the social relations between potential blame makers and 
officeholders (e.g., portraying more powerful actors as less powerful); 
• substituting the actual elements of a potentially blameworthy social practice 
with representations that are designed to background certain negative 
meanings and relations, and thereby limit the audience’s blame-generating 
desire (e.g., using euphemisms, linguistic and visual metaphors, abstract 
pictures, general diagrams, or decontextualised statistic l figures to refer to 
concrete wrongdoings of a particular officeholder, or to concrete individuals 
who suffer as a consequence of these wrongdoings); replacing the act of doing 
something problematic (e.g., wasting money) with an act of doing something 




To mitigate blame risk, officeholders may try to convey or support an impression that 
possibly negative events or circumstances that could attract blame are ‘less real’, 
while the potentially praiseworthy aspects of their character and actions are ‘more 
real’. Kress and van Leeuwen (2006) remind us that the ruth value or credibility of 
statements – that is, their ‘modality’ – can be linguistically marked by the speaker’s 
use of auxiliary verbs (e.g., ‘may’, ‘will’, ‘must’), adjectives (e.g., ‘certain’, 
‘probable’, ‘possible’) and tense (past claims seem l ss true than the present ones), by 
formulating the claims either as subjective ideas or objective facts (e.g., ‘they think 
that...’ versus ‘in fact,...’), and by labelling claims with qualifying terms such as 
‘belief’ or ‘reality’. Kress and van Leeuwen suggest that people use modality markers 
in visual communication, too. However, what counts as ‘more real’ depends on what 
kind of socially and historically developed ‘standard of reality’ a particular audience 
subscribes to. For example, some scientifically minded viewers may regard an abstract 
diagram as ‘more real’ than a photograph, because the former captures the essence and 
generality of the phenomenon whereas the latter merely depicts its surface. One’s 
preferred standard of reality serves as an indicator of group membership and social 
status.  
Modality both realises and produces social affinity, through aligning the 
viewer (or reader, or listener) with certain forms of representation, namely 
those with which the artist (or speaker, or writer) aligns himself or herself, and 
not with others. Modality realises what ‘we’ consider true or untrue, real or not 
real. (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 171) 
If officeholders want their visual messages to be persuasive, they need to tailor these 
to fit the ‘coding preferences’ of the particular audience at hand. Arguably, 
sociocultural elites are expected to show a preference for abstract coding that is 
characteristic to academic and scientific contexts. For such people, “modality is higher 
the more an image reduces the individual to the genral, and the concrete to its 
essential qualities”, and engaging with abstract images, either as a producer or 
consumer, “is a mark of social distinction, of being an ‘educated person’ or a ‘serious 
artist’” (Kress & van Leeuwen, 2006, p. 165). Abstractness is opposed to 
‘photographic naturalism’ in visual depiction, and a gradual distinction between these 
can be made on the basis of a number of modality markers: extreme abstractness is 




(there is no background), representation (there is v ry little pictorial detail), depth 
(there is no perspective), illumination (there is no play of light and shade), and 
brightness (only two degrees of brightness are used). 
I suggest that the affordances of abstractness in vi ual representation can be exploited 
by officeholders who seek to avoid criticism. First, decontextualised abstract 
depictions allow to background or omit possibly blameworthy aspects of particular 
decisions or events and make these seem less concrete (e.g., suffering individuals can 
be represented as a line or a bar on a chart, thereby collectivising and anonymising 
individual victims). Second, the use of abstract images in communication may 
constitute an attempt to imbue certain statements with the quality of being ‘scientific’: 
This could be seen as a visual appeal to expertise when officeholders are denying, 
justifying, or excusing possibly blameworthy acts or outcomes. Third, abstractness in 
visual communication could be interpreted (at least by certain audiences) as an 
indicator of high social status and exclusiveness of the communicator: characteristics 
that may, in some instances, reduce the audience’s motivation for critical reflection 
and blame generation. 
Ways of framing and positioning 
One of the most remarkable affordances of recontextualising is that people can be 
represented by types or roles that fit nicely into well-known storylines. As already 
noted in Chapter 4, people often attribute blame and praise in terms of a basic 
narrative frame that may be called ‘Rescue narrative’ (Lakoff, 2008, p. 24). 
According to this narrative frame, an (inherently evil) Villain harms a (helpless 
and innocent) Victim, then an (inherently good) Hero struggles against and defeats 
the Villain, so consequently the Victim is rescued, the Villain punished, and the 
Hero rewarded. Accordingly, avoiding blame means avoiding being represented – 
verbally or visually – as a Villain in stories about (possible) harm or loss. 
Officeholders who confront a blame risk may promptly try to present themselves 
as the Heroes, or the Helpers of a Hero, or the Victims, or perhaps as the ones who 
play no part whatsoever in the story at hand, all the while carefully avoiding giving 
out any verbal or non-verbal cues that would suggest that they could fit in the role 




Officeholders may use certain non-verbal attributes and techniques (e.g., looking 
similar to the audience members, speaking with a similar voice, saluting the 
national flag) to try to evoke a sense of having a common ground with the 
particular audience at hand, of belonging to the same ingroup – and by inference, 
of not being a Villain. Presumably, blame sticks more easily to those actors who 
seem to belong to an outgroup, who seem to be ‘not o e of us’ and possess 
stereotypically negative attributes. Thus for their blame avoiding performance to 
be a success, the performers must first develop a good understanding of the values, 
preferences and expectations of their audience members. 
When acting as participants in performances, officeholders can assume different 
speaker roles. Goffman (1981) refers to such positioning behaviour as taking a 
‘footing’ and distinguishes between three speaker roles: a Principal, who is 
responsible for a particular message; an Author, who creates the content and form of a 
message; and an Animator, who actually produces an utterance. An officeholder may 
choose not to fulfil all the three roles simultaneously but rather assume a role that 
helps to minimise her blame risk. Strategic footing shifts could serve the purpose of 
limiting blameworthiness by manipulating the perceived agency (control and 
obligation) of the speaker. An officeholder may, for example, claim to act as merely a 
conveyor of bad news (“Don’t shoot the messenger!”), or, on another occasion, 
distance herself from what is being said by exploiting someone else (e.g., a fictional 
cartoon character, or a hired professional actor in a campaign video) as an animator of 
some controversial ideas. 
Strategic ways of representing and framing actors and actions form the bedrock of 
multimodal blame avoidance in government. However, w  need to look beyond these 
to understand how officeholders use non-verbal semiotic resources to defend their 
claim of innocence in potentially controversial situations, or justify their possibly 
harmful (in)actions. 
Ways of arguing 
When officeholders put forward self-defensive arguments, their argumentative moves 
can be intricately coordinated with other elements of their multimodal performances. 
The verbal and visual modes may interact to increase the force of a potential blame 




verbal resources can be employed to help advance a standpoint with respect to (a) the 
perceived negativity or otherwise of a particular outc me or behaviour, and (b) the 
perceived agency of someone or something in causing th s. Convincing an audience to 
withhold blame may thus involve what has been termed ‘visual argumentation’ 
(Groarke, 1996; Roque, 2012) or ‘multimodal argumentation’ (Kjeldsen, 2015; 
Tseronis, 2015). 
Officeholders may use certain multimodal cues as ‘proof’, that is, as means for 
defending the standpoint that they are blameless, and for casting doubt on their 
opponent’s standpoint. Notably, officeholders may also ttempt shifting blame to 
someone or something else. As suggested already in Chapter 4, this could involve 
using fallacious appeals to emotions of the audience, for instance, attacking the 
opponent’s character to discredit her (a gumentum ad hominem), concluding that a 
proposition is true because many people believe so (argumentum ad populum), 
appealing to audience’s feelings of compassion (argumentum ad misericordiam), and 
providing false analogies. All of these appeals can be triggered or reinforced by the 
use of images. For instance, argumentum ad hominem can be accomplished in a 
debate by presenting an embarrassing or denigrating photograph of an opponent, 
argumentum ad populum by showing an edited video footage of a vox-pop where 
‘people on the street’ express unanimous support to the proponent’s standpoint, 
argumentum ad misericordiam by asking the audience to look at (possibly shocking) 
imagery of suffering people, and false analogy by displaying pictures of seemingly 
similar people or events and expecting the audience to infer that these are identical in 
other aspects besides looks. Such ‘strategic manoeuvres’ in advancing one’s 
standpoint can be evaluated in terms of to what extent the participants observe the 
pragma-dialectical standards for reasonableness (van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; 
van Eemeren, 2010). 
In a similar vein, visual cues can be used for the purposes of legitimising, that is, 
providing explanations and justifications for certain institutional practices. 
Ways of legitimising 
Legitimising involves admitting full responsibility for a particular behaviour or 
outcome, but trying to present the situation in a more positive light. Analysis of 




illuminate some of the semiotic resources officeholders use to construct such 
justifications. 
Drawing on van Leeuwen (2007, p. 92; based on van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999), I 
suggest that responses to blaming – as well as pre-emptive communication of 
potentially unwelcome conduct – can contain one or several of the following types of 
multimodal legitimations: 
• authority legitimation: using multimodal references to status and role (e.g., 
uniforms, badges of office or honour), rules (e.g., traffic signs), custom (e.g., 
video footage of many people engaging in an activity that is claimed to 
conform with some tradition), or commendation (e.g., images of an expert or a 
role model acting in a certain way); 
• moral evaluation legitimation: using multimodal references to value systems 
(e.g., evoking a comparison between two evaluative images, one of a 
seemingly ‘good’ and the other of a seemingly ‘bad’ person or situation); 
• rationalisation legitimation: using multimodal references to the instrumental 
goals, uses and effects of institutionalised social action (e.g., an abstract 
explanatory scheme or flowchart showing how to reach a particular goal); 
• mythopoesis: using visual narratives, e.g., cartoons or videos that tell moral or 
cautionary tales in which legitimate actions are rewarded and non-legitimate 
actions are punished. 
To sum up, my point of departure in analysing anticipative blame avoidance 
behaviour as performance is this: I presume that in fro t of various (potentially critical) 
audiences, government officeholders choose to use certain expressive equipment, such 
as settings, appearances, manners, and configurations of verbal and non-verbal 
semiotic strategies, that serve an overall goal of mitigating the ever-looming blame 
risk. Therefore, when I observed a large professional training event for British 
government communicators during my fieldwork for this research project, I tried to 
spot defensive uses of such resources and strategies by the participants. 
As explained earlier, defensive elements of officeholders’ behaviour can only be 
understood within their particular historical, institutional, and situational context. 
Therefore, before engaging with my field data, I provide a brief historical account of 




7.2 Professional training and blame avoidance in government 
In bureaucratic organisations, managers regard training as a management tool, a form 
of organisational control. Professional training can be seen as a “disciplinary logic” 
that is used by employers to “profess ‘appropriate’ forms of conduct when employees’ 
behaviour cannot be regulated (at least so economically) through direct control” 
(Fournier, 1999, p. 290). Thus employers provide training because it allows them to 
guide the behaviour of employees indirectly and more efficiently. Training can help to 
streamline the work processes by establishing and cementing clear divisions of labour, 
and by instigating a sense of self-control of workers through their compliance with 
professional standards. Trainees, on the other hand, engage in the development of 
their ‘professional skills’ and ‘professional knowledge’ because they see this as 
leading towards a perceived higher social status: the s atus of a ‘professional’.  
Undergoing training allows the employees to justify their actions – including those 
that may attract blame – with an appeal to professional sm and expertise. It also 
allows them to claim “exclusive ownership of an area of expertise and knowledge, and 
the power to define the nature of problems in that area as well as the control of access 
to potential solutions” (Evetts, 2003, p. 407). Professional training plays a role in the 
formation of officeholders’ occupational habitus and the construction of their 
professional identities. Becoming a member of a unified professional group may 
increase the officeholders’ ability to withstand public criticism when things go wrong. 
As I already noted in the previous chapter, such defensive behaviour may be called 
‘herding’: “always doing things in groups in some way, so that no one individual or 
organisation can be singled out for blame as deviant, and potential blame takers can 
find strength in numbers” (Hood, 2011, p. 92). Professional training programmes of 
government officials could be interpreted as collectiv  backstage rehearsals of 
resisting and limiting possible public blame related o various problematic aspects of 
their work. 
The civil servant communicators employed by the UK government departments are 
subjected to professional training. Attending training is seen as a precondition for 
advancing to higher positions in the hierarchy (Cabinet Office, 2014). The idea that 
such an arrangement should be used is not new. In Britain, civil servants have 




extent and importance of formal training programmes ha  increased over the years 
(Lowe, 2011). Already in 1933, an influential public relations expert Sir Stephen 
Tallents asserted that within government, “publicity should be recognised as a 
professional job, demanding special training and special capacities” (Tallents, 1933, p. 
265). Bernard Ingham, who became the Chief Press Secretary of Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s office in 1979, introduced inter al quality standards and formal 
training for government publicity officials. Since the mid-2000s, in line with the 
overall drive for ‘professionalisation’ of the public relations practitioners in private 
corporations, the British government has adopted strategic ‘development frameworks’: 
official documents that determine the ‘core skills and knowledge requirements’ for 
government communicators (Gregory, 2006). 
A 2013 incarnation of the document, titled Government Communication Professional 
Competency Framework, was devised in the aftermath of the financial crisis that 
emerged in the UK in the late 2000s. The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition 
government that took office in 2010 announced spending cuts, including cuts to the 
communication budget. A senior government communication official explained to me 
that 
because we couldn’t justify the investment we were making in 
communications, we had to get rid of fifty percent of staff. And we had a 
marketing freeze. Freeze in spending. And then we also had a spending 
controls programme introduced. (G. C., personal communication, April 28, 
2015) 
The coalition regarded the development of competencs and skills of government 
communicators as a way to reduce overall communication costs of the government. 
Accordingly, the document stipulates that all communicators have to possess the skills 
and knowledge necessary to “ensure communication prducts are cost effective and 
delivered to a high quality, representing value for money” (Cabinet Office, 2013, p. 
15). However, specifically for press and media officers in government, defensive 
reputation management is also listed as one of the core competencies: They are 
expected to know how to “develop strategies to protect and improve corporate and 




Based on the competency framework, the Cabinet Office runs streams of professional 
training events. In June 2014, I was able to attend one of the largest of these events – 
the Public Sector Communications Academy – and carry out a  participant observation. 
7.3 Multimodal defensive performances at the Public Sector Communications 
Academy 
The training event that I observed took place in a large conference venue, Renold 
Building, at the University of Manchester on 12 June 2014. More than 250 
participants from various central and local governme t departments gathered for what 
was branded by the organisers as ‘the first ever joint public relations conference 
between local and central government’. The training event was organised by Cabinet 
Office-led Government Communications Service in cooperation with 
LGcommunications, an organisation that represents local council communicators.56 
As several consecutive British governments had been criticised for officeholders’ 
manipulative behaviour in relation to news media (‘spin doctoring’), overspending on 
communication activities, and using public resources and personnel for party political 
communication (see Section 6.1), I expected that the participants at the training event 
would talk about these topics in a particularly contr lled, defensive way, and perhaps 
try to distance themselves discursively from these blameworthy issues. I also 
presumed that as a part of their backstage training, officeholders might rehearse the 
application of some of the defensive semiotic equipment in preparation for the 
forthcoming frontstage performances. Therefore, during the observation, my 
perceptual lens was focused on spotting various instances of anticipative blame 
management, or in Goffman’s (1969) terms, idealising a d mystifying. 
First of all, already the title of the event, Public Sector Communications Academy, 
may be seen as serving the purpose of idealising. The use of the term ‘academy’ not 
                                               
56 I learned about the Academy by browsing the websit of the Government Communication Service 
and sent an email to the Cabinet Office to request access to this event. The request was approved by a 
senior staff member and I was able to take field notes throughout the day. Notably, at the beginning of 
the Academy, the organisers made it clear that all participants were allowed to make social media 
postings from the event, thereby blurring the boundary between backstage and frontstage. Moreover, 
some of the materials presented at the event were afterw rds made publicly available via the website of 





only implies prestige and exclusiveness – as if it was an internationally recognised 
higher education and research establishment – but also alludes to ‘academic freedom’ 
(i.e., self-determination of the teaching institution) and ‘scientific objectivity’ (i.e., 
acting without political agenda and seeking the ‘truth’). By calling their training event 
‘academy’, officeholders shielded their enterprise from the possible criticism by 
appealing to expertise, self-determination, and objectivity. 
The selected expressive equipment – setting, appearance, and manner – supported the 
formation of this impression. The event was held at the premises of a university, not a 
government agency. During the presentations, the participants were seated in a large 
lecture hall with a pitched floor, with their attenion focused on the presenter and the 
screen at the front of the hall. The presenters stood behind a lectern, with an exception 
of only two speakers (neither of whom represented th  government) who chose to 
move around in front of the audience during their talks. All the presenters used 
presentation slides, often content-heavy with lots of text and figures. And all the 
presenters were dressed formally. 
The main teaching method used throughout the day was a lecture, thus the 
opportunities for audience participation were limited. Despite the use of the title 
‘academy’, there were no full-time academic scholars among the presenters: talks 
were given by communication practitioners and analysts, mainly representing various 
government departments. The presentations were relatively short: Ten people 
presented between the beginning of the event at 9:30 a.m. and the lunch break at 12:30 
p.m., and another ten presentations were given between 1:15 and 5 p.m. 
The language used by the presenters deviated from what one might typically hear at 
academic lectures. Several presenters uttered evaluations and imperatives that may be 
seen as more characteristic to self-help literature for business managers or perhaps 
motivational rallying speeches given at political prty conventions. This included 
straightforward positive self-presentation of government communicators as a group, as 
well as the use of cryptic (and hence mystifying) managerial jargon. Here are some 






(1) We are doing well. 
 Be proud of your day job. 
Drive for excellence. 
Get better, better, and better.  
 Nobody is above tactics and below strategy. 
Drive better outcomes. 
Understand the power of your brands. 
These utterances may be interpreted as repetitive confirmations of one’s positive 
professional identity that indicate the speakers’ (and participants’) concern about the 
reputation of their profession, about the looming blame risk. The use of managerial 
jargon, such as ‘the power of brands’, suggests that the speakers conceptualise 
government communication as a commodity (see Section 2.3). Mystification and 
ingroup cohesion were also discursively realised by the use of profession-specific 
acronyms, such as EAST, OASIS, PROOF, and IC.57 
Swiftness was repeatedly emphasised as an important professional value for 
government communicators, in both the spoken word and the movement of the 
presenters. For example, consider this piece of advice given by one of the keynote 
presenters: 
(2) Evaluate fast and learn quickly. 
The most visually stunning (at least for me) performance of swiftness was given by 
Alex Aiken, Executive Director of Government Communications at Cabinet Office, 
who ran away up the stairs promptly after finishing his talk in front of the l cture hall. 
                                               
57 EAST is a behaviour change framework adopted by the UK Government Communication Service. Its 
underlying principle is that “if you want to encourage a behaviour, make it Easy, Attractive, Social and 
Timely (EAST)”. OASIS is a communications planning model adopted by the UK Government 
Communication Service. The acronym stands for Objectiv s, Audience/Insight, Strategy/Ideas, 
Implementation, and Scoring/Evaluation. PROOF is an acronym that stands for the Government 
Communication Service’s five guiding principles forevaluating their activities: evaluation should be 




To better illustrate the use of multimodal resources by officeholders to keep blame at 
bay, I present a more detailed analysis of a key episode from the training event: the 
first minutes of the opening speech by Alex Aiken. Regarded as the Head of 
Profession of government communicators in the UK, Aiken was formally the highest 
ranking individual present at the event. Being the person responsible for government 
communication strategy and managing the combined Prime Minister’s Office and 
Cabinet Office communications team, his keynote presentation was going to set the 
underlying tone of the rest of the day. Therefore I was surprised when he walked to 
the lectern and did not start talking to the audience. Instead, he turned his attention to 
the presentation computer and switched on a video that was projected on a large 
screen on the wall in front of the lecture hall. 
The video was an animated cartoon, about two minutes long, with upbeat guitar music 
playing in the background throughout. The cartoon featured an anonymous male voice 
speaking about the government communications plan while a hand of an artist, who 
remained invisible, outside of the frame, swiftly drew or placed related texts and 
images on to a whiteboard. This technique, called ‘whiteboard animation’ or 
‘animated doodling’, is often used in online video tutorials; it gives an impression of 
an artist recording herself in the process of her artwork. 
The showing of a whiteboard animation to lead in the event served several blame 
management functions: 
• Positive self-presentation of government communicators as a team was 
masked as an online tutorial. This masking relied on visual intertextuality, 
referring to hand-drawn video tutorial as a popular genre on social media. 
• Dynamic movement of images coupled with a cheerful m sical soundtrack had 
two effects. On the one hand, it created an elevated sense of audience 
engagement, thereby possibly lowering their capacity for critical reflection. On 
the other hand, the fluent succession of imagery evok d a sense of swiftness, 
an important element of the dramatic realisation of the work of government 
officials (Hansson, 2015b; Wodak, 2011). 
• Cartoons typically present fantasy worlds, thus making it easy to background 
or omit real-world problems. The use of simple drawings and concrete 




instance, there were no depictions of real or abstrct ministers, journalists, or 
members of the opposition. 
• Showing a video enabled the presenter to shift his footing. By ‘letting a video 
speak’ about the tasks and accomplishments of government communicators 
instead of him talking about these issues, Aiken was able to (a) give an 
impression of neutrality as the video seemingly presented the ‘facts’ about 
government communication, and (b) distance himself from the party political 
content of the government communications plan. In Goffman’s (1981) terms, 
the introduction of the government communications plan through the medium 
of a cartoon and an anonymous voice-over speaker effectively masked the 
Principal (it was not clear who was responsible for the message) as well as the 
Author (it was not evident who created the content and form of a message). 
Aiken seemed to assume a smaller degree of authorship and responsibility for 
the message compared to if he had ‘animated’ the sam  sentences in his speech. 
In what follows, I analyse the content of the cartoon in detail in terms of how 
multimodal resources are put into use to avoid blame. The full transcript of the 
cartoon – containing both the text read by the voice-over and the description of the 
moving images on screen – is provided in Appendix F.58 
(3) 1 Alongside legislation, regulation and taxation,  
2 communication is one of the four key levers of government. 
In (3), the anonymous speaker represents government communication metaphorically 
as a tool in the hands of government (‘lever of government’) and identifies it with 
other types of government action (‘legislation, regulation and taxation’). This has at 
least three implications in terms of blame management. First, perception of individual 
agency is reduced as people – government communicators – are depicted as 
‘instruments’ rather than moral actors who make their own choices. This view is 
emphasised in the cartoon by the use of an image of a stylised lever attached to the 
Houses of Parliament (see Figure 7.1). Second, the semantic field of ‘government 
communication’ is narrowed down to denote a regulatory tool so that possible 
alternative/critical understandings of the notion (e.g., government communication as  
                                               






Figure 7.1. “Communication is one of the four key levers of government” 
malicious propaganda/spin, or as a field of practice that has important implications for 
democratic deliberation; see Chapter 2) are backgrounded. Third, the use of a list is 
salient. Legislation, regulation and taxation are fields of activity over which state 
possesses a monopoly and which are backed up by coercive force. By linking the field 
of communication (where government does not have a monopoly and which does not 
directly rely on coercive force; see Yeung, 2006) with these activities, the speaker 
attributes government communication and government communicators with more 
power and prestige.  
The visual resources used in parallel with these utterances support these 
interpretations: The logo of the Government Communication Service is presented 
together with the list of tasks (‘Legislation’, ‘Regulation’, ‘Taxation’ 
‘Communication’) and the Houses of Parliament. This could be interpreted as 
mystifying because the Government Communication Servic  actually does not have 
the power to legislate, regulate, or collect taxes; the Service is not based in the Houses 
of Parliament, and the Service does not communicate on behalf of Parliament. 
Parliament’s role includes examining and challenging the work of the government – 
an opposite to the government communicators’ job of explaining and justifying the 
policies of the government. Therefore, by associating themselves visually with 
Parliament, government communicators seem to distance themselves from the 
government. 
(4) 3 And every day we help improve the lives of people in the UK and beyond, 




In (4), the anonymous voice uses the inclusive first-person plural personal pronoun 
‘we’, supposedly speaking on behalf of all the government communicators. He states 
as an unmitigated fact that government communicators ‘help improve the lives of 
people in the UK and beyond’ and that they do it ‘every day’. Notably, the sentence 
starts with a coordinating conjunction ‘and’ that links the ‘helping’ of people to the 
‘instruments’ of the government (legislation, regulation, taxation, communication) 
listed in previous sentence. What this seems to imply is that the use of these policy 
instruments by the British government is universally beneficial for people everywhere. 
The claim is accompanied by abstract depictions of the map of the UK and the globe, 
suggesting that British government communicators have a global impact. While the 
verbal claim is made about ‘the lives of people’, no humans are depicted in the video: 
the abstract maps are used as visual metonyms that tand for people. 
(5) 5 The 2014/15 Annual Plan  
6 sets out how the Government Communication Service  
7 will help deliver the coalition's policy priorities.  
In (5), a document – ‘2014/15 Annual Plan’ – is represented as an agent who ‘sets out’ 
what the government communication professionals are supposed to do: They are 
supposed to “help deliver the coalition’s policy priorities”. While in line 2 the word 
‘government’ seemingly refers to government in general, in this sentence a link is 
established with a concrete government: the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition 
government. The political parties involved are not amed: The term ‘coalition’ is used 
as a synecdoche (pars pro toto), perhaps to maintain the impression of party political 
neutrality. The imagery used in the video does not refer to the coalition (Figure 7.2).  
 




A set of small abstract images that look like application icons on a smartphone screen 
do not seem to convey any concrete meanings related to what is being said: These 
icons may simply serve the function of visual distrac ion or embellishment, or 
suggesting that government communicators are using smart technology.  
(6) 8 In particular, we will focus on three cross-government themes:  
9 economic confidence, fairness and aspiration, and Britain in the world.  
In (6), the inclusive ‘we’ is used again to speak on behalf of all the government 
communicators, asserting that their work will “focus on three cross-government 
themes”. What these ‘themes’ may mean remains a presu posed, tacit knowledge. 
Again, a list is used both in the spoken word as well as in the visual depiction (see 
Figure 7.3). ‘Economic confidence’ is visually illustrated as an abstract line graph 
with an upward moving arrow, suggesting that this ‘confidence’ is measurable and 
should take the form of certain statistical figures b ing on the increase. ‘Fairness and 
aspiration’ are represented as scales. Scales symbolise alancing (which may be seen 
as one possible aspect of ‘fairness’), but it is not evident how they may be linked to 
‘aspiration’. ‘Britain in the world’ is again accompanied by an image of the globe.  
 (7) 10 We’ll deliver these and around one hundred and forty other campaigns  
11 effectively and efficiently.  
In lines 10–11, the anonymous voice makes an unmitigated promise on behalf of all 
the government communicators to ‘deliver’ campaigns ‘effectively and efficiently’. 
The promise is linked to the previous sentence by an anaphoric reference to the three 
‘themes’ (“We’ll deliver these”), thereby making it clear that the three ‘themes’ 
 




should be also seen as ‘campaigns’ among many others (“and around one hundred and 
forty other campaigns”). The visual presentation of the words “140 campaigns” may 
be interpreted as a part of an argumentative move of positive self-presentation that 
relies on a particular implicit conclusion rule, topos of numbers, which can be 
explicated here as: ‘If we deliver a certain number of  campaigns, we are doing a good 
job’. Why carrying out this particular number of campaigns is necessary or what will 
these campaigns exactly involve is not explained: it seems to be presumed that the 
audience will be impressed by the given number.59 
(8) 12 We will use new digital channels  
13 and we’ll evaluate everything we do  
14 so that the contribution good communication makes to achieving 
              government objectives  
15 is absolutely clear.  
The sentence in (8) connects several propositions. First, there are two promises on 
behalf of government communicators: to use new digital channels, and to evaluate 
their own work. Second, there are two claims: the work of government communicators 
is good (“good communication”), and they help the government achieve its objectives. 
These elements are used as premises to build the following argument: If government 
communicators use digital channels and evaluate their own work, then the ‘goodness’ 
of their work will be taken for granted (“absolutely clear”). 
The visual elements that accompany this sentence on the screen serve two functions. 
First, the logos of the web services Twitter, YouTube, and Flickr symbolise direct 
online communication that is not mediated by journalists and for which the users do 
not have to pay. Thus these may be used to support the impression of the frugality of 
the government, as well as its openness to modern public spheres. Second, the 
presented diagrams are illegible and may seem complex (see Figure 7.4). This may 
evoke feelings of awe among the audiences and emphasises the expertise of 
government communicators – thereby presumably reducing the likelihood of criticism 
targeted at them. 
                                               
59 As noted in Chapter 5, the topos of numbers is an (often implicit) content-specific conclusion rule 
used in practical arguments as a seemingly commonsensical bridge between numerical/statistical data 
and a particular claim. The topos of numbers can be generally paraphrased as follows: ‘If sufficient 





Figure 7.4. “We’ll evaluate everything we do” 
(9) 16 We’ll also continue with our reform of the government communications 
              profession 
17 to ensure that we deliver an exceptional public service  
18 delivered by skilled and talented colleagues.  
In (9), the promise to “continue with our reform” presumes that the audience 
possesses previous knowledge of the ‘reform’ and shares the view that the reform is 
necessary. Notably, communication is here framed as a public service rather than a 
policy instrument (“exceptional public service”). Ingroup feelings are elicited and 
strengthened among government communicators by positive naming and attribution: 
They are referred to as “skilled and talented colleagues”. 
The accompanying visuals present information that is not clearly related to what is 
being said (Figure 7.5). The words ‘Core’, ‘Associate’ and ‘Affiliate’ that appear on 
the screen are not used by the speaker. (One needs to have read the recent Government 
Communication Service Handbook r the website of the Government Communication 
Service to recognise that these labels refer to the three ‘levels of membership’ in the 
Service). The text ‘#JoinUs’ also presumes specialist background knowledge: It is a 
social media hashtag (a metadata label most commonly associated with micro-
blogging platform Twitter) that the Government Communication Service uses to 







Figure 7.5. “Skilled and talented colleagues” 
(10) 19 Last year our strict financial controls saved the public purse  
20 more than thirty six million pounds.  
21 This year we aim to save at least forty million pounds,  
22 continue the shift away from advertising to low cost and no cost campaigns,  
23 and increase the amount of collaboration between government departments. 
In (10), another topos of numbers is used to suggest that government communicators 
deserve praise rather than blame: The presumed common understanding is that saving 
a certain amount of money (36 million pounds) is deirable, and saving even more is 
better still. Advertising is portrayed as something from which communicators should 
distance themselves because of its high cost. The topos of numbers is supported by 
visual representation: The numbers that the speaker mentions appear on the screen 
together with the word ‘SAVED’ (Figure 7.6).  
The verbal reference to ‘low cost and no cost campaigns’ is accompanied on screen by 
the logos of Twitter and YouTube and a ‘thumbs up’ sign (see Figure 7.7). These 
function as visual synecdoches for social networks – the type of online media that 
comes free of charge to most users.  
The increased collaboration between government departments is visually represented 
as eight signatures. This only seems to be meaningful to those viewers who have read 
a copy of the Government Communications Plan 2014/15 (HM Government, 2014), 
because that document contains a page with the signatures of the heads of 





Figure 7.6. “£36 million saved” 
 
Figure 7.7. “Collaboration between government departments”  
proof of the commitment of the departments, expressed by their top communication 
officials, to follow this plan. 
 (11) 24 We expect to spend around two hundred and eighty nine million pounds  
25 on planned communications. 
26 That's the equivalent of around four pounds fifty per person per year  
27 or about the price of a coffee and a sandwich. 
In (11), the topos of numbers as a warrant for positive self-presentation of government 
communicators is developed further. The promise to spend ‘around 289 million 
pounds on planned communications’ is not compared to the spending in previous 
years but apparently divided by the number of peopl living in the UK. The use of the 
‘per person per year’ comparison is ambiguous and persuasive in at least three ways. 
First, which ‘persons’ the speaker is referring to is left unexplained – the audience is 




UK. Second, this comparison implies that ‘planned communications’ (i.e., campaigns) 
by the government are beneficial for each and every p son in the country: as if the 
government was giving a sandwich and a cup of coffee to everyone. This may be seen 
as misleading. There is no guarantee that every person in Britain benefits from all of 
the campaigns carried out by the government; indeed, many people may completely 
reject the aims of some of these campaigns. And thir , by evoking a comparison 
between the government campaign spending and the price of ‘a coffee and a 
sandwich’, the authors of the video suggest that the otal cost of communication 
campaigns is negligible: The comparison invites the audience to develop a mental 
model according to which ‘government campaigns costas much as a coffee and a 
sandwich’. This impression is supported by the visual depiction of a coffee and a 
sandwich (see Figure 7.8). 
 (12) 28 This is a sensible investment  
29 because good government communication saves lives,  
30 supports business and industry, 
31 and helps people make choices about their careers and their welfare. 
In (12), government communication is represented in economic terms, as an 
investment, evoking the understanding of government communication as a commodity. 
It is attributed with a positive evaluation: ‘sensible investment’. The proposition that 
communication campaigns are a ‘sensible investment’ is supported by three assertions 
about ‘good government communication’. This way of arguing has several 
implications for blame management. 
 




First, this implies that government communication is ‘good’ – and therefore the 
government communicators who do their work should not be criticised. Second, 
‘saving lives’ is something that supposedly nobody could be blamed for. By 
suggesting that government communicators ‘save lives’, they are in effect depicted as 
heroes who deserve unequivocal praise. Importantly, this categorical claim 
backgrounds the idea that many government communicators may actually not be 
‘saving lives’ but are rather trying to influence pople’s attitudes towards the 
government – to persuade them that the incumbent government is doing a good job. 
The communication activities that ‘save lives’ are represented visually in the form of a 
campaign poster for a road safety campaign that says “Driver, look out for cyclists at 
junctions” (see Figure 7.9).60 
In a similar vein, while it is not clear what ‘supporting business and industry’ and 
‘helping people make choices’ may involve, the use of the verbs ‘support’ and ‘help’ 
indicates the supposedly good will of the communicators. The construction ‘helps 
people make choices’ could be classified as what Mulderrig (2011, p. 51) calls a 
‘managing action’: a representation that evokes “a reduced or ‘softened’ agency for 
the government and a corresponding increase in agency (a d autonomy) for others.” 
(13) 32 We are on a journey towards world class government communications  
33 and this annual plan sets out some of the steps we’ll take over the year 
              ahead. 
 
 
Figure 7.9. “Good government communication saves lives” 
                                               




In (13), the use of the JOURNEY/PATH metaphor ‘we are on a journey’ and ‘the steps 
we’ll take over the year ahead’ evoke the unity of g vernment communicators, 
implying that they will ‘stick together’ as a group, and that they have a common 
‘destination’. Such representation may function as a part of a defensive herding 
strategy (see Chapter 6). ‘World class government communication’ could be 
interpreted as hyperbole. ‘World class’ is a highly ambiguous positive attribution that 
cannot easily be supported by concrete comparative evidence as there are no 
universally accepted standards for such classifications. However, the abstract and 
contestable notion of ‘world class government communications’ is used to refer to the 
ultimate, taken-for-granted destination for all of the government communicators in the 
UK. 
As soon as the cartoon ended, Aiken addressed the audi nce in the lecture hall and 
said that all government communicators in the UK should see this clip. He thus 
endorsed the content of the cartoon, while not explicitly identifying himself as Author 
or Principal. This episode, in my view, serves as a u eful reminder that 
conductingobservations in organisational settings is necessary to make sense of the 
particular uses of text, talk, and images for the purpose of blame avoidance. If I had 
had access only to the content of the cartoon, I would have missed out on how the 
video was actually used during the training event to shift the presenter’s footing. 
7.4 Concluding remarks 
I have suggested in this chapter that to understand anticipative blame avoidance in 
government, analysts need to pay attention to the interplay of a variety of 
communicative resources and strategies used by officeholders. Officeholders may try 
to mystify aspects of social reality that could attrac  blame, and idealise themselves, 
by combining verbal, visual, and auditory cues, exploiting the properties of a 
particular physical setting, and calculated shifts in footing of the speaker. In other 
words: Anticipative blame-avoiding behaviour can be int rpreted as a sort of 
multimodal performance. 
This means that if we take note of officeholders’ text and talk only, we are likely to 
overlook certain defensive symbolic moves that they realise by other means. 




episodes of certain performances, such as meetings, pre entations, briefings, and 
staged photo and video opportunities. The data for such analysis may come from 
recordings and thorough transcriptions of not only verbal but also visual (and possibly 
other) communicative acts. Importantly, to interpret anticipative blame avoidance, one 
requires knowledge of wider context – past events ad circumstances, institutions, and 
blame risks – that goes beyond immediate textual and visual co-text and the 
observable setting of the interaction. It is therefo  essential to engage with several 
types of empirical data and theory (e.g., see Reisigl & Wodak, 2001, 2009; Wodak, 
2011). 
By combining theoretical insights from existing literature on verbal and multimodal 
strategies with empirical data gathered during my fieldwork, I have tried to 
operationalise officeholders’ anticipative blame avoidance for semiotic analysis in 
terms of particular multimodal ways of representing actors and actions, framing, 
arguing, and legitimising. I outline the defensive semiotic strategies, together with 
examples of their realisations taken from my analysis, in Table 7.1. 
According to my observation, the use of these strategies serves two defensive 
functions. First, certain strategic moves help to background the ideas about any 
possible harm or norm violations that government communicators may have been 
associated with in the eyes of critical audiences, such as lying, spin doctoring, and 
using tax money for propaganda campaigns that may not actually serve the interests of 
the public. This is achieved, for example, by emphasising the positivity of their work 
(‘good government communication saves lives’), and by using professional jargon, 
abstract visuals, and various numerical data to foreground the expertise and high 
social status of government communicators. Second, semiotic strategies are used to 
limit the perception of (individual) agency for behaviours and outcomes that could 
possibly attract blame. This involves, for example, representing government 
communication metaphorically as a tool in the hands of government (‘lever of 
government’), thereby backgrounding the idea that government communicators could 
be moral actors who make their own choices, and by framing communication 
professionals as a single collectivised actor (‘we’), thereby helping to diffuse potential 




Admittedly, my inventory of semiotic strategies of blame avoidance is not 
comprehensive. It is based on a small-scale qualitative research project as a first pilot 
study, and I am not making any claims of its generalisability. Also, my description of 
the wider context of the particular performance is necessarily limited. However, these 
limitations can be overcome in future critical research into multimodal aspects of 
blame avoidance in government. 
 
Table 7.1. Semiotic strategies of blame avoidance in government 





Deleting references to perpetrators, 
victims, losses, transgressions, and 
negative characteristics of perpetrators 
Not using depictions of real people 
Adding cues that emphasise the positive 
characteristics of a problematic event or 
actor 
Showing an image of the globe to 
imply that British government 
communicators help everyone on the 
planet 
 Adding cues that shift the audience’s 
attention away from a problematic event 
or actor 
Adding upbeat background music 
 Rearranging the sequence of represented 
events so that a negative outcome seems 
not to have followed from officeholders’ 
(in)action 
Presenting the savings figures before 
spending figures in the whiteboard 
animation 
 Rearranging the social relations between 
different actors (e.g., victims and 
perpetrators) 
Depicting government 
communicators as a lever attached to 
the Houses of Parliament 
 Substituting the actual elements of a 
blameworthy social practice with 
representations that background negative 
meanings 
Representing campaign activities as a 
numerical figure (a lump sum of 
money) with the word ‘SAVED’ 
stamped on it 
 Substituting the act of doing something 
problematic with an act of doing 
something good/heroic 
Associating government 
communication with the logos of 
popular social networks, and 
backgrounding possibly problematic 
government–press relations 
 Choosing modality markers so to make 
negative events seem ‘less real’ and the 
positive events ‘more real’ 
Showing an abstract whiteboard 
animation to present bullet points, 
numbers, graphs, and icons (thereby 









Evoking the ‘Rescue narrative’ and 
claiming the role of the Hero, Helper, or 
Victim 
Showing a road safety campaign 
poster that says “Driver, look out for 
cyclists at junctions” 
 Using symbolic cues and techniques that 
align the performer’s point of view with 
the audience and evoke a sense of 
involvement 
Using the unified logo of the UK 
government (simplified Royal Arms) 
on presentation slides 
 Using footing shifts to modify the 
perception of agency 
Using an animated cartoon where an 
anonymous voice presents a plan  
 Performing swiftness to present oneself 
as constantly busy and to avoid critical 
reflection 
Running away at the end of one’s 
presentation 
 Choosing blame-neutral or blame-
backgrounding physical settings for an 
encounter 
Holding a government training event 
on university premises 
 Using a spatial arrangement that does not 
facilitate dialogue 




Using multimodal cues as ‘proof’ of one’s 
blamelessness, for casting doubt on 
opponent’s standpoint, or shifting blame 
to someone or something else 
Using a picture of a cup of coffee and 
a sandwich as ‘proof’ that 
government campaigns cost very little 
Ways of 
legitimising 
Using multimodal references to status 
and role for authority legitimation  
Using the logo of the Government 
Communication Service together with 
a picture of the Houses of Parliament 
 Using multimodal references to value 
systems for moral evaluation legitimation 
Presenting monetary figures with the 
word ‘SAVED’ stamped on them in red 
letters (i.e., saving money is highly 
valued) 
 Using multimodal references to the 
instrumental goals, uses and effects of 
institutionalised social action for 
rationalisation legitimation 
Presenting complex diagrams to claim 
that scientific rationality underlies 
government’s activities 
 Using multimodal narratives for 
mythopoesis 
Showing an animated cartoon where 
government communicators who save 








Throughout this thesis I have referred to various heuristic ‘check lists’ devised by 
authors – from philosophers from the past, like Aristotle and Bentham, to 
contemporary linguists, such as van Leeuwen and Wodak – who have sought to 
inform and educate the public about the (mis)uses of language in public life. Those 
who construct such conceptual devices hope that citizens equipped with critical 
language awareness are better able to challenge and possibly change the socio-
political circumstances in which they find themselves. In this study, I have explicitly 
followed – and built upon – this long tradition of language-oriented criticism of 
political/administrative behaviour. I have placed the discursive negotiations of power 
relations via legitimising and delegitimising at the centre stage of my study, and 
focused on government communication as one of the factors in larger societal 
processes that either advance or limit public participation in political debates.  
By integrating knowledge and conceptual tools from several disciplines, and carrying 
out an exploratory qualitative study of the defensive discursive strategies used by 
government communicators in the UK in the aftermath of the financial crisis of the 
late 2000s, I have tried to unravel the complexities of defining and evaluating 
linguistic/symbolic forms of blame avoidance behaviour in government (RQ 1). I have 
proposed several frameworks for conceptualising and analysing the ways in which 
government communicators use language – either reactiv ly (RQ 2) or in anticipation 
of blame (RQ 3) – to hold on to power. I hope that my work helps people to grasp 
much better the plurality of perspectives one could take when talking or writing about 
blame/avoidance in government, and to consider more fully the effects of particular 
linguistic choices on our understanding of who does r does not deserve blame. 
Admittedly, the inventory of defensive discursive strategies that I have provided in 
this thesis is neither comprehensive nor universal, as it is based on analysing a sample 
of empirical data drawn from text and talk by government officeholders in one 
country in particular historical and institutional settings. Indeed, it seems impossible 
to compile a finite list of defensive linguistic resources. Blame avoidance behaviour is 
characterised by creativity – just like language usand other human intentional doings 
in general – and is hence subject to conceptual innovation. Changes in social activities 




Social scientists cannot easily formulate universal ‘laws of human behaviour’ on the 
basis of which to make empirically ascertainable predictions (Fay, 1996). That is why 
it is more feasible to come up with practical (even if not ‘optimal’ or ‘perfect’) 
heuristic devices that help us identify, describe, and relate certain elements of human 
behaviour that seem conventional in particular settings.  
None of the heuristics referred to or proposed in this study is intrinsically ‘true’ or 
‘false’. Their value only becomes evident when these are taken up by others – scholars, 
journalists, critical citizens – who recognise these a  adequate for identifying and 
understanding certain manifestations of linguistic behaviour. All of these devices can 
be exploited by researchers, practitioners, and lay people in different ways. For 
example, Aristotle’s threefold heuristic – ethos, pathos, and logos – is often presented 
to novice public speakers as a rule of thumb: To make one’s speech more persuasive 
one should combine appeals to character, emotion, and reason. Bentham’s outline of 
political fallacies has influenced the work of modern academics who develop 
normative argumentation theories (e.g., Grootendorst, 1997). And the discursive 
strategies of positive self- and negative other-presentation listed by Wodak have been 
taken up in a stream of interdisciplinary studies which seek to describe and explain 
various forms of social exclusion and populism. 
I hope that the insights from my thesis will be applied in two ways. First, as this is an 
exploratory study, the proposed frameworks may be adopted and adapted by 
researchers in linguistics and political science – including, of course, myself – who 
carry out future case studies of defensive government communication. For example, 
researchers can check whether the same or somewhat simil r discursive strategies are 
employed by officeholders in other settings. In this way, in the first instance, the 
frameworks could help to advance scholarly understanding of government blame 
games. Second, some insights about specific moves of di cursive blame/avoidance 
could be rephrased as simplified ‘rules of thumb’ for critical citizens who wish to cut 
through the defensive communicative practices of (misbehaving) officeholders. Below, 





8.1 Implications for linguists: Looking beyond linguistic features 
The main thrust of my argument in this thesis has been that discourse analysts should 
interpret certain linguistic features in officeholders’ text and talk as manifestations or 
indicators of blame avoidance behaviour. Below, I summarise some of the specifically 
linguistic features that, based on my study, seem to be characteristic of discursive 
blame avoidance in government: 
• In terms of social actor representation (van Leeuwen, 1996), blame may seem 
distributed and somewhat less targeted when blame tkers are assimilated and 
collectivised, for example when the proper name of an entity (‘British 
government’) or first person plural pronoun (‘we’) is used. Blame may seem 
diffused when placed on categorised collective actors (‘immigrants’), 
functionalised actors (‘government communicators’), or impersonal 
objectivated actors (‘a report said’). Blame takers may also be completely 
excluded from text (‘the mistakes were made’). In asimilar vein, people who 
could be perceived as victims may be excluded or backgrounded in linguistic 
representations of events. 
• In terms of social action representation (van Leeuwen, 2008), when loss-
imposing actions are portrayed statically as entities or qualities (e.g., ‘waste in 
Whitehall’) then this may have an effect of masking human agency and 
reducing the perception of blame. A similar effect may result from 
deagentialising a possibly harmful action, that is, representing it as if it came 
about without human involvement (e.g. ‘the problem occurred’). Moreover, 
problematic events may be represented in terms of reactions/mental processes 
(e.g., “I am very concerned about this”), thereby backgrounding the material 
causes of the event. 
• Certain metaphors may be used by (potential) blame takers to claim a oral 
high ground with respect to an outgroup, and to implicate a particular outgroup 
as a scapegoat. For example, the metaphor POLITICS IS WAR appears in the UK 
government communication guidelines as a linguistic device for setting elected 
politicians morally further apart from permanent government communicators, 
making it easier to shift (potential) blame away from the latter (‘if a speech by 




political battle’). Metaphoric expressions may also be used to frame (potential) 
blame takers as Heroes (rather than Villains), thereby trying to quench the 
blame making desire of various critics. For instance, when a minister states in 
a press release that the government “pledged to be ruthless in hunting down 
and eradicating waste in Whitehall” (see Chapter 4), he casts ‘waste’ as a 
Villain and the government as a Hero who ‘hunts it down’ and ‘eradicates’ it. 
• Overlexicalisation (or discourse repetition) may be used to intensify an 
impression that the causes of a blameworthy event ar  external, and hence the 
particular government/officeholder does not deserve blame (e.g., the repetitive 
use of words like ‘global’, ‘across the world’, ‘international’ when talking 
about a crisis). 
• Epistemic modality can be linguistically realised so that the occurrence of the 
blame event, or the suggestion that the event was cau ed by the blame taker 
seems less true. For example, when the UK Prime Minister writes of “the 
global financial turmoil that started in America” then the external cause of the 
turmoil is represented as an unmodalised certainty (and hence the standpoint 
that his government should be blamed for this seems l ss plausible). When the 
Opposition Leader, on the other hand, writes that “the current crisis may have 
had its trigger in the US”, then ‘may’ functions as a modal qualifier that casts 
doubt on the claim of external causes of the crisis (and hence the standpoint 
that the government deserves blame for the crisis seem  more plausible). 
Whether or not an officeholder’s speech act or exprssion is ‘defensive’ – that is, 
aimed at holding on to power – does not always becom  evident simply by looking at 
a particular textual sample. Discursive blame avoidance is a complex social 
phenomenon. Therefore, analysts need to make systematic attempts to combine close 
empirical analysis of concrete micro-level interactions between people with a 
thorough understanding of the situational and institutional settings as well as the 
broader historical and socio-political contexts of these interactions.  
Based on this exploratory study, a conceptual framework can be drawn up that could 
serve as a heuristic guide for future discourse-analytic l studies into blame avoidance 



















Figure 8.1. A conceptual framework for analysing blame avoidance in government 
communication 
4. Strategies of blame avoidance 
Ways of presenting, distributing agency, operating 
3. Discursive strategies of blame avoidance 
Total problem denial, excuses, justifications, problem 
denial + counter-attack, drawing a line, changing the 
subject, restricting information, ‘lying doggo’, 
working behind the scenes, protocolisation, 
herding, ... 
2. Discursive/semiotic strategies 
Ways of arguing, framing, denying, 
representing actors and actions, 
legitimising, manipulating, ... 
1. Linguistic/symbolic 
realisations 
Text, talk, images, ... 


















I briefly describe the main components of this framework in ascending order, from 
the micro-level upwards, to explain how these are related to each other and how an 
interpretation of a (possible) instance of blame avoidance might proceed. 
1. As an initial step, empirical analysis involves collecting and studying concrete 
evidence of possible discursive blame avoidance in the form of 
linguistic/symbolic realisations, such as instances of text, talk, images, and 
other symbolic acts by government communicators. These realisations can be 
categorised under particular genres, such as news releases, opinion pieces, 
social media postings, policy documents, televised speeches, broadcast 
interviews, and so forth. 
2. When text, talk, and images are used by officeholders in various more or less 
conventionalised goal-oriented ways, then these may be conceived of as 
discursive or semiotic strategies, such as strategies of arguing, framing, 
denying, and so forth. There are several ways in which discursive strategies 
might be used to affect the audience’s perception of harm and causal agency in 
relation to (potentially) blameworthy events. These include 
• argumentation: using argument schemes to support the standpoint that 
there is little or no reason to blame anyone because little or no harm 
has been done, or the standpoint that harm has been done either 
unintentionally, unknowingly, involuntarily, or by someone else; 
• framing: representing oneself metaphorically/narratively as a Hero, a 
Helper of a Hero, or a Victim, and/or representing someone else as a 
Villain, to escape being assigned the role of the Villain by a blame 
maker; 
• denying: rejecting agency (via act-denial, control-denial, intention-
denial) and loss (via mitigations, downtoning) in response to 
accusations; 
• social actor and action representation: exclusion, suppression, and 
backgrounding (e.g., by impersonalisation or nominalisation) of 





• legitimation: providing explanations and justifications of possibly 
blameworthy actions by using references to authority, moral evaluation, 
rationalisation, and mythopoesis; and 
• manipulation: attempts by (potential) blame takers to impair or bias the 
understanding of blame-related information, and to control the 
formation of mental models in a way which is not in he best interest of 
the recipients, usually involving extensive use of discursive group 
polarisation, violations of conversational maxims, and other discursive 
strategies focused on potential vulnerabilities of recipients (e.g., their 
strong emotions or traumas, their lack of relevant knowledge, their 
lower status). 
3. When certain (combinations of) discursive strategies are used defensively by 
(potential) blame takers in particular contexts that involve blame risk, then 
these may be interpreted as di cursive strategies of blame avoidance (or 
presentational strategies), such as total problem dnial, providing excuses and 
justifications, or combining problem denial with a counter-attack (see Table 
4.1).  
4. These strategies, in turn, are part of a broader set of strategies of blame 
avoidance which also include non-discursive behaviour, such as defensive 
ways of distributing agency (via institutional architecture) and defensive ways 
of choosing policies and operational routines (as el borated by Hood, 2011). 
5. The strategies of blame avoidance are used by government officeholders as 
defensive moves either in response to real blame attacks or in anticipation of 
potential blame attacks. Hence, the strategies of blame avoidance (including 
the discursive strategies and their linguistic realisations) should be interpreted 
as components of a particular blame game. T xt, talk, images, and 
performances can be understood as strategic moves serving a defensive 
function if one can identify (potential) blame makers and blame takers, events 
that have been (or are likely to be) presented as negative, norms that are 
claimed (or implied) to be violated, audiences who could be persuaded to take 
the side of the blame makers or blame takers, and the (possible) outcomes of 
the blame game for the blame taker. 
6. The overall meaning one attaches to a particular government blame game or a 




how one conceptualises government communication. If one takes the side of a 
government and conceptualises government communication s a policy 
instrument or a commodity, then blame avoidance seem  to be a practical set 
of measures that should be used to achieve policy objectives of the government, 
or to ‘manage’ blame as a business risk. If one conceptualises government 
communication as manipulation by the political elites or as an ambiguous 
factor in democratic politics, then blame avoidance on the side of the 
government seems either to serve the maintenance of unequal power relations 
between the government and the victims of its manipulation, or to be an 
essential part of the discursive negotiations of political power in society.  
To identify and interpret a (potential) instance of blame avoidance, analysts should 
move abductively between these analytical levels, trying to discover links between 
textual/symbolic data, contextual elements, and theory. While the analysis of the 
micro-level components 1 and 2 is primarily language-focused, the interpretation of 
components 3–6 essentially involves the study of the specific context of situation (e.g., 
formal and informal power relations between participants, institutional rules and 
traditions) as well as the broader socio-political and historical contexts which the 
defensive practices are embedded in. This can be achi ved by consulting related 
documents, carrying out fieldwork, and drawing upon literature from multiple 
disciplines to gain specialised knowledge of the government at hand, the mediation of 
blame, and the politics of blame avoidance. 
As a critical step, analysts should consider whether any of the identified defensive 
discursive strategies could be seen as manipulative. Admittedly, there are no universal, 
sure-fire procedures for identifying every instance when officeholders as blame takers 
use text and talk in a purely self-serving way, exploit the vulnerabilities of their 
audience, and hurt the interests of less advantaged groups in society. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, the (excessive) use of argumentative fallacies and group 
polarisation could be normatively seen as signs of discursive manipulation. For 
example, when a UK officeholder evokes an ‘Us vs Them’ opposition by juxtaposing 
the actions of the UK government with those of the other countries, and using 
negative other-presentation (“troubled Europe”) to imply that the UK is not financially 
‘troubled’, this kind of discursive triggering of group polarisation may be regarded as 




for possible financial misconduct or policy failure of the government. In such cases, 
analysts should draw public attention to the manipulative effects of the particular 
realisation of a discursive strategy. This might result in the intensified public 
condemnation of the officeholder’s behaviour, possibly forcing her to admit her 
misconduct/failure, and either to change her behaviour or resign from office. 
From a linguistic point of view, anticipative discursive blame avoidance seems to be 
more difficult to spot and interpret than reactive blame avoidance. Reactive blame 
avoidance often involves sequences of interactions that unfold in relatively bounded 
temporal and spatial limits (e.g., a press conference or a broadcast news interview), 
and hence both the accusatory utterance of the blame maker and the defensive reaction 
of the blame taker can be relatively easily observed, r corded, and analysed. In case of 
anticipative blame avoidance, the ‘defensiveness’ of officeholders’ behaviour only 
becomes apparent to the analyst when she becomes aware of the likelihood of various 
blame attacks in particular situations, and the looming outcomes of these attacks for 
the potential blame taker. Defensive language use can be related to concrete historical 
‘bad deeds’, or a general critical attitude towards a particular office, profession, or 
individual officeholder, which seems commonsensical to a particular moral 
community at a certain time. For a critical linguist, this poses the need to look far 
beyond the immediate context of the situation, and to acquire background knowledge 
of past events, and socio-political and institutional variables related to the blame risk, 
including the (possible) effects of the mediation of the blame game. The study of 
anticipative discursive blame avoidance is necessarily a study of histories and the 
competing discourses about relations of power, perceptions of risk, norms, and norm 
violations. 
To interpret the communicative aspects of blame/avoidance in government more 
thoroughly, one should ideally combine at least three kinds of specialist knowledge. 
By looking at the micro-political level of discursive/semiotic strategies, we can 
identify the ways in which symbolic resources like language, images, props, and so 
forth are used to construct certain impressions and persuade others to change their 
attitudes and behaviour in relation to a participant of a blame game. To understand the 
mediation of blame, we must study the ways in which people use various media to 
amplify, sustain, or cover up stories about blame issues, so that government-related 




environment, we can find out how the behaviour of the participants in the blame game 
is both facilitated and constrained by various institutional, historical, and political 
factors (e.g., the political triggers and outcomes of a blame game). 
8.2 Implications for political scientists: Dissecting the discursive micro-politics of 
blame/avoidance 
Hood (2011) writes that “much presentational activity for blame avoidance consists of 
getting the words precisely right in the same way that a poet agonises over every 
syllable and inflection” (p. 56). Hence, it seems reasonable for scholars of government 
blame games to borrow insights and analytic tools fr m linguistics and its sub-fields – 
pragmatics, stylistics, and discourse studies – that traditionally specialise in micro-
level interpretation of text, talk and images in use, and hypothesise on the possible 
effects these particular usages might have on particular audiences. Below, I 
summarise some of the ways in which political scientists could exploit the 
linguistically informed frameworks developed in this study. 
• Government blame game may be conceptualised as a particular language game 
which involves certain typical components, such as bl me makers, blame 
takers, events, norms, etc., which can all be cast in text, talk, and images in a 
variety of ways. The chosen textual or visual representation affects the way in 
which the situation is perceived, including the perception of who is to blame 
and for what. Hence researchers who read or write about a particular blame 
game should consider answering a number of guiding questions that might 
help to illuminate the linguistically constructed persuasive nature of the story. 
As elaborated in Chapter 3, such questions include the following: How are 
blame makers and blame takers named and referred to? What characteristics 
are attributed to them? How are the negative or positive aspects of the blame 
events intensified or mitigated? How are the audiences of blame games 
constructed and represented in text? Which contextual features are omitted, 
backgrounded, foregrounded, substituted, or added in stories about 
government-related blame? Do the speakers/writers id ntify themselves as 
participants or observers of a blame game? Not all of these components are 




may be omitted or merely implied in the story, thereby indicating the stance of 
the speaker/writer and affecting the way the hearer/reader perceives the 
situation.  
• Presentational strategies of blame avoidance, such as denying, justifying, and 
counter-attacking involve particular ways of arguing. These arguments, 
whether presented verbally or visually, can be sketched out based on 
Toulmin’s functional model. This helps to focus on (a) exactly what kind of 
evidence is used to support the claim of blamelessness and (b) what kind of 
norms – supposedly shared conclusion rules (topoi) – are appealed to. Doing 
so makes it easier to assess the validity of the def nsive arguments, and to 
compare these with the arguments presented by blame mak rs. The pragma-
dialectical rules for a reasonable discussion (listed in Appendix B) could 
provide a normative basis for evaluating arguments used in blame games. 
• Blame avoidance behaviour is often closely related to the discursive 
construction of social (e.g., professional, organistional, national) identities. 
Officeholders may use language to construct a positive (i.e., blameless, 
virtuous) professional identity for their ingroup (e.g., by emphasising their 
expertise and distancing themselves from ‘bad’ events a d actors), presumably 
thereby discouraging potential blame makers from expr ssing their criticism. 
The discursive construction of professional identity may also be seen as a 
preemptive process of building resistance to blame. By systematically 
appealing to professional authority and expertise, officeholders claim the right 
to ‘practice in peace’, and the right to establish their own criteria for assessing 
their own work, thereby making it easier to disregard (possible) negative 
evaluations expressed by external critics as well as disaffected political leaders. 
• Certain strategies of blame avoidance which have been categorised as 
operational (i.e., pertaining to the ways in which officeholders’ work is 
organised, see Hood, 2011), such as protocolisation nd herding, may also be 
realised by using language in particular ways (see Table 6.1). The discursive 
strategies used for that purpose may sometimes mislead the public. For 
example, discursive protocolisation could be seen as m nipulative if 
officeholders calculatedly overemphasise the extent to which their work is 




officeholders systematically omit or blur information about salient differences 
among the members of a professional ingroup and their actions.  
• Presentational blame avoidance may be described in t rms of the strategic uses 
of symbolic resources beyond verbal language, such as combinations of 
multimodal (e.g., visual and auditory) cues, physical setting, and calculated 
footing shifts of the speaker. Officeholders may exploit these resources to 
idealise certain (positive) aspects of their work, and mystify the audience by 
hiding certain negative aspects. Multimodal representations could be used to 
blur the boundaries between reality and fiction, as exemplified in Chapter 7 by 
the use of an animated cartoon in the training of government communicators.61 
Importantly, such blurring may sometimes amount to manipulation: For 
example, strategic deployment of fictional (multimodal) representations can 
create an elevated sense of audience engagement, and background or omit real-
world problems that could attract criticism. 
In this study, I have tried to draw attention to the plurality of ways government 
communication and its defensive aspects are talked and written about. This is 
important, because each distinctive way of representing blame/avoidance in language 
constructs a particular understanding of power relations in society. Depending on 
one’s viewpoint, dishing out blame to the government may be regarded either as 
deviant behaviour, a business risk, a necessary way of resisting the oppression by the 
ruling elites, or as an essential component of democratic political life. Accordingly, 
the interpretations of blame avoidance behaviour by government communicators can 
also differ considerably. If one conceptualises government communication primarily 
as a policy instrument, blame avoidance seems to bea set of measures that should be 
activated whenever receiving blame might hamper or block the government from 
achieving its policy objectives. If one conceptualises government communication as a 
commodity, blame avoidance appears to be a necessary craft of ‘managing’ blame as a 
business risk related to customer dissatisfaction. If government communication is 
taken to be essentially manipulative, blame avoidance on the side of the government 
seems to serve the maintenance of unequal power relations between the government 
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and the victims of its manipulation: Avoiding blame eans withstanding (and 
ignoring) the objections less powerful groups and individuals express against the 
oppression by the ruling elites. If one conceptualises government communication as 
an essential component of democratic political life that may have both positive and 
negative implications, then both blaming and blame avoidance have a potential to 
foster social learning as well as to increase democratic deficit. 
An important empirical insight from the analysis of my UK government 
communication data set is that the government communicators in the UK, under the 
rule of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition from 2010–2015, conceptualised 
their activity mainly as a policy instrument and a commodity. The discursive features 
of these conceptualisations, outlined in Table 2.1,prevailed in the government 
communication guidelines (Chapter 6), the performances at their training event 
(Chapter 7), and the responses of a senior government communication official to my 
interview questions (Appendix E). Based on this realisation, I would like to put 
forward four hypotheses which could be tested by carrying out comparative research 
in the future.  
1. It may be the case that government insiders tend to a opt, perhaps habitually, 
more functionalist approaches (as opposed to critical) to the work of 
government agencies and officeholders, because thinking and talking (too) 
critically about one’s work could induce anxiety among government 
employees and reduce their desired sense of certainty. From this perspective, 
their conceptual choice may be interpreted as an indicator of deliberate (and 
perhaps organisationally supported) lack of reflexivity (see Alvesson & Spicer, 
2012).  
2. It is possible that the preferred conceptualisations f government 
communication vary according to the political leanings of the government. For 
instance, it could be that when a government is run by a ‘rightist’ political 
leadership that fully subscribes to the doctrine know  as New Public 
Management (see Hood, 1991), its communication is more likely to be talked 
of as if it was a commodity, while a ‘leftist’ government might perhaps pay 
more attention to the deliberative potential of its public communication. 
3. It could be that a more instrumental approach to government communication is 




cuts to its budget, communication comes to be seen by government insiders as 
a relatively efficient instrument for achieving certain policy goals (compared 
to providing more financial incentives or increasing administrative capacity to 
enforce change).  
4. By systematically representing government communication as a policy 
instrument or a commodity, officeholders may try to background the idea that 
government communication can be manipulative and hamper democratic 
deliberation in society. Talking and writing about government communication 
only in instrumental and economic terms could perhaps be interpreted as an 
anticipative blame avoidance strategy, aimed at steering public attention away 
from potentially conflictual or scandalous moral aspects of the work of 
government communicators, and towards a limited range of presumably 
‘positive’ measurable/numerical aspects, such as concrete monetary savings 
related to communication campaigns. 
8.3 Implications for critical citizens: Cutting thr ough the defensive talk 
Finally, I try to rephrase some insights from my study as simplified ‘rules of thumb’ 
for citizens who wish to evaluate the defensive language use of public officeholders 
and hold them to account. When assessing officeholdrs’ claims of blamelessness in 
relation to a (potentially) harmful behaviour or outcome, it is advisable to think about 
the following: 
• Do they try to appeal to your emotions? For example, th y may try to please 
you (e.g., by implying that you are in some way ‘better than others’), scare you 
(e.g., by claiming that you are under a threat), make you feel sad (e.g., by 
referring to traumatic events), or choose an emotionally uplifting mode for 
their presentation (e.g., using cheerful background music). Such appeals 
should be treated with suspicion, and relevant evidence/reasons should be 
requested to identify the instances of (possible) harm or loss and their causes. 
• Do they try to appeal to their authority? They may use language and other 
symbolic means to indicate their high social status nd expertise in a variety of 
ways (e.g., making powerful directive statements, refer ing to many laws and 




heroes/saviours/helpers). Such appeals should be treated with suspicion, and 
relevant evidence/reasons should be requested to identify the instances of 
(possible) harm or loss and their causes. 
• Do they plead ignorance? They may try to reduce the perception of blame by 
arguing or implying that a threat was unforeseeable nd those who failed to 
foresee it and take precautions should not be held accountable for the resulting 
harm or loss. Such claims should not be taken at face v lue. Officeholders 
should be questioned to ascertain whether their reasons for having no 
knowledge of the possible harm are plausible or not. 
• Do they deny that any harm has been done, or claim that the event or outcome 
in question should be seen in a positive light? In such a case, several other 
sources of information about the (alleged) blame event should be consulted to 
find out if there is any hard evidence available that would confirm that harm or 
loss has indeed been caused, that concrete victims an be identified and the 
extent of their suffering demonstrated. If this kind of evidence is available, 
officeholders’ claims should be challenged. 
• Do they avoid mentioning/discussing issues related to a (possibly) harmful 
behaviour or outcome? By controlling the topic, they may try to prevent others 
from casting doubt on their standpoints or advancing standpoints that suggest 
that they deserve blame. Relevant evidence/reasons should be persistently 
requested to identify the causes of (possible) harm or loss.  
• Do they use formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly 
ambiguous? Restatement and clarity of expression shuld be demanded, 
because otherwise one cannot assess the validity of their arguments. 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
It would be a mistake to treat the mediated blame games surrounding government as 
‘mere verbal battles’, to condemn invariably all the blame makers for instigating a 
conflict cycle, or to regard every attempt at blame avoidance as a devious act of self-
serving manipulation. Blame phenomena are complex, can be understood in multiple 
ways, and may involve serious clashes of incompatible interests and perspectives. 





Dealing with blame is part and parcel of government communication in modern 
democracies. Government communication has a brighte and a darker side – it can 
either support or frustrate democratic deliberation in society. And so does the 
government blame game. 
On the brighter side, both blame making and responding to blame can be a part of the 
process of individual and social learning, and more broadly – of personal and social 
change. Public manifestations of discontent potentially serve as helpful signals of 
(potentially) harmful (past, present, and future) events and norm violations. When 
government officeholders pay careful attention to the citizens’ expressions of 
disapproval, respond directly and honestly to concrete instances of public criticism, 
engage in self-reflection and self-legitimation, and do this mainly via constructing 
sound arguments supported by relevant verifiable data, then this could improve public 
understanding of the inner workings of the governmet, the choices and trade-offs 
officeholders face in their work, and the underlying rationale of their decision making. 
A blame–response sequence can, in principle, turn ot to be a valuable lesson for both 
officeholders and government outsiders. The former can find out more about the 
interests and concerns of certain individuals and groups – and embed this knowledge 
into future policies to improve people’s lives. The latter can find out more about the 
intentions, obligations, and capabilities of indiviual officeholders and their 
institutions – and thereby become more knowledgeable citizens who are better 
equipped to hold the government to account. 
On the darker side, skilful application of certain blame avoidance strategies 
predominantly serves the officeholders’ goal of holding on to (personal) power and 
resisting (social) change. Officeholders may try to insulate themselves from critical 
audiences, avoid potentially conflictual encounters, build resilience in the face of 
public disapproval, and inoculate themselves against blame (e.g., by intimidating, 
beguiling, or bribing potential blame makers). They may behave in this way because 
they see public manifestations of discontent as nothi g but ‘ammunition’ for strategic 
character assassination and mediated scandals orchestrated by opposition politicians 
whose goal is to delegitimise and replace the incumbent. Strategic blame avoidance by 
powerful perpetrators can take the form of suppressing victims’ resistance. Defensive 
semiotic resources can become self-serving officeholders’ instruments of resisting 




hiding and mystifying knowledge about wrongdoings, and reducing responsiveness to 
the concerns of less powerful individuals and groups. For such officeholders, ‘learning’ 
in the context of blame games may rather narrowly mean ‘learning how to better avoid 
blame’ – how to become more blame-proof and how to quench criticism possibly even 
before it is expressed. 
In this thesis, I have proposed a systematic approach to identifying and interpreting 
defensive discursive strategies adopted by government communicators in the 
circumstances of blame risk, and discerning their darker forms from the brighter ones. 
However, my work is only a small step towards expanding the field of 
blame/avoidance research in terms of scope and scale, as well as interpretive and 
explanatory power. 
The scope of this study has been limited to the UK government and a specific period: 
the aftermath of the financial crisis which started in 2007/2008. Future works on 
discursive blame avoidance may take a comparative appro ch and examine practices 
adopted by other governments in other historical and political contexts. Researchers 
might choose to engage with a broader range of data in terms of media, and analyse, 
for instance, defensive communication practices on Facebook, Twitter, and other 
content sharing platforms which are increasingly used by governments around the 
world. It is possible that the ubiquitous social networking may have an overall effect 
of speeding up the blame game, and compelling officeholders to adopt new kinds of 
defensive practices. It would be also worthwhile to seek empirical evidence of 
whether similar blame avoidance strategies are usedin non-governmental 
organisational communication, that is, communication by political parties, legislatures, 
courts, and corporations. 
Future research could focus on understanding discursive blame avoidance behaviour 
in government with regard to specific policy areas, such as human rights, immigration, 
warfare, security, privacy, and international relations. It would also be important to 
analyse blame avoidance in greater detail in specific arenas of blaming (e.g., conflicts 
over concrete policy proposals or official appointments) and to distinguish more 
carefully between blame events with varying magnitude or seriousness of norm 
violation (e.g., officeholders may get away with small personal misconduct but also 




‘Zooming in’ to a single tightly defined event would make it feasible to extend the 
analysis temporally, that is, to describe in greater detail the related sequences of 
blame/avoidance interactions over several weeks, months, or even years. Analysts 
could take better account of the multiplicity of blame makers and describe the ways 
officeholders defend themselves against (potentially conflicting) blame attacks that 
come simultaneously from several directions. The characterisation of blame makers, 
blame takers, and audiences of the blame game in text and talk would merit more fine-
grained analysis.67 Yet another possibility to concentrate attention on a particular 
component of the blame game would be to study blame voidance with regard to 
specific audiences and complement the observations of defensive behaviour with 
reception studies (e.g., how are defensive moves perceiv d by certain addressees). 
Last but not least, studies of blame avoidance could also be complemented with more 
detailed work on political and discursive strategies of blame making. 
Our understandings of blame phenomena, government, and communication are not set 
in stone. New insights from philosophy, psychology, and sociology of blame should 
be incorporated into the discursive study of blame avoidance in government. Similarly, 
it is vital to stay in touch with the advances in academic research into public 
administration and policy making, media and scandal, and the pragmatics of political 
discourse. The more we learn about defensive behaviour in government, the more 
acutely aware we become of the subtleties of ‘politics as usual’. We become fairer and 
stricter in our appraisals of what executive officeholders say or do – and what they do 
not say or do. And we become better prepared, as critical c tizens, to engage in 
developing new, more inclusive ways of doing democracy.  
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A. The discourse-historical approach (adapted from Clarke, Kwon, & Wodak, 
2012) 
The conceptual scaffolding: Social phenomena are seen as manifested across four 
levels of empirical context, and constructed/influenc d by organisational actors 






The methodological stages: A social phenomenon is investigated through an abductive 
but systematic dialogue between data and theory 
 
 
The analysis results in a conceptual understanding of the specific discursive/linguistic 
means through which the phenomenon is constructed and its implications for 





B. The pragma-dialectical rules for a reasonable discussion (adapted from van 
Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, 1996, pp. 283-284) 
1. Freedom to argue. Parties must not prevent each other from advancing 
standpoints or casting doubt on standpoints. 
2. Obligation to give reasons. A party that advances a standpoint is obliged to 
defend it if asked by the other party asks her to do so. 
3. Correct reference to previous discourse by the antagonist. A party’s attack on 
a standpoint must relate to the standpoint that has indeed been advanced by the 
other party. 
4. Obligation of ‘matter-of-factness’. A party may defend her standpoint only by 
advancing argumentation relating to that standpoint. 
5. Correct reference to implicit premises. A party may not disown a premise that 
has been left implicit by that party or falsely present something as a premise 
that has been left unexpressed by the other party. 
6. Respect of shared starting points. A party may not falsely present a premise as 
an accepted starting point nor deny a premise repres nting an accepted starting 
point. 
7. Use of plausible arguments and schemes of argumentatio . A party may not 
regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the def nce does not take place 
by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly applied. 
8. Logical validity. In her argumentation, a party may only use arguments that are 
logically valid or capable of being validated by making explicit one or more 
unexpressed premises. 
9. Acceptance of the discussion’s results. A failed defence of a standpoint must 
result in the party that put forward the standpoint retracting it, and a conclusive 
defence of the standpoint must result in the other party retracting his doubt 
about the standpoint. 
10. Clarity of expression and correct interpretation. A party must not use 
formulations that are insufficiently clear or confusingly ambiguous, and must 
interpret the other party’s formulations as carefully and accurately as possible.
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C. A news release published by Cabinet Office on 11 January 2012 
Eradicating waste in Whitehall saves £3.75 billion 1 
Minister for the Cabinet Office Francis Maude’s response to the Times’ article 2 
‘Whitehall waste: the £31 billion cost of failure’. 3 
In an article entitled ‘Whitehall waste: the £31 billion cost of failure’ on 9 January, the 4 
Times asserted that ministers need to address wastein government processes to avoid 5 
billions more going down the drain. 6 
Minister for the Cabinet Office Francis Maude has today made a statement in response, 7 
pointing to government action designed to cut waste which has already saved £3.75 8 
billion. 9 
He said: 10 
“When we arrived in government we pledged to be ruthless in hunting down and 11 
eradicating waste in Whitehall and that is precisely what we have done. Just in the 12 
first ten months to last March we saved £3.75 billion - equivalent to twice the budget 13 
of the Foreign Office, or to funding 200,000 nurses. 14 
This has not been easy; spending hours renegotiating co tracts, tackling vested 15 
interests and large suppliers and cutting back on spe d on consultants and advertising 16 
does not make for glamorous or headline grabbing work. For the first time, we now 17 
take full advantage of the bulk-buying power governme t has; this means that in stark 18 
contrast to the bad old days where different parts of government bought separately and 19 
failed to get the best deal, we now buy together, reducing procurement spend by £1 20 
billion so far and the new collective service means savings are expected to reach more 21 
than £3 billion a year. 22 
This work is vital. But we have a huge amount stillto do. We are clamping down on 23 
the loss of revenue through fraud, error and debt; and this tough new approach also 24 
extends to big projects. Gone are the days when projects began with no agreed budget, 25 
no business case and an unrealistic delivery timetables. The introduction of our Major 26 
Projects Authority marks a sea-change in the oversight of government’s major 27 




And I am not alone in highlighting all the good work we have done so far; the Public 29 
Accounts Committee recently recognised and welcomed our transparent approach to 30 
savings. Meanwhile other countries, especially in troubled Europe, are now looking to 31 
us for how this is done. 32 
We’ve done a lot already, but I don’t plan to stop here. Our radical changes and the 33 
savings we have already made are just the beginning; we are now focused on making 34 
more sustainable savings, through cutting bureaucracy in the civil service and opening 35 
up public services.” 36 
